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The way collective bargaining is conducted globally changes over time. Internationally, 
collective bargaining is becoming more decentralised, with a decline in membership numbers 
and the ensuing power of the primary parties involved in the process. The question is whether 
these trends are also evident in South Africa or if a different picture of centralised collective 
bargaining emerges. The research focused on bargaining councils in five industries as 
statutory institutions for centralised collective bargaining. The purpose was to determine how 
bargaining councils adapted to the changing environment during the 15-year period from 1995 
to 2010, with a particular focus on representivity, the main agreement (wages and conditions of 
service), benefit funds, dispute resolution and other related developments.  
Subsequently, a literature review was undertaken, focusing on collective bargaining, and 
bargaining councils, pointing to unanswered questions and forming the basis for descriptive 
research. It built on a previous exploratory study, making comparative research possible. The 
research encompassed qualitative research methods which included conducting interviews 
and reviewing documents. The empirical research elaborated on how and why councils have 
changed in the ways they have (explanatory research). 
The research indicated that councils are hardy robust institutions capable of surviving 
fundamental legislative, economic and political changes, even though many challenges still 
remain. It points to two main strengths in the current council system. Firstly, it indicates a 
positive change in all five of the councils in the last 15 years, namely the fact that the 
relationships between the parties have matured substantially (even though the approach that 
was followed to reach this point differed). Secondly, the research findings also suggest the 
possibility that the relative strength and success of the council system is to be found in the 
limited legislative (but voluntarist) framework governing bargaining councils, because this 
allows councils to address their diverse needs as they see fit. In other words, the main strength 
of the system is probably the ability of different councils to adapt differently to different 
dynamics and pressures in different sectors. One may thus conclude that the improved 
relationship between parties has allowed councils to do different things to help them remain 











MME Holtzhausen Page v 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AMSA Apparel Manufacturing South Africa 
ANC African National Congress 
BCEA Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
BIBC (CGH) Building Industry Bargaining Council, Cape Good Hope 
BWU Builders’ Workers Union 
CCMA Council for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
CEPPWAWU Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood Allied Workers Union 
DOL Department Of Labour 
DRC Dispute Resolution Centre 
FRA Fuel Retailers Association 
GB Great Britain 
ICA Industrial Conciliation Act 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
LMC Labour Market Commission 
LRA Labour Relations Act 
MEIBC Metal and Engineering Industry Bargaining Council 
MIBCO Motor Industry Bargaining Council 
MLC Millennium Labour Council 
MOL Minister of Labour 
NALEDI National Labour and Economic Development Institute 
NBCCI National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry 
NBCCMI National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry 
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council 
NMC National Manpower Commission 
NUMSA National Union of Metalworkers South Africa 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme 
RMI Retail Motor Industry Organisation 
SACTWU South African Clothing and Textiles Workers Union 
SEIFSA Steel and Engineering Industry Federation of South Africa 
SMME Small and medium enterprises 
UK United Kingdom 















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figures Page 













MME Holtzhausen Page vii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Tables Page 
Table 2.1 Goals of research 6 
Table 2.2 The population 10 
Table 2.3 Characteristics of qualitative research 11 
Table 2.4 Qualitative research issues 12 
Table 3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of centralised bargaining 32 
Table 3.2 Extension mechanisms in some European countries 37 
Table 4.1 Bargaining council numbers 45 
Table 4.2 Estimated bargaining council coverage, 1995 and 2005 46 
Table 5.1 Registered parties’ strength (includes non-parties) 88 
Table 5.2 SACTWU membership numbers 89 
Table 5.3 SEIFSA membership numbers 90 
Table 5.4 NBCCI bargaining levels 93 
Table 5.5 Number of employers and employees party to and covered by the 
main agreement 
107 















TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
 
DESCRIPTION        PAGE 
 
Declaration           ii 
Acknowledgement          iii 
Abstract           iv 
List of Abbreviations         v 
List of Figures          vi 
List of Tables          vii 
Table of Contents          viii 
 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY      1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION        1 
1.1.1 Collective bargaining conceptualised        1  
1.1.2 Main research focus         3  
 
1.2  OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION            3 
 
1.3  THE RESEARCH         3 
1.3.1 Research questions, objectives and dimensions   3 
1.3.1.1 A comparative component      4 
 
1.3.2 The population        4 
1.3.3 Importance of the research      5 
1.3.4 Research methodology       5 
 
1.4 CONCLUSION         5 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY      6 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION         6 
 
2.2 RESEARCH GOALS        6 
2.2.1  General         6 
2.2.2 Research dimensions and question     7 
2.2.2.1 Exploratory research      7 










MME Holtzhausen Page ix 
 
2.2.2.3 Explanatory research      8 
2.2.2.4  A comparative component     8 
2.2.2.5  In summary       8 
 
2.2.3 Population sample  9 
2.2.4 Research techniques       10 
2.2.4.1 Quantitative versus qualitative data collection   10 
2.2.4.2 Qualitative research      11 
2.2.4.3 Research methods      12 
 
 2.2.5 Validity and reliability       13 
 
2.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH     14 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION         14 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING      16 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION         16 
 
3.2 THE PLURALIST APPROACH       19 
3.2.1 An overview         19 
3.2.2 A critical reflection on pluralism      23 
 
3.3  COLLECTIVE BARGAINING       25 
3.3.1  Underlying collective bargaining principles    25 
3.3.2  Collective bargaining levels      30 
3.3.3  The advantages and disadvantages of centralised  
 collective bargaining       32 
 
3.4 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES   33 
3.4.1  Global union-employer-state relations     34 
3.4.2  Global collective bargaining developments    35 
3.4.2.1 A decline in trade union membership and power   35 
3.4.2.2 Employers’ organisations facing similar challenges  
to trade unions, reducing the services associated  
with (centralised) collective bargaining    36 
3.4.2.3 A decline in collective bargaining as a mechanism to  
determine wages and conditions of service and an  
increase in the individual contract     36 
3.4.2.4 A decline in the coverage of collective agreements,  
including coverage through extensions    36 










MME Holtzhausen Page x 
 
occurs        38 
3.4.2.6 Declining levels of detail in agreements    38 
 
3.5  CONCLUSION         39 
 
CHAPTER 4: BARGAINING COUNCILS       40 
  
4.1 INTRODUCTION         40 
 
4.2 BARGAINING COUNCILS        40 
4.2.1 General         40 
4.2.2 Historical overview        41 
4.2.3 Bargaining councils’ numbers and coverage    44 
4.2.4 A legal perspective        46 
4.2.4.1 General        46 
4.2.4.2 Functions and powers of bargaining councils   48 
 
4.3 FOUR KEY AREAS         49 
4.3.1 Representivity        49 
4.3.1.1 Determination of representation     49 
4.3.1.2 Admission of parties to councils     49 
4.3.1.3  Small firm representation      50 
4.3.1.4 Changing work patterns      52 
 
4.3.2 The main agreement (wages and conditions of employment)  53 
4.3.2.1 Collective agreements      53 
4.3.2.2 Flexibility arrangements      54 
4.3.2.3 Two-tier bargaining       54 
4.3.2.4 Bargaining chambers      55 
4.3.2.5 Extension of agreements to non-parties    56 
4.3.2.6 Exemptions from agreements     58 
4.3.2.7 Non-compliance and enforcement of agreements   60 
4.3.2.8 Labour rights and the changing workforce    61 
 
4.3.3 Benefit funds        63 
4.3.3.1 General        63 
4.3.3.2 Legislative changes       64 
4.3.3.3 Bargaining councils with funds     64 
4.3.3.4 Different types of bargaining council funds    65 
 
4.3.4 Dispute resolution        67 
 











MME Holtzhausen Page xi 
 
 
CHAPTER 5:  AN ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS   73 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION         73 
 
5.2 COUNCILS RESEARCHED        74 
5.2.1 The MEIBC         74 
5.2.2 The NBCCI         74 
5.2.3 The NBCCMI         74 
5.2.4 MIBCO         74 
5.2.5 The BIBC (CGH)        75 
 
5.3 THE RESULTS         75 
5.3.1 Threats and opportunities and subsequent changes   75 
5.3.1.1  Economic influences      75 
5.3.1.2  The changing world of work     77 
5.3.1.3 Level of cooperation between the respective parties  78 
5.3.1.4   The need for councils      80 
 
5.3.2 Influencing factors        82 
5.3.2.1 Size of a council       82 
5.3.2.2 Structure of the industry      83 
5.3.2.3 Nature of the employment relationship in the industry  83 
5.3.2.4 Nature and size of council parties     84 
5.3.2.5 Age of the council      86 
5.3.2.6 Financial circumstances of councils    87 
 
5.3.3 Key area 1: representivity       87 
5.3.3.1 General        87 
5.3.3.2 Trade union membership      88 
5.3.3.3 Membership of employers’ organisations    90 
 
5.3.4 Key area 2: the main agreement (wages, conditions of service 
 and related factors)       90 
5.3.4.1 Centralised versus decentralised bargaining   91 
5.3.4.2 Flexibility arrangements      92 
5.3.4.3 Time period of agreement      96 
5.3.4.4 Level of detail contained in agreement    97 
5.3.4.5 Two-tier bargaining       98 
5.3.4.6 Minimum versus actual wages     98 
5.3.4.7 Small firm representation     99 
5.3.4.8 Extension of agreements to non-parties    100 
5.3.4.9 Exemptions        102 










MME Holtzhausen Page xii 
 
 
5.3.5 Key area 3: benefit funds       106 
5.3.5.1 Bargaining council funds      107 
 
5.3.6 Key area 4: dispute resolution      108 
5.3.7 General comments        109 
5.3.7.1 Factors contributing to the success of councils   109 
5.3.7.2 Comments on the legal framework governing councils  112 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION         112 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION       114 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION         114 
 
6.2  A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS     115 
6.2.1  A global comparison       115 
6.2.1.1  Trend 1: a decline in trade union membership and  
power        115 
6.2.1.2  Trend 2: employers’ organisations facing similar  
challenges to trade unions and thus reducing the  
services  associated with (centralised) collective  
bargaining        116 
6.2.1.3 Trend 3: a decline in collective bargaining as a  
mechanism to determine wages and conditions of  
service, with a steady move towards the individual  
contract        116 
6.2.1.4 Trend 4: a decline in the coverage of collective  
agreements through extensions     117 
6.2.1.5 Trend 5: where there is collective bargaining, the  
level at which it is conducted, is diminishing – 
 if at national level there is an apparent shift to  
industry level and then to plant level    117 
6.2.1.6 Trend 6: a decrease in the level of detail in collective 
 agreements – agreements at the highest level 
 increasingly reflecting minimum standards and policy  
frameworks or objectives, with more operational  
flexibility possible at implementation level    118 
 
6.2.2  Influencing factors        119 
6.2.2.1 A council’s size       119 
6.2.2.2 The industry’s structure      120 










MME Holtzhausen Page xiii 
 
6.2.2.4  Nature and size of council parties     121 
6.2.2.5 A council’s age       121 
6.2.2.6 Financial circumstances      122 
 
6.2.3  Four key factors        122 
6.2.3.1 Representivity       122 
6.2.3.2  The main agreement      123 
6.2.3.3 Benefit funds       123 
6.2.3.4 Dispute resolution       124 
 
6.2.4  Reasons for Council’s Adaptability    124 
 
6.3  IN CLOSING         124 
 
 




Appendix A:  SCHEDULE FOR TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS’ 
ORGANISATIONS      136 
Appendix B:   SCHEDULE FOR BARGAINING COUNCILS  142 
Appendix C: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE AND DESIGNATION OF  












MME Holtzhausen Page 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 





1.1.1 Collective bargaining conceptualised 
 
Collective bargaining in its narrowest sense is the process through which employers 
(represented by management) and employees (represented by trade unions) enter into 
negotiations about matters of mutual interest in the workplace. The aim of this process is to 
reach an agreement perceived as fair and equitable by all parties. Finnemore and Van 
Rensburg (2002:223-224) summarise this narrower approach to collective bargaining‘s main 
objectives as 
 providing institutionalised structures and processes to channel possible conflicts and 
resolve these in a controlled way – thereby reducing unnecessary disputes; 
 creating conformity and predictability through developing and committing to collective 
agreements which establish common substantive conditions and procedural rules; 
 promoting worker participation in managerial decision-making; and 
 enhancing democracy, labour peace and economic development.  
Steenkamp, Stelzner and Badenhorst (2004:943-945) describe the purpose of collective 
bargaining as a process whereby employers and employees negotiate in an effort to ―... give 
effect to ... legitimate expectations for ... a stable and adequate form of existence‖. 
 
However, Cordova (1985:307) provides a broader view of collective bargaining: 
… [it is] a process of interest accommodation which includes all sorts of bipartite or 
tripartite discussions relating to labour problems and directly or indirectly affecting a 
group of workers. The discussions may take place in different fora, with or without the 
presence of governments, and aim at ascertaining a view of the other party, obtaining a 
concession, or reaching a compromise. 
  
Bendix (Steenkamp et al 2004:945) also emphasises this broader approach: 
 ... the process of bargaining ... rests on the presuppositions that neither party is 
completely wrong, that concessions by either party do not necessarily signify weakness 
in that party, and that, while the individual goals of the parties may be important ... it 
should not occur at the cost of disrupting the organisation as a whole.1 
 
South Africa‘s Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1924 marked the reluctant recognition by both 
government and employers of the process of collective bargaining. The period following this Act 
and before the Wiehahn Commission‗s first report (1979), was dominated by centralised 
                                                 
1 However, these conceptualisations of collective bargaining do not address the power dimension (see chapter 3), 
namely that it is a process that enables workers as a collectivity to be more powerful than they are when acting 
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sectoral collective bargaining. Collective bargaining was more focused on the narrower 
approach, with the emphasis on the enforcement of agreements.  
 
The right to collective bargaining has been acknowledged internationally. Convention 98 (1949) 
of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) recognises this right, stating that methods would 
be undertaken to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for 
voluntary negotiation between employers/employers‘ organisations and trade unions, with a 
view to regulating terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements. 
South Africa, which is a member country of the ILO, gave effect to the convention by protecting 
this right in the South African Constitution (s 23[5]), and by providing extensively for collective 
bargaining through labour legislation.  
 
The provision of an enabling framework for the parties through which they can bargain 
collectively is an objective of the LRA (s 1[c][i]), whilst section1(d) provides for the promotion of 
orderly collective bargaining at sectoral level in centralised bargaining forums (ie bargaining 
councils). A bargaining council is defined as ―... a collective bargaining institution established in 
terms of the LRA, 1995, on a voluntary2 basis by one or more registered employers‘ 
organisations, on the one hand, and one or more registered trade unions, on the other hand, in 
a specific sector and area‖ (Barker & Holtzhausen 1996:13).  
 
Centralised collective bargaining and an approach based on formal, statutory and official 
approaches are evident in many South African industries. Bargaining councils are regarded as a 
viable option for structuring centralised collective bargaining in these industries, and have been 
in existence for 86 years - first as industrial councils until 1995, and thereafter as bargaining 
councils. According to the Department of Labour (DOL), the first council was established in June 
1927. Having survived changes in empowering legislation and fundamental social and political 
change, bargaining councils are likely to remain a feature of the South African labour relations 
landscape. A possible explanation for the perceived lack of enthusiasm towards the industrial 
councils of the past is aptly summarised by Benjamin (Rycroft 1990):  
One must not forget that, for the larger part of their existence, industrial [bargaining] 
councils were extraordinarily undemocratic, in that they allowed for the majority of 
employers, coupled with a minority and racially exclusive trade union grouping to set 
wages and working conditions for entire industries. 
 
Although the number of councils is on the decline3, a number of new councils were established, 
and according to news reports (Pela 2005), even more sectors of the economy are considering 
formalising and institutionalising their collective bargaining arrangements by establishing a 
                                                 
2 In practice, bargaining councils are often formed after long battles and huge hardships have been endured by the 
two primary parties, with the formation of the council the result of a lengthy struggle over a collective agreement 
(Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004). 
3 According to figures calculated by Du Toit et al (2003:40), between 1992 and 2002, the number of bargaining 
councils decreased from 87 to 69. Of these deregistrations, 18 were as a result of amalgamations. This figure has 
decreased even further to a mere 41 councils currently registered with the DOL (soon to be 40 councils, as another 
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bargaining council - the mining sector is a case in point. In both the private and public sectors, 
new councils registered with the DOL during the period under investigation (1995-2010)4.  
 
1.1.2 Main research focus 
 
The central aim of the study is to identify the trends in bargaining councils during the past 15 
years. It examines and contributes to the pool of knowledge that is available on the councils. 
The research looks at how bargaining councils have developed and structured themselves over 
the last 15 years by studying factors that have remained the same or have changed. Identifying 
these trends makes it possible to see how South Africa‘s collective bargaining trends compare 
with those in other countries in the world, where they are the same and where they differ, and 
why. The next section explains this in more detail. 
 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is divided into two broad sections: a literature study followed by the empirical 
research.  
 
The aim of the literature study is twofold. Firstly, chapter 3 focuses on the principle of 
centralised collective bargaining. It reviews the pluralist approach as being fundamental to this 
process, and as a framework that best provides for the necessary objectivity as it gives credit 
and legitimacy to all the roleplayers. It concludes with a brief comparison of international 
centralised collective bargaining trends. Secondly, in chapter 4, the major findings of the most 
influential research and writings on bargaining councils are presented, serving as the point of 
departure of the study.  
 
The second part of the dissertation comprises the empirical research. Chapter 2 discusses the 
chosen research methodology. Chapter 5 provides a detailed description and analysis of the 
findings on five bargaining councils over the 15-year period, whilst chapter 6 concludes the 
study. 
 
1.3 THE RESEARCH  
 
1.3.1 Research questions, objectives and dimensions 
 
The research is based on the premise that the purpose of the LRA is to strengthen collective 
bargaining and specifically to provide a reformed framework for bargaining councils in order to 
solve some of the problems experienced by the earlier industrial councils. However, research 
indicates that challenges still exist in the current system.  
 
With this in mind, the following research question was formulated for the study: How have 
bargaining councils adapted to the changing environment over the 15-year period from 1995 to 
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2010, with particular focus on four key factors, namely representivity, the main agreement, 
benefit funds, dispute resolution and other related developments? 
 
In order to answer this question and to gain a clearer picture of councils since the promulgation 
of the LRA, the research uses descriptive and explanatory research, and adds a comparative, 
component as discussed below.  A previous exploratory study (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) is 
used as the basis for researching the four identified key areas and for evaluation purposes 
between two time periods. 
 
1.3.1.1 A comparative component 
 
Lastly, the centralised collective bargaining trends found in the five South African bargaining 
councils will be compared with the following international centralised bargaining trends as 
discussed in chapter 3, section 3.3: 
 Trade union membership and power is declining. 
 Employers‘ organisations are reducing the services associated with (centralised) collective 
bargaining. 
 Collective bargaining as a mechanism to determine wages and conditions of service is 
declining, with a steady move towards individual contracts. 
 The coverage of collective agreements through extensions is diminishing. 
 Where collective bargaining does take place, the level at which it is conducted is 
diminishing – if at a national level, it seems to be shifting to an industry level, and again 
from industry level to plant level. 
 The level of detail contained in national and industry level agreements is decreasing. 
Agreements at the highest level are increasingly reflecting minimum standards and policy 
frameworks or objectives, with more operational flexibility possible at implementation level. 
 In most countries, collective bargaining is taking place at more than one level. 
 
1.3.2 The population 
 
The objective of this research was to choose some of the most significant bargaining councils 
and observe how they have adapted to and weathered the changes of the past 15 years in 
order to determine what assisted them and worked, and what did not. This was deemed to be 
more relevant than selecting a representative number of councils because of the importance of 
the councils chosen. Based on this and on the significance of previous research (Holtzhausen & 
Mischke 2004), five councils in the chemical, motor, clothing, building and metal and 
engineering industries were selected as the population of the study (see also chapter 2, sec 
2.2.3).  
 
The chosen sample differs with regard to the structure and nature of the industries in which the 
councils operate; all are significant councils found in some of South Africa‘s major industries; 
there is a mixture of old and new councils; and the councils are in diverse industries, each with 
its own unique strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, four of these councils (ie the metal and 
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sector in terms of coverage of employers and employees (Bhorat, Van der Westhuizen & Gogo 
2009:27). The research thus had an adequate cross-section of councils.  
 
1.3.3 Importance of the research 
 
The study enhances the knowledge and understanding of bargaining councils as centralised 
collective bargaining structures. It explains how councils have adapted to their changing 
environment over the past 15 years. It highlights challenges the councils face in the short and 
longer term. Moreover, it makes possible a comparison of South African versus global 
centralised collective bargaining trends.  
 
1.3.4 Research methodology 
 
The focus of the study is qualitative. In-depth semistructured interviews with open-ended 
questions provided most of the research data. The study was concluded against the framework 
of pluralism, and as such included all role-players the main employers‘ organisation and trade 
union involved with each of the councils and the council secretariat were interviewed. Interview 
schedules were based on the literature review and structured to address all the objectives of the 
study. Confidentiality was assured.  Relevant documents were reviewed. Applicable existing 
statistics substantiated data when relevant. Methods to ensure validity and reliability were 




Chapter 1 provided an overview of the study and briefly explained the research question, goals, 
method and population. Chapter 2 focuses on the research methodology applied in the study 
and as such expands on the above discussion, thereby clarifying the research focus, question 



















This chapter aims to give a broad overview of the research methodology selected to investigate 
the research question elucidated in chapter 1. The research methods employed to obtain the 
data in this study was chosen against the background of the pluralist theoretical framework, 
which was drawn on to evaluate and interpret the data (discussed in chapter 3). A broad outline 
of the research methodology follows. 
 




According to Neuman (2000:20), before a researcher can conduct a study, he or she should 
decide on a specific type of research, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of each 
type. One of the many decisions a researcher should consider is the dimension of the research 
he or she intends conducting. Neuman (2000) explains that the purposes of social research may 
be organised into three groups based on what the researcher wishes to accomplish: exploration 
(exploring a new topic), description (describing a social phenomenon) and explanation 
(explaining why something is happening). Neuman (2004) summarises the goals of these as 
follows (table 2.1): 
 
Table 2.1: Goals of research 
Exploratory De criptive Explanatory 
Become familiar with the 
basic facts, settings and 
concerns.   
Provide a detailed, highly 
accurate picture. 
Test a theory‘s predictions or 
principle. 
Create a general mental 
picture of conditions. 
Locate new data that 
contradicts past data*. 
Elaborate and enrich a 
theory‘s explanation. 
Formulate and focus 
questions for future research. 
Create a set of categories 
or classify types. 
Extend a theory to new issues 
or topics. 
Generate new ideas, 
conjectures or hypotheses. 
Clarify a sequence of steps 
or stages. 
Support or refute an 
explanation or prediction. 
Determine the feasibility of 
conducting research. 
Document a causal process 
of mechanism. 
Link issues or topics with a 
general principle. 
Develop techniques for 
measuring and locating future 
data. 
Report on the background 
or context of a situation. 
Determine which of several 
explanations is best. 
* It is the researcher’s opinion that past data may also be confirmed and/or modified, and not only 
contradicted. 
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As explained below, this study focuses on descriptive and explanatory research, and adds an 
international comparative component.   
 
2.2.2 Research dimensions and question 
 
As explained in chapter 1, the research question for the study is: How have bargaining councils 
adapted to the changing environment over the 15-year period from 1995 to 2010 with a 
particular focus on representivity, the main agreement (wages and working conditions), benefit 
funds, dispute resolution and other related developments?  
 
To answer the question, the study identified research goals and dimensions as discussed 
below. 
 
2.2.2.1 Exploratory research 
 
Neuman (2000:21) explains that exploratory research investigates a new topic or issue in order 
to learn about it. If other researchers have written little about it, the researcher starts at the 
beginning, thereby exploring a relatively new field of study. The researcher‘s goal is to formulate 
further precise questions that future research can answer. Exploratory research is often the first 
stage in a series of studies because it makes it possible to design and execute a more 
systematic and extensive follow-up study. The research is often unpublished, but is incorporated 
into more systematic research that can be published later. 
 
In this study, previous relevant research on councils (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) served as 
an exploratory study. This study helped identify key issues to research, and its findings were 
also used as a benchmark for comparison.  
 
2.2.2.2 Descriptive research 
 
The spectrum of descriptive studies includes a variety of types, but the common element of all 
of these is the researcher‘s goal, which is to describe that which exists as accurately as possible 
(Mouton & Marais 1988:43-44). Descriptive researchers use more data-gathering techniques 
such as surveys, field research and content analysis (Neuman 2000:21).  
 
The research focus, namely how bargaining councils have changed over the past 15 years and 
its subsidiary themes are all descriptive and can therefore be regarded as the descriptive part of 
the study. The starting point for the descriptive research is a literature review of available 
research on centralised collective bargaining and its underlying principles, and the bargaining 
council system. This is done in chapters 3 and 4. As in the exploratory study, the literature 
review contributed extensively to the research because it helped to provide a theoretical 
framework within which to conduct the research, as well as a detailed description of existing 
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2.2.2.3 Explanatory research 
  
In explanatory research, the aim is to find reasons and give a deeper meaning to what was 
found in previous studies (eg exploratory research) and what has been described as accurately 
as possible (descriptive research). As Leedy (1993:215) so aptly puts it: ―... the extraction of 
meaning from the accumulated data ... the interpretation of the data - is all important ...‖ 
 
Thus, in order to explain and add depth to the results of the exploratory and descriptive parts of 
the study, explanatory research is necessary. The dissertation does this by relating it to specific 
characteristics of councils5 - such as their size, the structure and nature of the industry in which 
they operate, the nature of the employment relationship; the nature and size of the parties to the 
councils; and a council‘s age and financial strength. It was argued that these characteristics 
may be some of the variables that influence the way councils have adapted to their changing 
environment, and questions were thus posed to determine the effect of this. However, other 
factors or forces may also explain some of the changes councils have experienced –hence the 
discussion of relevant additional reasons.  
 
2.2.2.4 A comparative component 
 
Lastly, the study aims to compare the trends found in the five South African bargaining councils 
with international centralised bargaining trends (discussed in chapter 3, sec 3.3). It is argued 
that this component adds further depth to the study by not only focusing on the bargaining 
council institution, but also giving a broader view of centralised collective bargaining in South 
Africa.  
 
Consequently, questions were asked to compare South African trends with international trends:  
 Are trade union membership and power declining? 
 Do the same challenges exist in employers‘ organisations?  
 Is collective bargaining as a mechanism for determining wages and conditions of service 
declining?  
 Is the coverage of collective agreements through extensions declining? 
 Where collective bargaining does take place, is the level at which it is conducted 
diminishing? 
 Is the level of detail contained in national and industry level agreements decreasing? 
 Is collective bargaining occurring at more than one level? 
 
2.2.2.5 In summary 
 
Hence for this study to be meaningful and to provide a detailed accurate picture, the research 
seeks to examine, describe and explain how bargaining councils in South Africa have changed 
over the past 15 years, specifically with regard to the four identified key areas. It does this by 
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incorporating an earlier study (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) (exploratory research); by 
conducting a detailed literature review of the principles of centralised collective bargaining, 
international collective bargaining trends and bargaining councils (descriptive research); and by 
examining a variety of variables that may influence councils and thus explain why councils have 
have changed in the way they have (explanatory research).  This combination results in 
insightful, valuable and quality research. 
  
2.2.3 Population sample 
 
According to Leedy (1993:198-206), ―the results of a survey are no more trustworthy than the 
quality of the population or the representativeness of the sample‖. Careful consideration of the 
total population is critical. However, Neuman (2003:196) states that qualitative researchers may 
concentrate less on a sample‘s representativeness, or on detailed techniques for drawing a 
probability sample, and focus instead on how specific events, cases and actions can clarify and 
deepen understanding. The relevance of the sample to the research topic is thus more 
important than the representativeness of the sample.  
 
Mainly two reasons determined the choice of councils to be researched. Firstly, councils were 
selected from a diverse range of bargaining councils where the differences between them were 
meaningful. As a result of this approach, councils specific to areas of interest, but with varying 
characteristics6, were selected. The characteristics included the following: 
 size (eg regional versus national councils) 
 the structure of the industry (eg serving overwhelmingly small versus large organisations) 
 the nature of the industry (eg manufacturing versus construction) 
 the nature of the employment relationship (eg fairly standardised contracts of employment 
versus labour brokering) 
 the nature and size of the parties to councils (eg small versus large powerful unions) 
 the age of the council 
 the financial strength of the council 
 
Secondly, if the same selection of councils had been researched again, as in a previous study 
(Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004), comparisons would have been possible, adding depth to the 
current research. Accordingly, five councils were chosen in the chemical, clothing, building, 
metal and engineering and motoring industries, as explained in table 2.2 below.  
  
                                                 
6 As explained above, these characteristics were also used as variables in determining why councils have changed 
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Table 2.2: The population 
Bargaining council Characteristics 
National Bargaining Council for 
the Chemical Industry (NBCCI) 
 A relatively new national council 
 Strong subsectoral orientation 
 Main agreement not yet extended 
 A relatively stable but extremely diverse industry 
National Bargaining Council for 
the Clothing Manufacturing 
Industry (NBCCMI) 
 Previously regional councils, now a newly amalgamated 
national council  
 Still a strong regional orientation 
 Non-compliance challenges 
 A council potentially in crisis  
 New dynamics on employers‘ side 
 A crisis industry 
Building Industry Bargaining 
Council (Cape of Good Hope) 
(BIBC CGH) 
 Regional council 
 Most other construction councils having collapsed 
 Cyclical industry 
Metal and Engineering 
National Bargaining Council 
(MEIBC) 
 Strong and stable national council 
 An older council 
 An industry under pressure 
Motor Industry Bargaining 
Council (MIBCO) 
 Large stable national council 
 Excellent dispute resolution system 
 Relatively stable industry 
 
The table above shows that the cho en sample differed with regard to the structure and nature 
of the industries they are in; all were significant councils; most were old, but one relatively new 
council was included; they were in diverse industries; and each had its own unique strengths 
and weaknesses. The population consequently covered a satisfactory cross-section of councils.  
 
Although it cannot be claimed that this selection of councils is representative of bargaining 
councils in South Africa, they constitute most of the major councils in the private sector and 
therefore provide an adequate reflection of bargaining council trends.  
 
2.2.4 Research techniques 
 
2.2.4.1 Quantitative versus qualitative data collection 
 
According to Leedy (1993:139), all research methodology rests upon the principle that the type 
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researcher as words or numbers7. Researchers collect data using one or more techniques that 
may be grouped into two categories, namely quantitative data collection (collecting data in the 
form of numbers) and qualitative data collection (collecting data in the form of words) (Neuman 
2000:33).  
 
According to Henning et al (2004:1-4), the purpose of the research influences the chosen 
method for the data collection and analysis. The distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
paradigms lies in the quest for understanding and for in-depth inquiry. In quantitative studies, 
the focus is more on the control8 of the actions and representations of the participants. 
However, in a qualitative study, the variables are not controlled because it is precisely this 
―freedom and natural development of action and representation‖ that the researcher wishes to 
capture. The goal of qualitative studies is to explore a topic in depth, instead of it lying in the 
―quantity of understanding‖. Based on this reasoning, qualitative research was chosen as the 
appropriate research method for the study.  
 
2.2.4.2 Qualitative research 
 
Qualitative data ―are a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes 
in identifiable local contexts‖ (Miles & Huberman 1994:1). Qualitative data enable one to see 
exactly what events led to what consequences and to derive fruitful explanations. Table 2.3 
illustrates the main characteristics of qualitative research. 
 
Table 2.3: Characteristics of qualitative research 
Qualitative research characteristics 
Capture and discover meaning once the researcher becomes immersed in the data 
Concepts are in the form of themes, motifs, generalisations and taxonomies 
Measures are created in an ad hoc manner and are often specific to the individual setting or 
researcher 
Data are in the form of words and images from documents, observations and transcripts 
Theory can be causal or non-causal9 and is often inductive 
Research procedures are particular, and replication is very rare 
Analysis proceeds by extracting themes or generalisations from evidence and organising data 
to present a coherent, consistent picture  
Source: Neuman (2000:123) 
 
Mariano (Leedy 1993:140) cautions that qualitative research is a creative, scientific process that 
requires a great deal of time and critical thinking, and emotional and intelligent energy - 
                                                 
7 In the researcher‘s opinion, this is too limited a viewpoint, because elements such as visual impressions and the 
impact of the people interviewed may also be vital. This does not, however, reach the interviewer in words or in 
numbers.  
8 In the researcher‘s opinion it is almost impossible to control variables, even when researchers endeavour to do so. 
9 This point may be disputed, as it may be argued that a methodological approach is imperative to draw on in order to 
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―creative scholarship at its best‖. As such, certain omnipresent issues should be kept in mind 
with qualitative research, as highlighted in table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4: Qualitative research issues 
Qualitative research issues 
Data collection is labour intensive 
Regular data overload 
The distinctive possibility of researcher prejudice 
Time demands of processing and coding data 
The sufficiency of sampling when only a few cases can be managed 
The generalisability of findings 
The reliability and quality of conclusions  
Their value in the world of policy and action 
Source: Miles & Huberman (1994:2) 
 
2.2.4.3 Research methods 
 
Marshall and Rossman (1995:78) state that qualitative researchers rely mainly on four methods 
to gather information, namely participation, direct observation, in-depth interviewing and 
document review.  
 
Both in-depth interviewing and reviewing relevant documents were used to gather data in this 
study.  
 
a In-depth interviewing 
According to Marshall et al (1995:81), interviews have particular strengths, namely collecting 
large amounts of data quickly, gathering a large variety of information across a large number of 
subjects and immediate follow-up and clarification. Leedy (1993:187-192) suggests the use of a 
questionnaire (interview schedule) for the survey. He states that in survey studies, observation 
in one way or another is absolutely essential. The questionnaire is an instrument for observing 
data beyond the observer‘s physical reach, and should be designed to fulfil a specific research 
objective. The questionnaire is closely allied to the structured interview, as the questions for the 
interview schedule should be as carefully planned and as accurately worded as the items in a 
questionnaire.  
 
The main data-generating technique in this research was semistructured interviews with open-
ended questions. Two interview schedules were designed (see annexures A & B) – one for the 
council secretariat and one for the employer and employee parties. The questions were chosen 
to address all the objectives of the study. This document was sent to interviewees prior to the 
interviews to ensure preparedness. The main employer and employee party were identified on 
the basis of the size of the organisation – for instance, if a council had more than one employer 
party, the largest one was included in the selection of interviewees. Council secretariat 
representatives were also interviewed. All interviewees were either heading the organisation, or 
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first made to ascertain the correct person for the interview and to strengthen a bond of 
commitment between that individual and the researcher. Confidentiality was assured.   
 
In total, 11 interviews (including one telephone interview) were conducted with 13 
representatives of both the main employer and employee parties of the selected councils, as 
well as with four councils‘ executive directors. In some instances, more than one person 
attended the interview, resulting in more respondents than interviews. These extra interviewees 
were nominated by the original group of interviewees because of the significant contribution 
they could make to the interview. NUMSA nominated one interviewee for both the motor and 
steel and engineering industries. In addition, two questionnaires (including the same questions 
as those in the interview schedule) were completed. A total of 15 respondents thus participated 
in the research (see annexure C for more detail on the respondents and interviews). Only one 
interview was thus not conducted, namely with the clothing sector council secretariat, because 
no appointment could be confirmed during the time frame of the research, even after various 
attempts by the researcher. In total, four telephone follow-up interviews were conducted, and 
various email enquiries made afterwards to ensure accurateness. 
 
Because of the sensitive nature of the information, no digital recordings could be made. Hand-
written records were kept during each interview. These records were included in a formal report 
written as soon as possible after each interview. The researcher attempted to capture as 
accurately as possible the essence of the contents of each interview. The entire body of data 
was perused more than once, breaking it down into smaller chunks. Each piece of data was 
classified into categories and recurring themes were identified, binding all the interviews 
together by summarising, grouping and structuring the data. Quotations that represented 
specific categories were identified and recorded. 
 
b Reviewing documents 
Researchers can supplement other methods of data gathering (eg interviews) by gathering and 
analysing documents. According to Marshall et al (1995:85), it is an unobtrusive method, rich in 
portraying the values and beliefs of participants in the setting. They suggest minutes of 
meetings, logs, announcements and formal policy statements as possible sources of data.  
 
Documents that were analysed included the constitutions and collective agreements of 
bargaining councils, newsletters, information documents and websites.  
 
2.2.5 Validity and reliability 
 
Validity generally refers to the extent to which a concept, conclusion or measurement is well 
founded and corresponds accurately and correctly to the real world. In other words, the validity 
of a measurement tool is considered to be the degree to which the tool measures what it claims 
to measure. Validity is often considered along with reliability, referring to the extent to which a 
measurement gives consistent results, that is, repeatedly measures what it measured the first 
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According to Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson  and Spiers (2002:9-10), to ensure both validity and 
reliability, the researcher needs to move back and forth between design and implementation to 
ensure comparisons between question formulation, literature, data collection strategies and 
analysis. Data are systematically and constantly monitored, focus is maintained and the fit of 
data and the conceptual work of analysis and interpretation are checked and confirmed. 
According to Kvale (Henning et al 2004:148-149), the researcher is therefore tasked with 
managing the process by filing ―evidence‖ in order to validate (ie check for bias, neglect, lack of 
precision; question all procedures and decisions critically; theorise throughout the process; and 
discuss and share research actions with reviewers for a critical review).  
 
Verification strategies that ensure both reliability and validity of data involve activities such as 
the following:  
 Firstly, methodological coherence involves ensuring congruence between the research 
question and the components of the method. The interdependence of qualitative research 
demands that the question matches the method, which in turn matches the data and the 
analytic processes.  
 Secondly, the sample must be appropriate, consisting of participants who best represent 
or have knowledge of the research topic, thereby ensuring optimal quality data.  
 Thirdly, collecting and analysing data concurrently forms ―a mutual interaction between 
what is known and what one needs to know‖.  
 The fourth aspect requires thinking theoretically. Ideas emerging from existing data are 
reconfirmed in new data; which may give rise to new ideas which, in turn, must be verified 
in data already collected (Morse et al 2002:11-13). 
 
Strategies to ensure validity and reliability were applied in the current research. Interviewees 
were probed to clear up vague responses or to elaborate on a statement. When respondents 
were not sure what was being asked, the researcher explained the question. Interviewees were 
contacted afterwards when necessary to ensure accurate analysis of the information collected 
during the interview. To eliminate bias (as suggested in Brynard & Hanekom 2008:44), leading 
questions were avoided, the sample of interviewees included all relevant parties to ensure a 
complete and accurate picture from all points of view and conflicting data were checked. 
 
2.3  LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Possible shortcomings in the research may lie in the realities of qualitative research. Probably 
the most prominent of this entails the relatively small sample of councils that could be included 
in the sample because of the time-consuming nature of interviews – a fact which limits the 
representativeness of the data when considering all bargaining councils in South Africa. Even 
so, the population sample (see section 2.2.3) ensured high relevance in answering the research 
question, mainly because it allowed comparisons with the results of the prior study (Holtzhausen 
& Mischke 2004); because the sample recognises the differences in characteristics of the 















This chapter indicated the research methodology that was applied in the study. It dealt with the 
qualitative research methods used in this study, which included interviews and the reviewing of 
documents. In addition, the chapter explained that the study was built on a previous exploratory 
study (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004), making comparative research possible. It indicated that a 
thorough literature review on collective bargaining (chapter 3) and bargaining councils (chapter 
4) formed the basis for the descriptive research. In addition, the chapter highlighted that the 
empirical research (chapter 5) contributed to explaining why councils have changed in the way 
they have (explanatory research). The chapter explains that the study concluded with a 
comparison between identified South African and international centralised bargaining trends in 
chapter 6.  
 
The next chapter focuses on centralised collective bargaining and also reviews pluralism as the 
primary philosophy of collective bargaining and as the selected viewpoint from which this 
research was done. It concludes with a comparative study of centralised collective bargaining in 



















The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it deals with pluralism as the underlying 
philosophy of collective bargaining and also as the chosen perspective from which this research 
was undertaken (see sec 3.2). It then discusses the theory of collective bargaining – a key 
aspect of the study of bargaining councils. It reflects on its core principles, the levels at which it 
is conducted and concludes by looking at the advantages and disadvantages of centralised 
bargaining, which is the level of collective bargaining on which the research focuses (sec 3.3). 
The chapter concludes with a brief overview of centralised collective bargaining in a number of 
other countries, thus allowing a comparison between identified South African and international 
centralised bargaining trends (see chapter 6).  
 
The introduction provides a theoretical and empirical foundation for this chapter. The issues it 
raises are then expanded on in the ensuing sections. 
 
Bendix (2004:233) comprehensively describes the collective bargaining process as one 
necessitated by a conflict of needs, interests, goals, values, perceptions and ideologies, but also 
resting on a commonality of interest, whereby employees and their representatives, and 
employers and their representatives, negotiate in order to achieve some balance between the 
fulfilment of their respective needs and objectives. From this definition the following is clear: 
 Representation is fundamental. 
 Commonality forms the basis. 
 Conflict is the reason. 
 Power is the regulator or driving force of collective bargaining. 
Collective bargaining is widely regarded as a labour right. The ILO Declaration on the 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998a) sees freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining as two of the main principles and rights 
of all parties. In South Africa, these rights are promoted, adhered to and regulated by the LRA. 
An important feature of the current statute is the promotion of orderly voluntary collective 
bargaining, particularly at sectoral level too – unlike the duty to bargain, which was created by 
the Industrial Court under the previous Act. It is often argued (eg see Du Toit et al 2003) that by 
not stating a general duty to bargain, but by creating mechanisms to encourage it, a classical 
pluralist approach becomes the ―vision embodied in the Act‖. Similarly, Bendix (2004:253) 
emphasises that collective bargaining, which is central to the conduct of the labour relationship, 
is an expression of pluralism. 
 
According to Bendix (2004:253), a pluralist approach ―rests on the presumption that with 
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that an equalisation of power10 will occur and that the free exercise of power by one group will 
be constrained by the countervailing power of the other‖. Through unions, employees thus equal 
the power of management.11 These parties will then engage in mutually beneficial collective 
bargaining (being dependant on each other), moderating their demands for the common good, 
thereby maintaining the conflict inherent in the relationship at manageable levels. Nel (2008:7) 
agrees, stating that the pluralist perspective typically concentrates on how to regulate and 
institutionalise conflict in order to contain and control its impact on the parties and their 
relationships.  
 
However, Hyman (1978:29) contends that pluralists advance far too easily from recognising that 
conflict is inherent in the relationship, to managing and institutionalising the conflict. In this 
regard Hyman elaborates on Fox‘s response to the Donovan Report: ―...its optimistic 
assessment of the prospects of an agreed ‗reform‘ of British industrial relations implies a 
somewhat narrow conception of the dynamics of industrial conflict‖. According to Fox, ―clearly 
the assumption was being made of a widespread basic consensus which needed only the ‗right‘ 
institutional form in which to emerge‖. It is furthermore often argued that pluralists may claim to 
recognise the different interests present in the workplace, but do not engage enough with the 
extent to which the conflict stems from the manner of production within which the employment 
relationship occurs. In this regard, Hyman (1978:31) aptly quotes Fox: ...‖Pluralists themselves 
accept as natural and inevitable that in collective bargaining trade unions should pursue 
restricted (and hence readily negotiable) objectives.‖ 
 
Many years ago, Fox (1966) asserted that the organisation has to be seen as a ―plural‖ society 
which has to be contained in some form of equilibrium. He argued that rival sources of 
leadership and attachment have to be accepted, especially by whoever is ruling the plural 
society in question. According to Finnemore and Van Rensburg (2002:7), liberal pluralism 
accepts that society has diverse competing interest groups, each with the right to free 
association and to further the interests of its constituents by any legitimate means. However, the 
pluralist approach is often criticised as being idealistic, arguing that unions are in a constant 
struggle to challenge employers‘ power. Theorists, such as Fox (1974), reflected on the ―myths 
of pluralism‖, and concluded that power is not really distributed equally and that long before 
employers reach the negotiation table, they are forced into accepting the main structure as 
shaped by management. 
 
Historically, pluralism evolved in the USA and the UK, with collective bargaining still remaining 
as a pillar of collective dispute resolution (Finnemore & Van Rensburg 2002:8). However, the 
traditional collective bargaining process has been influenced in these countries by the demise of 
large labour-intensive industries, privatisation, the changing nature of work and globalisation. In 
general, union membership has declined. According to Kassalow (Gladstone, Wheerler, Rojot, 
Eyraud & Ben-Israel 1992:152), long-established centralised structures of collective bargaining 
gave way in the 1980s in a number of USA companies and industries as management sought 
                                                 
10 This may be too simplistic and idealistic, and should refer instead to a greater equalisation of power that may occur 
between the parties. 
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greater flexibility. In the USA and UK (as in many other countries), pluralism is increasingly 
questioned, with collective bargaining perceived to be too disruptive and the accompanying 
industrial action too costly for any country having to compete in the global world. Hence many 
international companies shifted their production to the newly industrialised countries of South 
East Asia where trade unions were undeveloped and employers guaranteed, a ―docile but 
productive workforce‖ (Finnemore & Van Rensburg 2002:8-9). 
 
However, labour relations are changing in South East Asia. According to Bamber, Park, Lee, 
Ross and Broadbent (2000:5), a longstanding and contested debate argues that there is ―a 
global tendency for technological and market forces associated with industrialisation to push 
national employment relations systems towards uniformity and convergence‖. This may include 
the increasing autonomy of employment relations institutions, including unions, and also 
referring to, for instance, a move towards collective bargaining. Bamber et al (2000:18-19) 
explain that since the 1990s, countries such as Indonesia have asked for more democratic 
institutions. In South Korea, there is a strong rise of an independent union movement, while in 
Taiwan, labour regulations were expanded and reinforced. Taiwan has also witnessed a growth 
in union membership from 3,8% in 1955 to 22,9% in 1987 (Carrell & Heavrin 2004:456). 
However, unions are often regarded as politically and socially oriented. In Japan, enterprise 
unionism is seen as one of the pillars of the Japanese system of labour relations, with 
bargaining conducted primarily at local level, although general issues may be conducted at 
industry level (Carrell & Heavrin 2004:314).  
 
Europe has witnessed similar challenges to its employment relations. Lansbury (Brewster, 
Mayrhofer & Morley 2004:11) argues that even though all European countries experience 
increased demands to adapt their conventional industrial relations practices in response to 
global competition and changing technologies, most European countries are unsure about the 
exact nature of the industrial relations system they should be seeking to establish and which 
system would be appropriate in decades to come. 
 
In South Africa, the ICA (1924) was the first Act modelled on pluralist principles of promoting 
collective bargaining, but excluded Africans from the definition of an employee (also refer to the 
discussion on this in chapter 4). According to Finnemore and Van Rensburg (2002:9), the Act 
gave rise to an underdeveloped and discriminatory form of pluralism. Although most employees 
and their unions were given legal status within the formal framework of labour relations in 1979, 
African employees were still denied basic democratic rights, resulting in many African trade 
unions in the 1980s adopting a Marxist analysis of capitalism. Employers were increasingly 
seen as the ―capitalist class allies of the apartheid system‖. This resulted in a vision of 
socialism: ―While pluralism presupposed some semblance of balance of power between 
employers and unions, those promoting socialism found much to support their arguments that in 
fact there was a huge disparity in power between capital and labour‖ (Finnemore & Van 
Rensburg 2002:9). 
 
Still, many recognition and wage agreements were negotiated in the South African workplace in 
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levels proved to be a vent for political and social tensions (Finnemore & Van Rensburg 2002:9). 
In later years, it resulted in a unique form of collective agreement, namely the transformation 
agreement (Swanepoel 1999:115), in which employers manage competing forces, on the one 
hand, and bring about change in the social fabric of the society, on the other, ultimately 
achieving economic growth and upliftment. This kind of agreement, which is fairly unique to 
South Africa, underlines the encouraging spirit and management of challenges by the various 
parties in the bargaining field.  
 
Having briefly outlined the basis of this chapter, the issues are elaborated on below.  
 
3.2 THE PLURALIST APPROACH  
This section focuses on a broad theoretical overview of the pluralist perspective to labour 
relations and collective bargaining in particular. The justification for discussing only the pluralist 
approach is found in the goal of analysing collective bargaining from as objective a perspective 
as possible – a viewpoint that gives credit and legitimacy to both of the parties in the collective 
bargaining process – something not done from either a purely managerial or labour perspective. 
This does not imply that pluralism is, or should be, the only perspective to be considered in 
labour relations, or more specifically collective bargaining. Nor does the selection of the pluralist 
perspective negate the teachings of other philosophies. However, of the many philosophies, the 
pluralist approach allows best for objectivity because it acknowledges the specific interests of 
both labour and management; accepts that these two groups are different; and that it is 
legitimate for both sides to seek to further their respective interests. For the same reasons, the 
Marxist analysis, although a strong and comprehensive theory, has not been adopted because 
of its pro-labour and anti-managerial approach. The pluralist approach also allows for the radical 
approach, as this perspective merely points out that there is no equalisation of power – even 
after workers have come together in a strong trade union that negotiates on their behalf (Fox 
1977:136-151). 
 
3.2.1 An overview  
Salamon (1998:5-9) explains that pluralism emphasises the organisation as a blend of various 
homogeneous groups with divergent interest, over which the government tries to maintain some 
sort of equilibrium. Either cooperation or conflict between parties can be emphasised. It is 
argued that the pluralistic perspective forms the basis of collective bargaining, especially if one 
perceives the process as necessitated by a conflict of needs, interests and aspirations between 
the two primary parties, but also based on their mutual interest of organisational survival. 
Collective bargaining may then be the tool that addresses the differing needs and objectives of 
each party.  
 
The underlying principles of the organisation must also be understood in order to comprehend 
the place and functioning of collective bargaining in the organisation. Dahrendorf (1959:157) 
referred to two differing views on society, namely that social order results from a general 
agreement of values which outweighs all other possible or actual differences of opinion and 
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and on the domination of some and the subjection of others. He concluded that these views are 
not mutually exclusive. He distinguished between two theories in contemporary sociology, as 
does Fox (1971:57-60). The first of these is the integration theory which sees the social 
structure of an organisation in terms of a functionally integrated system held in equilibrium by 
certain patterned processes based on common norms and values; whereas the conflict theory 
views social structure as being held together by coercive power, but still producing within itself 
the forces which maintain it in an endless process of change. Both authors concluded that the 
structure and dynamics of an organisation (and society) are too complex and subtle to be 
accounted for by either of these theories. Enterprise norms are more likely to be supported by a 
mixture of power and authority, than by either on its own.  
 
Hence Fox (Clarke & Clements 1978:136) contends that the organisation has to be seen as a 
―plural‖ society which has to be contained in some form of equilibrium. He explains that there is 
a relatively extensive distribution of authority and power within such a society, a parting of 
ownership from management, a separation of political and industrial conflict and a recognition 
and institutionalisation of conflict in both spheres. This perspective is based on the assumption 
that the organisation consists of individuals who come together in various distinct sectional 
groups, each with its own interests, objectives and leadership. Employers and employees all 
have their own expectations that they bring with them to their work roles. Because of the 
multistructured and competitive nature of these groupings, tensions and competing claims have 
to be managed in the interest of maintaining a ―viable collaborative structure‖ (Fox 1971:193). 
Salamon (1992:34) explains that the underlying assumption of this perspective is that the 
organisation is in a permanent state of dynamic tensions as a result of the inherent conflict of 
interest between the various parties, and it therefore needs to be managed.  
 
Fox (1971:57-60) points to the possibility of seeing the organisation as a coalition of 
stakeholders, but says that conflicting interests or incompatibilities are always evident. Fox 
(1966:4) states that within the pluralistic perspective, ―the degree of common purpose which can 
exist in industry is only of a very limited nature‖. Employees and managers will both have their 
own aspirations, and much depends on the compatibility of these aspirations. Therefore, while 
workers bring a variety of their own needs and goals to the workplace, they also accept, to 
varying degrees, management‘s prerogative to organise work and direct the workforce. Thus, 
when management‘s actions are perceived as legitimate, the employment relationship will be 
characterised by a consensus model of organisations, similar to those proposed by the 
management‘s theorists.  
 
The pluralistic perspective further suggests that even though there are differences between the 
parties, they are not so fundamental that they cannot be bridged by compromise (Fox 1971:195-
199). However, a balance of power between them is necessary. Declaring to workers that ―we 
are all in this together‖ may well be true in the sense that all stakeholders may be dependent for 
what they want on the organisation‘s continued existence; however, their wants may not be 
easily acceptable. Fox (Clarke & Clements 1978:137) highlights the importance for the health 
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overly subjected to coercive dictation by the other in negotiating terms and conditions of 
employment. As Fox (1966:5) explains: 
The general picture of industrial relations that could be drawn from this pluralistic 
approach is one that, though hardly free of conflict, contains mechanisms enabling the 
contending parties, not too unevenly matched, to negotiate their mutual accommodations 
in a manner appropriate to a society which aspires to industrial and political democracy. 
 
The pluralistic view accepts the principle of freedom of association and thus the formation of 
trade unions (which Fox 1966:7 & 1971:107 defines as ―a concentration of power‖). He explains 
that an individual‘s membership to the collectivity may mould his/her attitudes and responses. 
The individual‘s behaviour within the organisation is now subject to an additional source of 
authority besides that of management. The whole objective of the collectivity is to put together a 
group that can mobilise power. Because of the enterprise being a coalition of interests, 
composed of different sectional groups, it provides a legitimate basis for union activity to first 
protect their economic interests, but also to defend them against the arbitrary exercise of 
managerial authority. The assumption that the welfare and conditions of employees can be 
improved through planned organised activity of employees and their representatives (ie trade 
unionism) was first proposed by the Webbs, who agreed on the need for strategies in order to 
improve poor working conditions and wages by increasing the bargaining power of individuals 
against their employers (Kochan 1980:7-9)12.  
 
The premise of excessive trade union power is also debated. Flanders (1975:245) explained 
that there is an ―inherent contradiction, a logical inconsistency‖ in this view. He quotes Ashley to 
substantiate his statement: 
The only practical alternative to strikes - peaceful collective bargaining - depends for its 
efficiency on the existence of strongly organised unions. But strongly organised unions, 
though they are indispensable instruments for enforcing treaties, are powerful weapons 
of attack … This puts the employer in an awkward moral situation: it is almost more than 
can be asked of average human nature to demand that he shall rejoice at the growing 
power of a union; and yet, unless it is strong, it cannot effectively maintain the peace. 
 
According to Flanders (1975:218-219), all forms of bargaining are ―pressure-group activities‖, 
with the resulting deals being, ―in reality, compromise settlements of power conflicts‖. Collective 
bargaining is therefore a power relationship between organisations, best described as a 
diplomatic use of power. Flanders (1975:237-238) explains that neither trade unions or 
employers‘ organisations, nor individual organisations have a monopoly of power on their own 
side. Instead, various groups in the organisations have different degrees of power, often 
resulting in fractional bargaining. Blyton and Turnbull (1994:178) contend that collective 
                                                 
12 This also points to one possible reason (based upon the principles of the pluralist perspective) for the support of 
centralised collective bargaining (the focus of this study) by trade unions. The strategy lies in strength in numbers 
obtained through bargaining at industry level. By enhancing the trade union‘s power, its chances of improving poor 
working conditions and wages are increased. Centralised collective bargaining is thus a means for employees to 
challenge some of the powers employers hold by acting collectively. As can be seen from section 3.3.3 below, 
centralised bargaining and the subsequent increase in the balance of power, also enhance stability and labour peace 
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bargaining represents a potential source of managerial control in the way in which it can 
institutionalise conflict by channelling the power of trade unions into a ―... mechanism which, 
while acknowledging that power, at the same time circumscribes it and gives it a greater 
predictability.‖ According to Dahrendorf (Blyton & Turnbull 1994:178), ―... the frozen fronts of 
industrial conflict are thawed‖. Collective bargaining thus tempers industrial conflict.  
 
However, the real concern is the dynamics of change in pluralistic structures in which social and 
industrial conflict is accepted as justifiable and not suppressed (Flanders 1975:248-252). The 
process of collective bargaining, as groups rally and exert power to change old norms and 
fashion new ones, has predominantly met the upsurge of manifest conflict in industrial relations. 
Fox (1971:146-147) argues that whether managers believe that the participation in collective 
decision-making can help them to maintain industrial peace or regulate markets, or whether 
they feel compelled to submit to it through the threat of sanctions, it still remains common in 
societies where there is no state intervention to rely on collective bargaining. Fox (1971:153) 
describes a pluralistic society with the least possible state intervention as follows:  
Through the mechanism of freedom of contract, freedom of association, an unrestricted 
traffic in ideas and ideologies, combined with a strong preference for voluntary action, 
there develops a wide variety of relatively autonomous but interacting norm-creating 
groups and agencies. The result is a multiplicity of separate normative systems, which 
appear to evolve in a more or less haphazard fashion. Though … they may lack 
integrating principles, some degree of constant disorder is bound to follow …  
Dubin (Flanders 1975:251) argues that in a democracy, the permanence of the society and its 
stability depend upon a universal set of criteria for determining when conflict becomes disorder 
– in industry, collective bargaining can be regarded as the social process that provides such a 
framework within which employers and employees‘ viewpoints of disputed matters that lead to 
industrial disorder can be considered, with the aim of eliminating the causes of the disorder. In 
this sense it can be regarded as the ―... great social invention that has institutionalised industrial 
conflict‖.  
 
The inherent conflict that exists can be about both procedural and substantive issues (Fox 
1971). Whenever there is a position of authority, the possibility of conflict of interests exists, as 
differences over the range and use of authority, power and control are bound to emerge. 
However, Kochan (1980:19) explains that conflict is limited, as employers and employees are 
interdependent for their survival and for achieving their goals, and moreover, employers and 
employees may also share common goals in some areas of mutual interest. Kochan (1980:19) 
concludes as follows:  
Thus, the conflict of interests, while being a permanent feature of industrial relations, is 
neither unlimited nor all encompassing. It exists for only a sub-set of issues that are of 
concern for both workers and employers and is limited by the need for both workers and 
employers to cooperate enough to assure the survival of the system. 
Kochan (1980) explains that these assumptions provide a useful starting point for 
conceptualising the nature of the relationship between an organised group of employees and 
their employer. These sociopsychological aspects of collective bargaining should not be ignored 
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parties (Flanders 1975:229-230). Although there may be inherent conflict in the employment 
relationship, it may not always be perceived to carry a wide enough range of issues to result in 
employees activating a rigorous response.  Fox (1971) also contends that not all workers 
perceive this conflict of interests to exist in their relationship with their employer, or if they 
perceive that it exists, they may not be motivated enough to do something about it. However, a 
variety of actions and strategies may be chosen as a display of the conflict in order to pursue 
workers‘ goals, for example, leaving the organisation or joining a trade union. However, as 
Kochan (1980:20) explains, because the conflict of interest is seen as an inherent part of the 
employment relationship, the manifestation of this conflict in, say, industrial action or bargaining 
impasses, is viewed as natural and legitimate products of the system.  
 
A number of other implicit assumptions on the nature of industrial society and employment 
relations emanated from this theory. Kochan (1980:7-9) clarifies that the emphasis placed on 
protective labour legislation (eg health and safety issues) and union organisation, implied an 
acceptance of the inherent conflict13 of interest existing between employers and employees. 
Perlman (Kochan 1980:8) argued that employees‘ attitude and behaviour are dominated by their 
need for job security. Barbash (Kochan 1980:8) expanded on these theories and stated that 
central to labour problems was the clash between the job security interest of workers and the 
needs of employers for effective and efficient organisations. These theorists argued for the 
acceptance and accommodation of differing interests. The authors explain that their philosophy 
represents a middle ground between the classical economists, on the one hand, and the 
Marxists and socialists, on the other. This laid the foundation for the field of industrial relations. 
It was also realised that there was a need for a more integrated approach to industrial relations 
that analyses various viewpoints of economists, psychologists and industrial sociologists on the 
subject.  Kochan (1980:13) explained it by saying that a need was perceived to end the split 
analysis of trade union and collective bargaining problems, on the one hand, and the problems 
of the management of modern organisations, on the other.  
 
A question that emerges is how collective bargaining deals with the pluralist approach of various 
needs and inherent conflict within the workplace. How can the range of worker‘s goals be 
recognised, whilst at the same time balancing these against the needs and constraints of the 
employer? These and other questions relating to collective bargaining are discussed below. 
 
3.2.2 A critical reflection on pluralism 
 
The pluralist approach is often criticised. Fox explains (1973:192) that in describing an ideology, 
there is always the difficulty of the existence of many individual variants. Some devotees accept, 
while others may reject, each given item of the syndrome. Only a generalised picture can 
therefore be offered. 
                                                 
13 Various views on the matter of ―inherent conflict‖ existed. Kochan (1980:7-8) pointed out that Commons‘ view 
differed from the beliefs of Webbs and Marx, who argued that the source of inherent conflict arose from the nature of 
capitalism. However, Commons and his followers advocated that the source of inherit conflict is not derived from the 
nature of capitalism and that the means for dealing with it through trade unions, and periodic conflict resolution, 
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According to Hyman and Brough (1975:163-166), the possibility that the structure of ownership 
and control within the capitalist industry may generate irreconcilable conflict between the 
interests of employees and employers is not dealt with. The use of the term ―pluralism‖‘ implies 
that in that society, relations are characterised by competition of different sectional groups of 
which none ―possesses a disproportionate concentration of power‖. Fox (1966:14) maintains 
that the presupposition of balance needs to be engineered by structural adaptations in work 
organisations, and that direct negotiations with workers are essential. Hyman and Fryer 
(1974:169) felt that although the pluralist framework recognises differences in interests and 
objectives, the legitimacy of interest groups and their objectives are often only selectively 
endorsed. So, for instance, union democracy (―the control of union policy and organisation from 
below by the rank and file‖) is rarely treated as a significant and serious issue. Furthermore, 
Hyman and Brough (1975:163-166) describe it as an act of faith that workers are willing to 
cooperate - for this to happen, management need to recognise the legitimate existence of a 
divergence of interest. The presupposition of being able to resolve conflicts of interest is 
plausible only if it is assumed that these conflicts are less fundamental than the underlying area 
of common aims and interests. In this later works, Fox (1973) agreed with this point, by stating 
that even though there is a difference in interests, values, norms, and so forth, the disagreement 
is not so great that it will destroy the system, but will rather submit to compromise and the 
groups find themselves able to share moral beliefs which lead to them observing agreements 
freely and honourably.  
 
These writings were followed by what Fox (Clarke & Clements 1978:141-145) termed a ―radical 
approach‖ to pluralism, in which he advances a critical reflection of the pluralist framework. 
According to this, trade unions focus on areas that revolve around issues such as wages, 
working conditions and the like – all of great significance to both the role players, but it still does 
not address the basic fundamentals of the system such as the hierarchical nature of the 
organisation, or the massive inequalities of financial rewards, status, control and autonomy in 
the workplace. The question the radical asks is why trade unions do not question and challenge 
management on all the issues that have a huge impact on their work experience, rewards and 
life destinies. According to Fox, the answer is twofold. Firstly, unions realise that while they have 
some economic power, and may even enjoy support from government, they still do not have 
enough power to challenge management about these significantly larger aspirations. Why do 
they not hold this power? The answer lies in the fact that trade union members, apart from 
realising what they can lose from a clash in trying to fulfil these aspirations, ―are still too much 
under the influence of social conditioning to venture a bid of these dimensions‖. To some extent 
they also accept the principles on which management operate their enterprise. Fox therefore 
concludes that when employees accept (as they almost always do) the basic structure, 
principles and conventions of the work organisation, they do not do so from free considered 
choice, but partly because they are aware of the superior power that supports the pattern of 
organisations, and furthermore because their social environment induces them to see it as 
―natural, realistic, and only to be expected‖. Union aspirations are therefore limited to influencing 
those managerial decisions that have immediate importance and are within reach through 
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How do the radicals thus see the process of collective bargaining? According to Fox (Clarke & 
Clements 1978:144-149), ―for them, collective bargaining is at worst a mere façade behind 
which the employer continues to dictate terms, at best a means by which organised employees 
can get marginally to grips with their masters on some issues although still leaving the latter with 
the real reserves of power‖. The radical agrees that appearances of the process may suggest 
the contrary, for example, in wage negotiations when it often seems as if the agreed-upon wage 
is closer to that demanded by the employees, than that initially offered by the employer. 
However, this is so because the aspirations of employees are shaped by their awareness of the 
employer‘s power and the need to be ―realistic‖. Appearances are therefore misleading, and 
even if employees are members of trade unions, they are still in a much weaker position than 
their employers. Agreements may therefore be seen as being imposed by a much stronger party 
on a much weaker one, which may well result in employees not perceiving a moral obligation to 
abide by such agreements. Fox (Clarke & Clements 1978:149-150) concludes that he believes 
more in this radical view, or some version of it, than pure pluralism. However, what is much 
more important is for managers to determine the views held by their labour force. It is only when 
we realise that our attitudes and behaviour are based on assumptions about our society and 
organisations, that we can scrutinise them and decide whether we find them convincing. 
 
3.3 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
3.3.1 Underlying collective bargaining principles 
 
Kahn-Freud (Godfrey et al 2010:4) argued that the starting point of collective bargaining is the 
inequality between the employer (the bearer of power) and the employee (the one without 
power). In an attempt to equalise this power imbalance, employees negotiate collectively 
through representatives, rather than individually and on their own behalf. The process results in 
collective agreements regulating the employment relationship in a group context (Hollinshead et 
al 2003:344). Collective bargaining is thus founded on the theories that employees can only 
challenge the power of employers through collective bargaining (Kahn-Freud, in Godfrey et al 
2010:4), and of joint regulation as the essential character of collective bargaining (Flanders 
1975:222) allowing employees – through their representatives – to open up discussions of 
issues of concern to them, and to respond to issues raised by management.  
 
According to Hollinshead et al (2003:343-344), there are two fundamental requirements for 
collective bargaining to take place: 
(1) Employees have to see themselves as part of a group with similar objectives and 
interest in the employment relationship.  
(2) Management must be prepared to accept and acknowledge the existence of trade 
unions and their right to represent the interests of its members.  
The requirement of employees (and employers) to act as a group seeking the same objectives 
has its own challenges. Dunlop (1967:173) points to another characteristic of collective 
bargaining - it involves the determination of priorities within each party of the bargaining 
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or association is erroneous and mischievous‖. Instead, collective bargaining is about 
compromise and the assessment of priorities in each side. As Venter, Levy, Conradie and 
Holtzhausen (2009:369) point out: ―… it [collective bargaining] is premised on the joint 
regulation of the employment relationship through co-operation, commonality, trust and 
compromise‖. However, Hyman (1978:25), in his discussion of seminal works of Flanders, 
points out the very important insight that it cannot be assumed that the objectives of one party to 
a relationship will necessarily coincide with those of the others, nor that what is rational and 
efficient for one party, will be so for the other party who may have different aims and interests. It 
can therefore be argued that the challenge does not only lie with finding a balance between 
opposing parties, but that a redress of major socio-economic inequalities is imperative. 
 
Still, arguments for collective bargaining are often based on two beliefs: on the one hand, a 
belief in the injustice of unconstrained, unilateral management discretion which may result in 
employee exploitation, and on the other, a preference for voluntary arrangements determined by 
the parties themselves (Salamon in Hollinshead et al 2003:347). In fact, the process of 
collective bargaining assumes that there is an ongoing interdependent relationship between the 
parties and that both parties would prefer to solve differences on a mutually acceptable basis, 
instead of terminating the relationship. Gompers (Carrell & Heavrin 2004:106) also emphasises 
the characteristic of a continuous relationship between the two main parties in collective 
bargaining, starting with the negotiation of a contract to an almost daily interpretation and 
administration of its provisions. However, in Hyman‘s critique of pluralism (1978:26) it is argued 
that Flanders and Fox saw pluralism not as a ―theory of sovereignty, but of social 
differentiation‖, and that the most important issue is the ―maintenance of social integration 
despite group autonomy and government non-intervention.‖ This argument indicates a tension 
between pluralists‘ support of voluntarism and the reality of government intervention in labour 
relations.  
 
Many argue that the main aim of collective bargaining is to reach mutually acceptable 
agreements through negotiations on matters of joint interest. According to Flanders (1975:221, 
252), because agreements are jointly determined by representatives of both parties, they 
consequently share responsibility for its content and observance. Fox (Clarke & Clements 
1978:138) reiterates the continuous character of collective bargaining, which enables the parties 
to constantly adapt agreements to changing needs and circumstances, thus enhancing the 
acceptability of collective agreements.  
 
Historically, collective bargaining was the method whereby manifest conflict in industry was kept 
within ―socially tolerable bounds‖ (Flanders 1975:252). If collective bargaining is thus viewed as 
a social process, the input should be seen as conflict and disarray, and the output as rules, 
including their application and modification. He concludes that collective bargaining can be 
regarded as both a rule-making or conflict-resolving process of bilateral character through which 
the terms on which individuals are employed, are determined and regulated. Furthermore, the 
rights of and relationships between individuals, employees, union officials and employers were 
defined (see seminal works such as Flanders 1975:216 & 248; Kochan 1980:27-28; Fox 
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agreements and in unwritten understandings), are supported by an adequately high degree of 
agreement between the role players. This is no easy task. According to Derber (Flanders 
1975:229), the parties to collective bargaining may differ in their 
 long-term goals and motives; 
 immediate standards; 
 perception of the factual situation; 
 expectations of their future; 
 sympathy for and understanding of the other party; 
 judgement of relative power and of the feasibility of gaining their objectives; and 
 skills in bargaining and persuasion. 
 
The term ―collective bargaining‖ was first described in the works of Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
(Kochan 1980:27) as fundamentally an economic transaction that employees turned to in order 
to enhance their bargaining power against that of the employer. The basic purpose of this 
process was therefore to maintain or improve conditions of employees‘ working lives (Flanders 
1975:214). Flanders (1975:223) explained they concluded that collective bargaining developed 
as a reaction by workers to the disadvantages of individual bargaining  - under conditions of free 
competition, most individual workers deal with employers from a position of unequal bargaining 
power (see Kochan 1980:6).  
 
Fox (1971:154) argues for seeing the value of the process of self-determination through the 
process of collective bargaining (against an authoritarian approach). When economists, for 
instance, evaluate trade unionism and collective bargaining solely in terms of 
substantive/economic outcomes, it is inadequate as a social assessment and ignores the 
significance of the procedural aspects. In pluralist societies, ―how‖ something is achieved is 
equally important.  
 
Several authors pointed to reasons other than purely an economic exchange for collective 
bargaining. Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965:113–130) regard collective bargaining as 
 an economic transaction;  
 a governmental system in which the laws of the workplace are codified; and  
 a structure for continuous decision-making.  
Swanepoel (1999:346) argues that although the traditional paradigm centres on economic 
exchange, the bargaining arena is often more complex, say, in the South African context14, than 
a single economic transaction. 
 
Overlooking the non-economic consequences of collective bargaining implies that labour is only 
regarded as a commodity, thus ignoring the fact that labour is more, because it cannot be 
separated from the worker‘s life. The rejection of this ―commodity approach‖ was promoted by 
many (eg Kochan 1980:6, 18; Fernie & Metcalf 2005:21). Instead, workers are seen as 
individuals with unique needs, expectations and goals in the workplace. According to Kochan 
                                                 
14 It is this author‘s opinion that when analysing the LRA‘s purpose and the bargaining structure provided for 
collective bargaining, it may be assumed that the legislator had in mind that the collective bargaining process should 
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(1980:19), workers not only have goals such as job security and better wages, but also intrinsic 
concerns such as satisfying work leading to personal growth. Employees who are represented 
by trade unions through the process of collective bargaining are influenced by the effects of this 
process beyond the securing of material gains to the establishment of rights in industry. 
Flanders (1975:225) states that collective bargaining also promotes the ―rule of law‖ in 
employment relations because it defines rights and obligations, say, by preventing victimisation.  
 
Salamon (Hollinshead et al 2003:347-349, 367) stresses that collective bargaining is not limited 
to substantive agreements, but that  
its real significance, perhaps, lies in management acceptance of a style of employment 
relationship which is based on the legitimisation of the expression of the different interests 
within the organisation (conflict), on joint regulation (constraining the unilateral exercise of 
managerial authority over employees), and on the principle of employee involvement and 
influence in a range of organisational decision-making.  
 
The notions of collective bargaining and joint-decision-making are closely linked to the ideology 
of pluralism. Hyman (1978:20-21) points out that pluralists assume that there are no ―undue 
concentrations of economic power‖, especially in the labour market as such power, if it exists, 
are either diffused or, when recognised, said to be balanced between large corporations and 
organised labour.  He reiterates that often the argument is that full employment and legislative 
support for collective bargaining among workers permitted union power to equal, or to even 
exceed such power. Ross (1958) in Hyman (1978:23) takes it even further by stating that ―the 
development of collective bargaining, and the institutional arrangements associated with it... has 
resulted in the establishment of parity of bargaining strength between employers and 
employed‖. The focus of all of these are thus on the workplace, rather than on the society 
(Hyman 1978:23). Hyman adds that according to Fox (1966), the distribution of power and 
resources within an enterprise is not explicitly considered, and a balance of power is therefore 
not asserted – an assumption underlined by the notion that management has to accept other 
sources of leadership, and that management - within a plural society - has to share decision-
making with them, All of these arguments, however, ignore the important decision-making 
powers that influence the relationship beyond the ambit of collective bargaining, such as 
broader social inequality. As such, Fox in later works (1971:139) argues that: 
 If unions are to stand any chance of forcing management to yield a share in decision-
making... their struggle and the methods used must be tolerated by society and the 
state. In the last resort, it is the values and the norms, legal and otherwise, of the wider 
society which determines whether or not the collectivity is able to impose itself upon the 
organisation‘s procedural system. 
In South Africa, the often very militant stance of unions is a case in point. 
 
Chamberlain (Flanders 1975:230-233) holds that all theories about collective bargaining can be 
reduced to the following three: 
(1) A means of contracting for the sale of labour (the ―marketing theory‖); 
(2) A form of industrial government (the ―governmental theory‖); and 
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In his marketing theory, the contractual aspect of collective bargaining is emphasised, viewing it 
as the process of determining under what terms labour will continue to be supplied to an 
organisation. Collective bargaining is thus necessary to redress the bargaining imbalance that 
exists between employers and employees. In his governmental theory, the contractual character 
of bargaining relationships is recognised, but the emphasis is on setting up organs of 
government for making, interpreting and executing industry laws. The principle that underlies 
this theory is ―the theory of industrial sovereignty‖ which has two facets, namely that managers 
should divide their power with unions to ensure that mutually acceptable laws of industrial self-
regulation can be in place, and, secondly, that they should engage in a joint defence of their 
autonomy. The managerial theory emphasises the functional relationship between unions and 
organisations, combining to reach decisions on matters of mutual interest. Its basis is the 
―principle of mutuality‖ which holds that ―those who are integral to the conduct of an enterprise 
should have a voice in decisions of concern to them‖, thus furthering the idea of industrial 
democracy. Chamberlain (Flanders 1975) did not argue that these theories should be regarded 
as separate and loose standing, but rather reflecting different stages in the historical 
development of collective bargaining.  Moreover, it expresses not only different views on what 
happens in collective bargaining, but also on what should happen.  
 
Flanders (1975:232-233) criticises these theories. The marketing theory is flawed because it 
argues that bargaining only takes place in the context of economic processes. The 
governmental theory is unnecessarily restrictive, only concentrating on substantive rules, whilst 
collective bargaining cannot exist without both substantial and procedural rules.  Regarding 
Chamberlain‘s managerial theory, the question is asked whether collective bargaining is a 
method of management that involves trade unions in the managerial function. It is often argued 
that trade unions, through entering into bargaining relationships, give employers an additional 
source of supervision over worker behaviour, and thus for management it can represent a 
degree of joint control (see Ursell & Blyton 1988:94, Blyton & Turnbull 1994:178). Flanders 
(1975:234) criticises this line of thought, asking why collective bargaining, in any circumstances, 
is equated with joint management. He reasons that the responsibility of trade unions in signing 
collective agreements does not go beyond upholding the observance of the rules they have 
shared in making. According to Chamberlain (Flanders 1975:235), in seeking to extend their 
decision-making in the organisation, trade unions are not trespassing on the managerial 
function. Flanders (1975:235) contends that a modern view of collective bargaining should 
broaden its scope from regulating markets to regulating management.  
 
This does not mean that collective bargaining holds the same value for all management, but 
rather that acceptance has only been partial (Fox 1971:155-158). The importance of the 
management prerogative is noted. By accepting joint regulation, managers ―commit themselves 
to compromise and to abandoning some aspects of their claim to management prerogative‖. 
The tendency will therefore be to allow joint regulation only of those areas where they feel their 
prerogative is least involved. Flanders (1965) distinguishes here between ―market regulations‖ 
(determining norms relating to the employment contract, say, working hours) and ―managerial 
regulations‖ (determining norms governing the utilisation of labour, capital and other resources 
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negotiate about the terms on which employees are to be hired, than on how employees are to 
be utilised once hired.  
 
Salamon (1992:220) also points to the management prerogative creating conflict in a context 
where trade unions and collective bargaining exist. He states the following: ―The confrontational 
attitudes engendered by the forceful re-exertion of managerial prerogatives cannot realistically 
provide a foundation for the creation of a long-term co-operative relationship between 
management and employees.‖ Conflict may thus develop because parties have different 
standards for judging managerial decisions and behaviours. Fox (1971:159) asserts the 
following: ―Only comparatively rarely has management grasped that the only sure and stable 
way of maintaining its control was to share it.‖  
 
The challenge thus lies with management and trade unions to negotiate ways of regulating their 
relationship. Hence, in a nutshell, the resolution of conflict is characterised by establishing 
procedures and institutions that can achieve cooperation through compromise (Salamon 
1992:35) – this is no easy task. According to Flanders (1975:159), certain conditions need to be 
met for collective bargaining to survive: 
 
(1) The parties must retain a certain degree of organisation; 
(2) The parties must be ready to enter into agreements with each other, i.e. mutual 
recognition; 
(3) The agreements must be observed by those covered by them. 
 
In order for this to happen, sanctions of one kind or another are necessary, for instance, through 
the legal enforcement of collective agreements. 
 
3.3.2 Collective bargaining levels 
 
Collective bargaining occurs globally in various forums and at different levels. Figure 3.1 
portrays the five levels at which bargaining takes place in a market-type economy, with different 
issues being negotiated at different levels (see Douwes-Dekker 1990:23; Swanepoel 1999:348; 
Hollinshead et al 2003:352-356; McDonald 1986). These forms of collective bargaining are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive - parties may voluntarily enter negotiations at all levels, and as 




                                                 
15 This is also the case in South Africa, with the focus of this study on bargaining councils, that is, centralised 
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Figure 3.1: Collective bargaining levels 
 
Source: Adapted from Douwes-Dekker (1990:23); Swanepoel (1999:348) 
 
In South Africa three major levels of collective bargaining are visible. In this system, one level 
sets the framework for the next – so for instance will minimum centralised sectoral levels be set, 
but allowing for productivity bargaining at plant level. All of this happens within a set 
institutionalised framework. The strength and co-ordinating capacity of the roleplayers is vital in 
the success of such a system. Nevertheless, tensions remain between decentralised and 
centralised bargaining, and at present a variety of strategies are prevalent with no obvious, 
single trend. 
 
The extent to which organised capital and organised labour are active at the various levels 
depends, according to Douwes-Dekker (1990:23), on the following: 
 the legitimacy granted to unions in the society it operates in; 
 support by employers and employers‘ organisations;  
 cohesive national federations; 
 a propensity by the primary parties to accept trade-offs on the nature of their preferred 
socio-economic order;  
 support received through legislation/basic agreements; 
 the relationship between the various role-players; and 
 the levels at which trials of strength regarding industrial action is expressed. 
 
The level at which bargaining occurs has both advantages and disadvantages. Since this study 
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3.3.3 The advantages and disadvantages of centralised collective bargaining   
 
Any discussion on centralised bargaining (and/or bargaining councils) should consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of such a system. The discussion does not aim to examine in 
detail each advantage and disadvantage, but rather to give a broad overview. Table 3.1 
compares the advantages and disadvantages of centralised bargaining, and as such, also of 
councils. 
 
Table 3.1: Advantages and disadvantages of centralised bargaining 
Centralised bargaining 
Advantages  Sets industry-wide standards. 
 Sets minimum conditions per industry without government interference. 
 Creates a stable environment and promotes labour peace because it increases 
the power of both parties.  
 Allows for more professional bargaining with skilled people. 
 Economies of scale arise, for example, industry-wide benefit funds that are more 
significant and cost effective.  
 Generates cooperation, partnerships and commitment between major 
stakeholders as they learn from each other and determine strategies, objectives 
and plans for an industry. 
 Allows the formulation of industry-wide responses to increased competition. 
 It is easier to make financial information available on general conditions of the 
industry without having to make public information on individual organisations 
which may damage their competitiveness.  
 It allows both primary parties to regulate industrial relations, wages, fringe 
benefits and other matters through a process of negotiation and agreement.  
 The number of strikes in a sector should decline because of the serious nature of 
such strikes and subsequent greater efforts to prevent them. 
 Considers and deals with industry-specific circumstances. 
 Provides a dispute resolution mechanism for an industry. 
 Offers the prospect of cooperative sectoral policy formulation, regulation and 
administration systems. 
 Allows unions to promote equality, whilst preventing wage drift. 
 Promotes strategic trade unionism as whole industries are considered. 
 Maintains that both parties need not devote limited resources to repeating 
negotiations. 
 Allows time for tackling fundamental economic issues such as productivity, job 
creation and pay levels.   
 Offers protection for members in weakly organised workplaces. 
 Takes wages out of the competition. 
 Streamlines the administrative burden of negotiating wages at plant level. 
 Removes wage conflict from the shop floor. 
 Prevents employers (especially SMMEs) from being targeted by unions 
individually. 
 Lessens the influence of the union on the shop floor. 
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Disadvantages  It is less flexible. 
 The interests of select groups tend to be underrepresented. 
 It tends to support large organisations (including large unions) because they are 
better able to set up and drive their agendas. 
 Volatile currencies and problematic organisational issues for trade unions make 
it almost impossible to deal with international trade and product markets. 
 Wages and benefits tend not to accommodate the economic realities and needs 
of individual organisations. 
 Unions and employers do not connect actively in dialogue to address issues of 
specific workplaces. 
 It does not improve labour productivity in individual organisations. 
 It prevents enterprises from reacting appropriately and speedily to the pressures 
and competition resulting from the worldwide economy. 
 Wages in small, low-profit organisations are pushed higher, thus creating a 
barrier to the entry of new small businesses.  
 Because councils are complex, they tend to discourage investors. 
 Workers may be disadvantaged if negotiations and the finalisation of agreements 
are too protracted. 
Source: Adapted from Bendix (2006:250); NMC (1995:14-17); Baskin (1995:49); Anstey (2004:1830-
1831); Le Roux (1990:2); Venter et al (2009:377); Bhorat et al (2009:1); McKersie (1990:10); Vettori 
(2001); Barker (2003:33;325) Standing et al (1996:153); Finnemore & Van Rensburg (2005:229); 
Holtzhausen (2005:13); Reynolds & Backer (1992:44-45); Standing, Sender & Weeks (1996:153, 194-
195). 
 
3.4 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
  
According to Bamber, Lansbury and Wailes (2004:3-6), there are several reasons for studying 
international comparative employment relations. This field provides information on international 
developments, may serve as a source of models for policy development and assists with the 
construction of theories. The increased global connectedness necessitates a greater need for 
information on worldwide practices. The above authors caution that much information about 
many countries must be collected before generalisations can be made. There is also a tendency 
to focus on the institutional and legal structures as a basis for comparison, as opposed to more 
complex, informal practices and procedures. Institutional forms of collective bargaining that work 
well in one environment, would not necessarily work well in another (Aidt & Tzannatos 2002). 
However, comparing countries with similar economies, cultures and historic traditions has many 
advantages: ―By looking at differences we seek uniformities, universal rules which explain these 
differences‖ (Strauss in Bamber et al 2004:5).  
 
It is against the backdrop of these cautionary remarks that the next section deals with a 
comparative study on collective bargaining trends in selected countries (see also the 
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3.4.1 Global union-employer-state relations 
Carrell and Heavrin (2004:43) state that there are three distinct attitudes that governments have 
displayed in reaction to unionisation of workers: suppression, tolerance and encouragement: 
 
(1) Suppression. Most countries in the development of their industrial economies suppressed 
unions and the notion of collective bargaining. Great Britain (GB), at the beginning of the 
Industrial Revolution, passed the Combination Acts in 1799 and 1800, making a union 
illegal as a conspiracy to restrain trade. France (1791) forbade employee combinations, 
thus suppressing unions.  Reaction in the early 1800s in the USA to the labour movement 
was comparable - the ―combination of labourers [was] considered illegal‖. Germany, 
Russia and Japan passed similar laws as industrialisation reached them in the late 19th to 
20th centuries. When industrialisation came to some Third World countries, they did not 
ban unions, but still attempted to suppress collective bargaining. For instance, the 
governments of Ghana, Nigeria and Singapore limited the authority of trade unions, even 
though unions were supported legislatively. Unions were seen in a support role to 
employees, rather than as the representatives of employees to employers. The 
suppression of unions is most common when there is concern that the workers‘ demands 
will threaten a nation, fearing that the workers will destroy what has been created. 
(2) Toleration. The history of the union movement shows that that this period of suppression 
is followed by one of tolerating unions, mainly because unions keep functioning even 
when suppressed. Countries with economic growth simply lose the desire to keep workers 
from organising. This tolerance results in unions becoming powerful political forces. A 
case in point is the USA, which in the 1930s, went from mere tolerance to legally 
protecting unions and collective bargaining. 
(3) Protection and encouragement. Industrial countries fighting the two World Wars found it 
necessary to ―marshal capital and labour for the war effort‖. In exchange, capital wanted 
money and labour wanted collective bargaining. Collective bargaining was mandated by 
law or policy in both the USA16 and Britain, largely because of this. Developed economies 
striving for industrial peace also encouraged collective bargaining. Governments, it is 
concluded, encourage collective bargaining when it is perceived to assist economic 
stability.  
The above does not address the current trends that are emerging worldwide of declining 
membership of employer and employee organisations, and a trend towards decentralisation17. A 
question that arises from the above is: What happens after ―protection and encouragement‖? 
Would these authors add another attitude in years to come?  
                                                 
16 This view of Carrell and Heavrin (2004:43) may be questioned because, in the USA, there is strong employers‘ 
resistance to trade unions and collective bargaining. The protection and encouragement that existed may have been 
purely the result of the war (ie an economic requirement), and not because of trade union support from employers‘ 
side.  
17 Rojot (Gladstone et al 1992:184) warns of ―the risk of too global a use of general concepts‖, stating that ―it is 
perhaps too facile to hold blithely that decentralisation is a universal trend‖. Although it certainly is a popular concept, 
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Many countries in which collective bargaining is prevalent are European, possibly because 
traditionally they were heavily unionised (more so than the USA, for instance) and reflect key 
values such as pluralism. Brewster et al (2004:21) confirm that in European countries, union 
recognition for the purpose of collective bargaining is often a requirement by law and that 
bargaining occurs at national, industry and plant level. Nevertheless, union participation is 
declining and decentralisation policies seem to be the order of the day. For example, in the 
European Union, the use of trade unions for negotiating and establishing employee rights 
decreased by 17% in 1999 alone (Brewster et al 2004:216). 
 
3.4.2 Global collective bargaining developments  
 
According to Wild (2004:91-99), a number of significant transnational and transsector changes 
are evident in both the conduct of collective bargaining and on the strength of the role players 
(see secs 1.3.1 and 2.2.2). These trends are discussed in the sections below and supported by 
further research. 
 
3.4.2.1 A decline in trade union membership and power 
 
Globally, trade union membership and power are declining (see Vettori 2006; Ouchi & Araki in 
Maree 2010:2). According to a study by the ILO in 2000 (Godfrey et al 2010:11), trade union 
membership peaked in most countries during the 1980s, but has declined steadily since. 
Bamber et al (2004:344-345) cite a few examples of decline: Australian union density declined 
from 51% in 1976 to 25% in 2000. In the UK it decreased from 45% in 1985 to 29% in 2000. 
Nevertheless, Wild (2004:91-99) cautions against making the assumption that the deals that 
trade unions struck are less influential because of declining union membership and a decline in 
the level of people covered by these agreements. For instance, in France, in the nonagricultural 
sector, low membership of unions (approximately 6% in the private sector) coexists with 
collective bargaining coverage of almost 90%. 
 
Various reasons are given for the decline. Godfrey et al (2010:8-12), Ferner and Hyman 
(1998:xvii) and Bamber et al (2004:344-346) explain that globalisation increases the inequality 
in power between transnational employers and employees, and undermines unions‘ ability to 
organise employees. The increase in atypical work also contributes to the challenge unions face 
in recruiting members because workers in part-time, temporary and other forms of unstable 
employment are difficult to organise. There is also a decline in the number of manual workers, 
who often held the stronghold of trade union membership. Furthermore, the political change that 
swept the globe contributed to undermining the position of trade unions. Bamber et al 
(2004:345) point to another contributing factor, namely economic factors such as the influence 
of rising unemployment in many countries because of recessions. They add that in more 
competitive global product markets, unions are less able to attract members by achieving huge 
wage increases and better working conditions, since this may lead to pricing such members out 
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3.4.2.2 Employers’ organisations facing similar challenges to trade unions, reducing the 
services associated with (centralised) collective bargaining 
 
Weiss (2004:5) confirms that the weakness of trade unions is matched by that of employers‘ 
organisations, and that collective bargaining is generally mostly confined to plant level.  
 
Employers are faced with new challenges and opportunities as economies became more 
integrated with the global economy (Bamber et al 2004:346-347). Competition between 
companies, industries and countries has increased, and many industries have had to 
restructure. Consequently employers‘ have perceived a greater need to ensure proficient work 
practices and restrain labour costs. In most countries, employers have adopted a stronger 
stance in collective bargaining, in many instances, discouraging unionisation. Wild (2004:95) 
explains that companies exposed to international competitive pressures see decentralised 
collective bargaining as increasing their ability to adapt to changing labour and product market 
needs. Employers‘ associations consequently need to adapt to these trends because employers 
are moving away from activities directed at centralised bargaining levels (see Bamber et al 
2004:350). 
 
3.4.2.3 A decline in collective bargaining as a mechanism to determine wages and conditions of 
service and an increase in the individual contract 
 
Ouchi and Araki (Maree 2010:2) argue that determining working conditions at plant level is 
steadily becoming widespread. This is supported by Ferner and Hyman (1998:xiii), who argue 
that multinational companies are more likely to impose common patterns of employment 
relations across their international operations, and that the outcome of such forces are 
company-based employment systems. One can thus refute the argument that increased 
integration of economies in a global market will contribute to this trend. The changing world of 
work (eg the increase in atypical forms of employment and women entering the labour market – 
also effecting a subsequent increase in part-time and casual employment) has also contributed 
to a steady move away from wage determination through collective bargaining to the individual 
contract (Wild 2004:98). Weiss (2004:9) argues that because of the weakness of employers‘ 
organisations and the ―non-existence of collective actors in large parts of the economy‖ in the 
EU, it is not surprising that collective bargaining is the exception rather than the rule, and that 
when it does occur, it is mostly only at plant level.  
 
3.4.2.4 A decline in the coverage of collective agreements, including coverage through 
extensions 
 
Traxler et al (Bamber et al 2004:382) state that collective bargaining coverage is a key indicator 
of the extent to which national employment relations are organised, because ―the less 
employees are covered by collective agreements, the more irrelevant organised industrial 
relations as a whole will become‖. According to Bamber et al (2004:382), countries such as 










MME Holtzhausen Page 37 
 
in the private sector. However, France is an example of a country in which coverage has 
increased, while it has remained relatively stable in Canada, Germany and Sweden.  
 
Godfrey et al (2010:14) argue that the general trend towards decentralising collective bargaining 
impacts significantly on collective bargaining coverage, an element further affected by the 
decline in union membership. When no provision is made for the extension of collective 
agreements, coverage is essentially limited to party employers and employees. Schulten 
(2005:10) agrees, stating that the existence and use of extension procedures may positively 
affect bargaining coverage, as can be seen, say, in France, Italy and the Netherlands.  
 
Wild (2004:91-99) concurs, arguing that the impact of collective bargaining depends much on 
the system that exists for the extension of agreements18 beyond those directly covered by the 
agreement. Extension mechanisms impact most strongly in countries and sectors where there is 
multi-employer bargaining. Extension agreements are at their most effective in Europe, with 
countries like Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy and Slovenia having coverage levels of 
90% or more. Whilst the existence of extension provisions do tend to generate high levels of 
bargaining coverage (eg in Austria, Spain and Portugal), the parallel is not automatic. Sweden 
and Norway are examples of countries with high levels of bargaining coverage, but this is the 
result of strong trade union and employer influence and discipline. In Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia, low levels of coverage are found, although statutory extension mechanisms exist. 
Table 3.2 illustrates the use of extensions in some European countries. 
 
Table 3.2: Extension mechanisms in some European countries 
Country Erga omnes 
extensions 




Austria X X X 98 
Belgium X - - >90 
Germany X - X 67 
Italy - - X 90 
Netherlands X - - n/a 
Sweden - - - <90 
UK - - - 36 
Spain X X - 81 
Source: Wild (2004:97) 
 
Collective agreements are extended automatically by law in Austria, Finland, Luxemburg and 
Spain. However, it is more common for extensions to be granted at the request of one of the 
negotiating parties (eg in Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Poland) or both of the parties (eg 
in Denmark, France, Hungary, Ireland and Slovakia). In some countries (eg France and 
                                                 
18 Extension provisions are based on three broad forms of machinery namely erga omnes extensions (makes 
collective agreements binding on those employers in the field of application but who were not parties to the 
agreements themselves); sectoral extensions (makes a collective agreement in one sector applicable to another 
sector where effective collective bargaining does not exist); and contract compliance extensions (normally applied by 
government agencies where contracts are only offered to bidders who apply in terms of a relevant collective 
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Greece), the government has an overriding right to decide whether agreements should be 
extended. There are often regulations pertaining to the extensions of agreements. In Germany, 
Finland and Spain, for instance, a minimum of 50% of the employees in the sector must be 
covered before a further extension will be granted, and 51% for Greece, Hungary, the 
Netherlands and Ireland.  
 
3.4.2.5 A decline in the level at which collective bargaining occurs 
 
Where collective bargaining does take place, the level at which it is conducted, is diminishing – 
if at a national level, it seems to shift to an industry level, and from industry to plant level (see  
Bamber 2004:350; Wild 2004:91-99; Ferner & Hyman 1998:xvi-xvii; Auer 2000:56-58). Australia 
is a case in point, where the industrial relations system has moved from a highly centralised one 
to a system where decentralised, plant-level bargaining is promoted (Strachan & Burgess 
2000:361). In most countries in which there is collective bargaining, it seems to occur at more 
than one level (see Schulten 2005:12-15).  
 
Schulten (2005) distinguishes between two groups of countries according to a broad range of 
similarities. The one group consists of 11 ―old‖ European Union (EU) member states mostly in 
Northern and Western Europe. These countries still have relatively strong multi-employer 
bargaining institutions, sectoral or intersectoral bargaining, and relatively high bargaining 
coverage. Sectoral centralised bargaining systems at national level are mainly prevalent in 
these countries. Another four countries have intersectoral level bargaining. The second group 
(10 countries including most of the Central and Eastern Europe states, that is, most of ―new‖ EU 
countries and the UK), have relatively weak bargaining institutions compared to the first group. 
Bargaining usually occurs at plant level and bargaining coverage is relatively low. France is an 
example of a country where no wage bargaining level is clearly dominant. Weiss (2004:9) and 
Lado (2002:108) confirm that in these countries there is practically no sectoral or national 
bargaining, and that the coverage of agreements is extremely limited. 
 
In the USA there are examples of sectoral or national bargaining in certain parts of the 
economy, especially in the public sectors, despite the principal pattern of decentralised 
bargaining. However, the dominant form of collective bargaining in the world today is at plant 
level – this is true for most of the Asia-Pacific region, Eastern Europe, Africa and the Americas. 
In contrast, most of the current European Union countries (see discussion above), some of the 
Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) and South Africa have more 
centralised collective bargaining systems.  
 
3.4.2.6 Declining levels of detail in agreements 
 
The level of detail contained in agreements at national and industry level is decreasing (Wild 
2004:91-99). Agreements at the highest level are increasingly reflecting minimum standards and 
policy frameworks or objectives, with more operational flexibility possible at implementation 
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this is also mainly driven by companies‘ pursuit of flexibility, enabling them to respond 




Collective bargaining is a complex and intricate process, with no clear-cut answers. Raskin 
(Ulman 1967:135) aptly summarises it as follows: ―I am a great believer in collective bargaining; 
the only trouble is that after thirty years of watching it at close range in dozens of industries, 
large and small, I am not sure I know what it is.‖  
 
In pursuing the goal of better understanding the collective bargaining process, this chapter 
focused on the pluralist perspective of the employment relationship as a basic underlying 
philosophy, with the rationale of analysing collective bargaining from as objective a perspective 
as possible. It expanded on theoretical principles underlying collective bargaining and pluralism, 
also indicating the various levels at which collective bargaining can be conducted. It argued that 
centralised collective bargaining is a means for employees to challenge some of the powers 
employers hold by acting collectively. 
 
Finally, a global view of centralised collective bargaining was given. From the literature it is clear 
that centralised collective bargaining is under a great deal of pressure in many industrial 
relations systems all over the world. This discussion will serve as the basis for comparing South 
African centralised collective bargaining trends (based on the empirical research) with 
international trends in chapter 6. According to Bamber et al (2004:330), one of the purposes of 
comparative employment relations is to ―rethink the relationship of the international to the 
national‖. One way of doing this is by identifying elements of the international industrial relations 
regime. This is based on the idea that national level employment relations practices do not exist 
in isolation, but ―rather develop in and are reinforced by an international set of rules or system of 
governance‖.  
 
Against this international background, and with a clear understanding of the principles of 
pluralism and collective bargaining, the next chapter focuses on centralised collective 






















Chapter 4 builds on the discussion of the fundamental principles of collective bargaining in the 
previous chapter by focusing on centralised collective bargaining in South Africa. This is done 
by means of a detailed literature review of the bargaining council system. As explained in 
chapter 3, this research studies councils from a pluralist perspective, thus expressing viewpoints 
from both a labour and a managerial perspective. However, one should never lose sight of the 
fact that councils are made up of opposing parties, and that agreements are almost always a 
compromise between contesting interests. Furthermore, whereas chapter 3 expanded on 
international collective bargaining trends, this chapter focuses on a literature review of the 
bargaining council institution in South Africa, paving the way for an international comparison in 
the study‘s concluding chapter. 
 
The chapter starts off by giving a general and historical overview of councils. It then focuses on 
the bargaining council system of today – it provides a legal perspective, indicates trends in 
council numbers and coverage and discusses a council‘s functions and powers. Against this 
backdrop, the literature review then examines prominent research that has been conducted on 
the four key aspects of this study, namely representivity, the main agreement (wages, 
conditions of employment and related aspects), benefit funds and dispute resolution.  
 
The purpose of the literature review on councils is twofold. Firstly, it is a vital source of 
information on what has been written about councils in South Africa – thereby enhancing the 
level of knowledge on councils. This leads to the second purpose of this chapter, namely laying 
the foundation for the current research by highlighting areas of contention and the challenges 
councils face. The review of the literature generated the questions that were asked in the 
empirical study (see ch 5). The chapter also serves as a starting point from which to determine 
what has been happening with councils in the last 15 years – the basic research question of this 
study.  
 




The LRA does not enforce collective bargaining, but promotes it – specifically also the 
establishment of centralised collective bargaining structures (bargaining councils) and the 
extension of agreements to non-parties. Thompson and Benjamin (Holtzhausen & Mischke 
2004:1) elucidate as follows: ―The showpiece labour-management institution of the LRA is 
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business to move in that direction as they structure their relations. However, it is a framework 
that can only be induced, not obliged‖. 
 
The role of these councils is to ―create a stable framework for the setting of standards relating to 
minimum wages and conditions through distributive bargaining, to promote industrial relations 
stability, to participate in the development of industrial policy and policies relating to skill 
enhancement, enhance productivity and tackle poverty and inequality‖ (Report of the 
Presidential Commission to Investigate Labour Market Policy [hereafter referred to as the 
Labour Market Commission (LMC)] 1996:5).  
 
However, describing councils in all their facets is no easy task. Godfrey, Maree, Du Toit and 
Theron (2005:4) rightly say that bargaining councils are diverse organisations and as such 
difficult to make generalisations about. This is evident in the various characteristics of respective 
councils. Councils range in size from huge ones, covering the entire country and a number of 
sectors and subsectors, to national councils with a fairly narrow sectoral focus, to regional 
councils that together cover a reasonable proportion of an industry, to small local councils that 
cover only a few hundred workers.  
 
4.2.2 Historical overview 
 
Bargaining councils are the direct descendants of industrial councils,19 first provided for in the 
1924 ICA. The voluntary establishment of industrial councils attempted to provide an orderly 
system for self-regulation in industries through collective agreements. However, African workers 
were excluded from the definition of an employee in this Act, and therefore did not form part of 
the industrial council system (also refer to the discussion on this in ch 3). The result was long-
term wariness of councils by African workers (Steenkamp et al 2004:950; Bhorat et al 2009:3-4), 
long after 1979 when the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation reported that 
African employees should be allowed to join registered trade unions and be directly represented 
on industrial councils. It is widely accepted that this report fundamentally changed the labour 
relations system in South Africa (Steenkamp et al 2004:943). Still, many unions preferred to 
strengthen their membership and negotiate at plant level instead of at industry level, while 
employers put pressure on trade unions to join industrial councils. This resulted in many 
disputes in the 1980s. This situation was reversed once trade unions came to accept industrial 
councils (Horwitz 1989; Finnemore 1989), a change that occurred when the fast-growing Metal 
and Allied Workers Union joined the industrial council for the metal industry in 1984 (Steenkamp 
et al 2004:950). Many trade unions followed suit. The interests of African workers also became 
a fundamental point of discussion and negotiation at centralised level. 
 
Voluntary collective bargaining, through social dialogue with the relevant role players, helped to 
find mutually acceptable solutions to the uniqueness of South Africa‘s past and anticipated 
future (Holtzhausen 2005:7). An ILO report (1998) emphasised the value of negotiating with the 
workforce in the light of existing collective bargaining agreements in order to smooth the way for 
                                                 
19 The reference to ―industrial councils‖ was changed to ―bargaining councils‖ in the LRA of 1995, in order to indicate 
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and accommodate the needs of workers. Trade unions supported these viewpoints. As early as 
1991, Copelyn (2004:60) suggested that the most powerful base that unions have is the 
platforms they use for collective bargaining - collective bargaining can be used to deal in 
earnest with the social and economic concerns of their members. Enormous creative 
opportunities open up for unions when they adopt a system of national industry negotiations. 
Institutions such as industrial councils provided the independent base for trade unions to 
influence a new South Africa.  
 
This was also the case in 1994, with the most important goal of unions being to secure a more 
comprehensive system of centralised collective bargaining (Godfrey 2009:15). Finnemore and 
Van Rensburg (2002:225) agreed that after the 1994 elections, centralised collective bargaining 
was strongly promoted. For instance, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
supported bargaining councils and the extensions of agreements to all workplaces in the 
industry: 
Effective implementation of the RDP requires a system of collective bargaining at 
national, industrial and workplace level, giving workers a key say in industry decision-
making and ensuring that unions are fully involved in designing and overseeing change 
at workplace and industry level. Industrial bargaining forums or industrial councils must 
play an important role in the implementation of the RDP. Agreements negotiated in such 
forums should be extended through legislation to all workplaces in that industry (African 
National Congress (ANC) 1994, in Finnemore & Van Rensburg 2002:225). 
 
The Ministerial Legal Task Team appointed by the ANC in 1994 to draft a new Labour Relations 
Bill, was specifically asked to give effect to government policy as reflected in the RDP (Du Toit 
et al 2003:23).  
 
The LMC (1996:55) supported the vision of the LRA to increase industry-level bargaining. It 
stated that the DOL should encourage and facilitate (if necessary) the establishment of councils. 
In addition, the LMC (1996:191) offered the following advice:  
Negotiation through democratic institutional structures is both socially desirable and 
economically efficient. More co-operative relations at firm, industrial, regional and 
national level should encourage investment and productivity growth and allow for the 
balancing need for secure and reasonably remunerated employment and society‘s need 
for rapid employment creation. 
 
At the time, Baskin (1995:51) made the statement that the ―centralised bargaining system as we 
know it, set up in the 1920s through the industrial council system, is archaic and often inflexible 
… we need to see it as a challenge. We need to draw lessons from that in building a system 
that is both centralised and comprehensive.‖ Hence the National Labour and Economic 
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 It argued for three main interactive20 bargaining levels: national, industrial (across fairly 
broadly-defined industries), and plant-level; 
 It argued for broad-based industry forums, registered as industrial councils, listing about 
30 such structures, distributed across 11 industries. This industrial level, it was suggested, 
should form the legal centre because of the law allowing for the extension of agreements 
and should therefore not be based on the principle of voluntarism21; 
 Industrial councils agreements should be more flexible, allowing for various basic 
schedules which can be set down for different sub-sectors/regions/smaller employers; 
 Councils should set framework agreements with basic minimum standards and conditions, 
and then bargaining up or down from there – thus avoiding rigid, complex agreements; 
 Councils should be reformed to be less bureaucratic and more user-friendly; 
 Councils should accommodate the ―legitimate need of small business‖.  
However, the above system never took off (Godfrey 2009:15-16). Various discussions and 
negotiations saw major differences between business and labour (Du Toit et al 2003:23-30). 
Union federations argued for national industry-wide bargaining to be achieved by the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) demarcating the scope of each 
bargaining council - to be confirmed by law. Furthermore, all employers should be represented 
at council level, and any trade union with 30% membership should be entitled to representation. 
Bargaining was to take place when unions had a 50%+1 level of representivity. Bargaining 
issues were to be decided by the parties, if necessary, by recourse to industrial action. 
Extension of agreements would thus have been unnecessary because of the nonexistence of 
non-parties to the process. Exemptions were proposed to be agreed upon by the parties to the 
councils, with a right of appeal only if bargaining was not concluded in good faith.  
 
A task team preparing the first draft of the LRA for discussion at NEDLAC argued that three 
collective bargaining options existed: a duty to bargaining with the Act prescribing bargaining 
topics and levels of bargaining; an option of less compulsion and with courts deciding on levels 
and topics of bargaining if the primary parties could not agree thereupon; and lastly, voluntary 
bargaining determining own bargaining arrangements through exercising power (Godfrey 
2009:16). The third model was chosen, and the bargaining council system remained voluntary. 
However, the Act provided for the encouragement of the council system through a number of 
provisions such as providing a mechanism for the Registrar and the Minister of Labour (MOL) to 
support the establishment of bargaining councils (Du Toit et al 2003:23-30). The key features of 
the old system were thus retained – voluntarism, extension of agreements on the basis of 
representivity and the extension of agreements if parties were sufficiently representative 
(Godfrey 2009:17). Some innovations were added, for instance, a more transparent exemption 
system, provisions for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs) representation, NEDLAC 
                                                 
20 The approach of different levels of bargaining in order to address different issues found general support in 
industries such as the motor industry. It was argued that the scope and content of the negotiations at these levels 
should be determined by the relevant parties in order to improve collective bargaining in that industry (NMC 1995:16-
33). However, this should not be confused with bargaining on the same issue at two levels – employers have always 
strongly resisted this. 
21 This viewpoint was strongly contested by employers.  Most companies indicated that centralised bargaining should 
not be enforced by law, but should be based on the principle of voluntarism – with the prevailing circumstances and 
the nature of the business dictating the bargaining system (NMC 1995:16, 33). Union representatives reiterated their 
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submissions and training and education schemes. Vettori (2001:342) reflects that ―given our 
history, it is perhaps not remarkable that at a time when the rest of the world was moving away 
from industry collective bargaining, the Act adopted a stance in the opposite direction‖.  
 
Today it is often said that councils play a key role in their respective sectors, but they need to be 
flexible in order to govern effectively. If these councils are to succeed in their suggested roles, 
they should focus on rendering a service. This will provide the necessary incentives for labour 
and business to willingly participate in the system. Yet, this debate is not clear cut, but holds 
many varying viewpoints.  
 
Donnelly (2001:564-565) found that employers have a strong propensity to associate and 
participate in, inter alia, the bargaining council system. According to his research, the beliefs 
that institutional support will assist in managing one‘s own labour relations better; that there is 
still enough flexibility within the bargaining system to make participation worthwhile; and that 
association is the best protection from an empowered state alliance with powerful unions, all 
play their part. A combination of these factors leads to perceptions on the part of employers that 
bargaining councils are as much ―political devices as economic agencies‖. The employers‘ 
response to this broader political agenda may well determine the resilience of sectoral 
bargaining over time, as employers choose to associate instead of free-ride. However, 
employers‘ natural preference for individualism and autonomy of action conflicts with this need 
for collective security within a potentially hostile system.  
 
Godfrey et al (2006:733-734) caution that councils have been the foundation for and central to 
the collective bargaining and industrial relations systems of South Africa for over 80 years. 
Changes to the statutory framework that may threaten or destabilise the bargaining council 
system may have serious consequences well beyond that system - especially because the 
system is not in a healthy condition. Furthermore, councils are supported by business and 
organised labour (Millennium Labour Council [MLC] 2001:1551) which state that ―the parties 
acknowledge that bargaining councils are an integral part of the collective bargaining 
arrangements in SA.‖   
 
4.2.3 Bargaining councils’ numbers and coverage 
 
As indicated in the discussion above, the bargaining council system in South Africa is 
experiencing an era of transformation and volatility. Councils are on the decline, even though 
some were recently established. Godfrey et al (2005:13&81) explain that the decline has neither 
been offset by the establishment of the five public sector councils after the new LRA, nor by the 
small number of other councils established (eg chemical, fishing and wood and paper). 
Furthermore, it is significant that the new councils that have been formed have, in most 
instances, been established with great difficulty after a long period of struggle. Four of the nine 
major sectors of the economy have no bargaining council at all, or the bargaining councils cover 
an insignificant proportion of workers. Nonetheless, more sectors of the economy are 
considering formalising and institutionalising their collective bargaining arrangements by 
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Table 4.1: Bargaining council numbers 







* This figure excluded two councils that were in the process of deregistration. 
**   One of these councils has filed for liquidation 
Source: Adapted from Godfrey (2009:17); DOL (2010) statistics (www.labour.gov.za) 
 
The decline in the number of councils can be ascribed to some extent to the amalgamation22 of 
regional councils and subsectoral councils into national councils (eg the NBCCMI), but also to 
the fact that some of the councils ceased to function and were deregistered. Godfrey et al 
(2005:81-82) argue that this may be a healthy process, which will end with a smaller number of 
large national councils covering employees previously covered by regional and local councils. 
Nevertheless, this is no easy task. New councils are not easy to establish and the merger of 
councils also tends to be sluggish and difficult - the merger of regional councils to form the 
NBCCMI took about eight years, and ―the council is still to all intents and purposes an 
amalgamation of regional structures rather than a national structure‖. If the trend is indeed 
towards large national councils and the downfall of smaller councils, then the likely outcome 
would be a few councils covering only certain sectors, with the majority of the labour market 
covered by the BCEA or sectoral determinations, or plant-level bargaining (of which only the 
latter two set wages). Godfrey et al (2005:82) correctly state that this raises questions about the 
future nature of the industrial relations system. 
 
As indicated in table 4.2 below, council trends are also visible from the point of view of coverage 
of employees. The LRA and BCEA cover about 9.5million employees in the country (Godfrey 
2009:18; Bhorat et al 2009:22-34). Of these, about 25% are covered by bargaining council 
agreements (approximately 2.36 million employees), about 36% by sectoral determinations and 
the remaining 39% only by the BCEA (including those covered by ministerial - and the so-called 
―old‖ sectoral determinations). Bargaining councils cover just less than a third of employees who 
are potentially covered by collective bargaining (ie people working for someone else in 
occupational categories 4 to 9 of the Labour Force Survey). However, when coverage in the 
public sectors is excluded, 13% (or approximately 1 million) of employees in 1995 in formal 
employment were covered by council agreements. According to Bhorat et al (2009:27), in 1995, 
the manufacturing sector accounted for almost half of all workers covered by bargaining council 
agreements (43%), a figure that declined to 36% in 2005. In the construction sector, the number 
                                                 
22 This may point to even greater centralisation in certain industries (Du Toit et al 2003:40). Even so, the impact of 
this from the perspective of the number of bargaining councils is important - for example, the formation of the national 
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of workers covered by councils almost halved between 1995 (230 000 employees) and 2005 
(approximately 114 000 employees).  
 
Hence even though the number of councils has decreased, the number of employees covered 
by councils has increased over the last decade, although the predominant reason for this is the 
addition of the public sector councils (Godfrey et al 2006:746) (see table 4.2 below).  
 
Table 4.2: Estimated bargaining council coverage, 1995 and 2005 
Category 1995 2005 
Total formal employment 8 120 279 8 039 401 
Total BC coverage 1 193 597 2 580 331 
Total BC coverage (% of total formal employment) 14.7% 32.1% 
 
Private sector BC coverage 1 193 597 1 072 399 
Private sector BC coverage (% of total formal 
employment) 
14. 7% 13.3% 
 
Public sector BC coverage - 1 507 932 




Uncovered  Approximately 
68% 
Source: Adapted from Bhorat et al (2009:27) 
 
Bargaining councils are thus on the decline, but the coverage of workers through these 
institutions remains significant, and have increased when considering the inclusion of the public 
sector. According to Godfrey (2009:18), this implies a strengthening of the council system since 
the introduction of the LRA in 1995. Moreover, councils are well located within the 
manufacturing sector, thereby hugely impacting on the country‘s economy (Adler 1991:53).  
 
4.2.4 A legal perspective 
 
It is necessary to look at councils‘ legal structure and functioning in order to grasp the 
challenges they face. The aims of this section is not set out to provide a full and comprehensive 
discussion of all legal provisions relating to councils, but merely to provide some background on 
those areas pertinent to highlighting the structural or functional aspects relating to this 
dissertation. As such, an overview is provided, laying the foundation for a more in-depth study of 




As stated above, one of the objectives of the LRA is to promote collective bargaining at sectoral 
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 Access to a workplace within the registered scope of the council and stop-order facilities 
are automatically granted to trade unions (irrespective of their representation level at that 
particular workplace) that are party23 to a council (s 19). 
 Council agreements may change minimum conditions of service (s 49, BCEA)24. 
 Parties to the council may, by collective agreement, establish thresholds of representivity 
with regard to some of the organisational rights referred to in the LRA (s 18[1]). 
 Bargaining councils may add to the mandatory list of issues over which workplace forums 
must be consulted on25. 
 Matters which may not be an issue in dispute for the purposes of industrial action can be 
determined by the parties to a council through a collective agreement (s 28[1][i]). 
 
Thomson (Du Toit et al 2003:234-235) suggests the following reasons why centralised 
bargaining is so strongly promoted by the LRA: 
 It is argued that a structured setting in which collective bargaining could take place was 
better suited to industrial relations in a post-apartheid South Africa. 
 A higher degree of wage equity is possible through sectoral bargaining. 
 Because councils are based on a system of voluntarism, it is argued that these councils 
are only established once both the employer and the labour parties have agreed that it will 
serve common interests. 
 Flexibility is allowed through the LRA system for councils to set minimum (as opposed to 
actual26) wages and to negotiate framework (as opposed to fixed) agreements. 
 
Councils are extensively regulated in Part C of Chapter III (Collective bargaining) of the LRA 
(1995). Some amendments followed in 2002. Sections 27 to 34 set out the statutory provisions 
of councils, for example, the procedure to be followed in the registration of a bargaining council 
through the DOL. For councils to be registered, the parties to the proposed council must be 
sufficiently representative of employers and employees within the scope of such a council.  
 
The starting point of a bargaining council is consensus, that is, the adoption of the constitution 
of the council by registered parties in terms of section 27 (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004). Half of 
the councils‘ representatives are appointed by trade unions and the other half by employers – 
hence both parties have equal voting powers. The constitution (s 30) makes provision for the 
appointment of representatives and office-bearers – setting out their functions. It stipulates 
                                                 
23 Godfrey et al (2006) emphasise the importance of distinguishing between party, nonparty and noncompliant firms. 
Party firms are registered with a bargaining council and are also members of an employers‘ organisation that is a 
party to the council. Nonparty firms are registered with a council, but have not joined any of the party employers‘ 
organisations. Agreements are extended to these firms. A noncompliant firm is one that falls within a bargaining 
council jurisdiction but has not registered with a council and does not comply with the bargaining council‘s (extended) 
agreement(s). 
24 According to section 49 of the BCEA, a collective agreement that has been negotiated in a council may replace or 
exclude any basic condition of employment, as long as the agreement does not infringe on the set of core rights and 
entitlements as set out in the BCEA. 
25 The last two provisions in particular give councils considerable power to influence the bargaining agenda at plant 
level (Du Toit et al 2005:245). 
26 ―Actuals‖ is the term used in industries to refer to the actual wages workers receive. Minimum wages set the norm, 
although workers often obtain more than that. When councils negotiate on actual wages, it means that the negotiated 
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negotiating decision-making procedures for the purposes of reaching substantive agreements, 
and provides for the resolution of disputes, meeting procedures, the administration of funds and 
exemption procedures. Actions for changing the constitution and for winding up the council (if 
necessary/so agreed) are also determined.  
 
4.2.4.2 Functions and powers of bargaining councils 
 
The powers and functions of councils (s 28) are to 
 conclude and enforce collective agreements 
 prevent and resolve labour disputes 
 perform the dispute resolution functions referred to in section 51 
 establish and administer a fund to be used for resolving disputes 
 promote and establish training and education schemes 
 establish and administer pension, provident, medical aid, sick pay, holiday, unemployment 
and training schemes or funds or any similar schemes or funds for the benefit of one or 
more of the parties to the bargaining council or their members 
 develop proposals for submission to NEDLAC or any other appropriate forum on policy 
and legislation that may affect the sector and area  
 determine by collective agreement the matters which may not be an issue in dispute for 
the purposes of a strike or a lockout at the workplace 
 confer on workplace forums additional matters for consultation 
 provide industrial support services within the sector 
 extend the services and functions of the bargaining council to workers in the informal 
sector and home workers 
 
Du Toit et al (2003:249) indicate that these functions are not exhaustive (s 28[1]), but that the 
topics that may be included in councils‘ constitutions suggest functions that may go beyond 
these in order to promote collective bargaining at sectoral level. A fundamental issue that arises 
in the context of these statutory provisions is the extent to which bargaining councils perform all 
these functions. According to Holtzhausen and Mischke (2004), it would appear that bargaining 
councils generally focus their attention and activities on collective bargaining and dispute 
resolution - to the virtual exclusion of any other function.  
 
Through the 2002 amendments, councils now have the power to provide industrial support 
services within their sector and also to extend these services and functions to workers in the 
informal sector and home workers (s 28). According to Godfrey et al (2005:19), it is unclear 
what the effect of the 2002 provisions will be. Even though the intentions mean well, much 
depends on the ability of councils to offer support services and extend their policing of 
agreements into the informal economy. Du Toit et al (2003:51) also contend that even though 
these two new powers are aimed at strengthening the role of bargaining councils in their 
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4.3 FOUR KEY AREAS 
 
This section deals in depth with the following four key areas identified earlier: 
 representivity  
 the main agreement (wages and conditions of service, and other related issues)  
 benefit funds  




4.3.1.1 Determination of representation 
 
The Registrar, when considering whether the parties to a council are representative, takes into 
consideration the nature of the sector and the area for which registration is sought. Parties may 
be regarded as representative of the whole area, even if the parties have no members in part of 
the area (s 49(1), LRA; Joubert & Faris 2009). In 2004, bargaining councils as a whole were 
representative on both accounts (Godfrey et al 2006:741-742)27: Employer parties employed 
63% of all employees, whilst trade union parties represented 60% of all employees covered by 
the councils – even though not all councils were representative on both measures. Nonetheless, 
representation is viewed by all role players as one of the main challenges councils face (see 
Godfrey et al 2007; Dicks, in Ndungu 2007:152).  
 
Many factors influence whether a bargaining council is and will remain representative. The 
council system is directly affected by its external environment (see Horwitz 2000). For a council 
to maintain its infrastructure and services and to retain its staff component, a certain number of 
employees are needed – if this number drops significantly because of economic pressure in an 
industry, the council also suffers financially. Another example stems from the perception that it 
is cheaper to compete from outside the council. Employers might resign from their employers‘ 
organisation, which would lead to an increasingly unrepresentative employers‘ organisation, and 
the ultimate collapse of the council. The BIBC (Gauteng) is a case in point (Baskin 1998). The 
number of employees covered by the council decreased substantially, while the number of 
employees in the industry remained stable or might even have increased. Estimates suggested 
that there were as many employees outside of the regulatory net as inside. Enforcement of the 
council agreement became increasingly difficult, to some extent because of the nature of the 
industry, and in part because the agreement was removed from market realities. 
 
4.3.1.2 Admission of parties to councils 
 
Registration of a trade union or an employers‘ organisation is a legal prerequisite for access to a 
bargaining council (s 27[1]). Registered trade unions and employers‘ organisations not 
                                                 
27 These data refer to the representivity of parties that are registered – unregistered (ie noncompliant) parties, 
although technically covered by the councils, are not included in the calculations (Godfrey et al 2006:742). The 
clothing sector is a case in point: this council‘s representivity is 52% on the first measure. However, when 
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belonging to a council during its establishment, may apply for admission to the council (s 56). 
Access criteria for the bargaining council are set in the council‘s constitution and include either 
fixed numbers or percentages of representation, for the purpose of setting access thresholds 
(Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004:9). The applicant‘s certificate of registration and a copy of its 
constitution must accompany the written application. The council should then, within a period of 
90 days, indicate whether to grant or refuse the application. A party that is turned down may 
take the matter up with the Labour Court.  
 
The DOL maintains that access criteria are for the parties to regulate by means of agreement in 
the constitution of the council, and that the Department should not intervene — but only give 
advice as and when necessary (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004:9). However, the DOL 
emphasised the need for parties to set access criteria and indicated that the core consideration 
in respect of access to councils should be the number of employees employed by employers, 
because small numbers of employers can employ large numbers of employees. The number of 
employers is therefore not the appropriate approach. In all bargaining councils covered by this 
research, access criteria have existed for trade unions, and registration of the union is a 
prerequisite.  
 
4.3.1.3 Small firm representation 
 
The specific needs and problems of the small business sector are highlighted in this study. 
Taking care of this sector is necessary for various reasons, but also because the council system 
mainly covers small firms. In fact, the average size of registered businesses across the council 
system is 18 employees (Godfrey et al 2006:743). In addition, the average size of all party firms 
is 27 employees, and of all nonparty firms, 11 employees – thus confirming that councils 
comprise fewer larger party firms, compared to more and smaller nonparty firms.  
 
Organised labour and business (MLC 2001:1551-1552) agreed to promote small business 
membership in employers‘ organisations, so that their interest would be better represented at 
bargaining councils. To this end, they suggested that all role players should give a ―political 
signal‖ to nonparty employers that good practice would be developed by councils to support 
better communication. They suggested the introduction of a requirement on councils, through 
section 54 of the LRA, to submit an annual report to the Registrar reflecting the extent of activity 
of SMMEs in the various councils, including factors such as trade union and employers‘ 
organisation membership, application of agreements to non-parties, and the nature and extent 
of applications for exemptions applied for and/or granted.  
 
The LRA looks after the needs of SMMEs through, say, obliging bargaining councils to make 
specific reference in their constitutions to their representation. As rightly stated by Albertyn 
(1990:124-126), ―if industry level bargaining is to be sensitive to the needs of all the employers 
and workers who fall within its ambit, significant minorities must be allowed a say in the 
bargaining process‖. He suggests a pluralist approach (see chapter 3) in which the centralised 
system is not based purely on majorities, but also not on an ―all-comers‖ system, affording equal 
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argues that the best system would be one of centralised bargaining lying between these two 
extremes and taking the best of both through significant, but proportional representation within 
an economically defined bargaining unit.  
 
According to Du Toit et al (2003:8), greater participation by SMMEs in employers‘ organisations 
should solve many of the problems cited by small organisations in their opposition to councils. 
However, in reality, a different picture emerges. Even though the LRA aims to encourage small 
businesses to join employers‘ organisations or to form such organisations themselves in order 
to make their voices heard in councils, these provisos seem to have had practically no impact, 
and the LRA does not appear to have gone far enough in this regard (Godfrey et al 2006:741-
743). The Act left out an important proviso which would have forced employers‘ organisations to 
recruit more small businesses, namely that the party employers‘ organisation has to represent 
the majority of employers covered by the council. This oversight was regrettable from the 
perspective of the small business - it implies that a minority of large firms on councils can reach 
agreements with unions and have them extended to many small firms. The system as a whole 
would have been unrepresentative if the third measure had been introduced, since only 41% of 
all employers were members of party employers‘ organisations – no fewer than 24 councils 
were unrepresented on this measure. However, note that Godfrey et al (2007) found that small 
firms do not want to join employers‘ organisations – either because they are not aware of them,  
have been put off by them or have no interest in participating in them.   
 
DOL research data provide another interesting perspective (Godfrey et al 2006:744-746). 
Relatively large numbers of small businesses covered by bargaining councils are members of 
party employers‘ organisations; in addition, small businesses are generally fairly well organised 
by party trade unions. The question is thus asked why small businesses appear to have a 
problem with the council system. Numerically, small businesses should be able to outvote the 
minority of larger businesses. Research in the clothing sector shows that even though small 
firms complain about decisions taken by their employers‘ organisation, the decisions were 
mostly reached on the basis of consensus, even often voted for. The authors conclude that the 
reason why small businesses seem to be so pliable is that in debates within the employers‘ 
organisations, they make little impact compared with the larger organisations where well-versed 
and powerful arguments are put forward. Despite their reservations, small businesses tend to 
end up agreeing with the larger organisations. One can only conclude that it must largely be a 
question of expertise possessed by their larger counterparts that dominates the process, and a 
shortage of human resources to challenge the sophistication of the large firms. Nevertheless, 
research (Godfrey et al 2007) pointed out that even though small firms‘ knowledge of labour 
legislation and other regulations is by and large inadequate, it is visibly better in firms covered 
by bargaining councils. This trend is ascribed to these firms‘ exposure to monitoring by the 
councils and the latter‘s user-friendliness in terms of advice and assistance.  
 
One other way of dealing with SMMEs was recommended by the LMC (1996:58), namely a less 
burdensome schedule of minimum conditions. In this way, the special circumstances of SMMEs 
and the dualism of the labour market are taken into consideration, whilst also keeping all 
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is one basic labour law covering all employers and employees. If this approach is followed, 
instead of SMMEs having to apply for exemptions, the process should be easy for small and 
start-up businesses to pursue. The LRA opted for the second approach of exemptions. But it 
sounds easier than in reality. Small businesses seemingly struggle to meet the standards set by 
councils (see Ichharam 2003). There are other problems as well – for example, the small 
employer does not have the time and/or knowledge to apply for exemptions, often does not 
know about the possibility of exemptions or does not see applying for exemptions as a practical 
option (Godfrey et al 2007). 
 
Trade unions also find it difficult to organise within the small business sector, again challenging 
council representivity. Bennett (2002:ix;18-19) cites the example of the profound restructuring of 
the clothing sector following the reintegration of the South African economy in the mid-1990s 
into the international marketplace. The organisation of work changed considerably, posing 
enormous challenges for all role players. In order to remain globally competitive and cut costs, 
large and medium enterprises downsized, increasing the number of smaller firms. The 
restructuring placed enormous pressure on the NBCCMI - significant numbers of small firms 
withdrew from the council, either by rejecting it outright, or by subcontracting work to informal 
undertakings or independent sub-contractors. In certain areas, increasingly more employees 
functioned outside the council.  
 
4.3.1.4 Changing work patterns 
 
Globalisation and the changing world of work bring its own challenges to bargaining councils 
and their representivity levels. According to the Auer (2000), the fragmentation of large-scale 
mass production in the time of globalisation weakens centralised bargaining and threatens a 
further erosion of collective bargaining coverage. It explains that along with the changing 
balance of power in industrial relations, globalisation also leads to adjustments in the nature of 
the employment and bargaining relationship. More prominence is given to, say, productivity and 
performance-related bargaining and internal flexibility issues (eg flexible work hours at plant 
level). This general tendency to negotiate these kinds of issues at plant level has led to 
decentralisation of the industrial relations system.  
 
South Africa has been part of the global world since the country‘s democratisation, with trade 
unions experiencing the same problems as their counterparts worldwide - an increase in 
temporary and part-time workers (ie casualisation), independent contractors, and so forth - all 
categories which are difficult to organise (see Theron 2003:1273-1274; Horwitz 2000) – thus 
also threatening representivity levels for the parties to bargaining councils. In general, unions 
first attend to permanent workers, and the likely impact of an increase in use of atypical workers 
(ie flexible forms of employment such as part-time and casual employees) may erode their 
support base (Olivier 1998:672).  Ndungu (2007:3) asserts the following: ―Fundamental to the 
question of improving union capacity to bargain collectively should be the acknowledgement 
that the changing nature of workplace relations has resulted in the weakening of centralised 
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the decline of bargaining council strength (DOL 2007). NALEDI (Musgrave 2008) emphasises 
that these trends necessitate better collective bargaining systems.  
 
Apart from the increase in atypical work, the informal sector28 is also growing. Standing et al 
(1996:153, 194-195) stated years ago that councils are not necessarily representative because 
many small nonregistered employers increasingly operate in the informal economy. The growth 
of the informal economy was again confirmed by the ILO (2004:60). According to Benjamin 
(2008:1579), more than 30% of working South Africans fall within this sector. Moreover, an 
increase in vulnerable employment29 is visible as formal employment growth decreases - as was 
the case in South Africa when GDP growth declined 5.3 percentage points to minus 2.2% in 
2009 because of the recession (ILO 2010:9-19). Even though the international economy 
appeared to start growing again during 2009, labour markets showed little sign of improving, 
with sharp increases evident in unemployment.  
 
4.3.2 The main agreement (wages and conditions of employment) 
 
This key area focuses on the collective bargaining function of councils in order to reach 
agreements on wages and conditions of service. However, in reality, it is far more complex than 
this – for example, agreements are extended to non-parties and parties may ask for exemptions 
from agreements. In addition, there is the question of non-compliance and enforcement of 
agreements, how agreements and labour rights can be extended to the growing section of 
vulnerable employment and how councils deal with different sectors in one industry. All these 
issues are addressed below.  
 
4.3.2.1 Collective agreements 
 
One of the main advantages of councils is that the parties themselves, without the intervention 
of government, set conditions of employment through collective agreements. These agreements 
bind the parties to the council who are part of the agreement, unless it is extended to non-
parties (ss 31-32). Section 32 allows councils to request the MOL to extend collective 
agreements to non-parties within its registered scope.  
 
According to Godfrey et al (2005:14), councils have a great deal of leeway in the sorts of 
agreements they produce, the variation they introduce, the way in which agreements are policed 
and the sorts of services (if any) offered to firms within their jurisdiction. As Anstey (2004:1852) 
aptly puts it: ―It is not the establishment of a national bargaining council which will preserve 
collective bargaining in an industry, but what the parties put on its agendas ...‖.  
 
The main agreements of councils differ substantially - some are long and complex, and full of 
particulars built up over years of negotiations, while others are relatively straightforward 
                                                 
28 The informal economy is defined as a sector recognised by two primary factors, namely the absence and/or non-
compliance of legal regulation, and the small sizes of firms (Benjamin 2008:1579, 1583).  
29 Vulnerable employment is defined as the sum of own-account workers and workers contributing to family 
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(Godfrey et al 2005:4; Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004). Some agreements moved away from 
detailed statements, emphasising principles rather than using elaborate language to cover every 
contingency. However, McKersie (1990:14) stressed that the ability to do this depends on the 
degree of trust and maturity between the parties. The length of agreements differs as well - 
spanning a number of years to being only applicable for a year period. Horwitz (2000) suggests 
that agreements should be longer term, allowing for workplace change and development 
between bargaining periods, whilst ensuring compliance and stability (see also Webster, Van 
Meelis & Psoulis 2000). 
 
4.3.2.2 Flexibility arrangements 
 
According to Barker (2003:34), wage flexibility is influenced by collective bargaining and the 
degree to which provision is made in agreements for flexibility arrangements. In the case of 
bargaining councils, there seems to be a history of rigid agreements, with stringent and 
cumbersome exemption procedures – although many would argue that this is merely to provide 
more security for workers within the bargaining arena. 
 
Much pressure thus exists on councils to provide some form of flexibility - mostly in the form of a 
variation in agreements, and usually with regard to specific regions (Godfrey et al 2007). One 
example was the proposals by Horwitz (2000) for the BIBC (CGH) to restructure its main 
agreement to permit ―regulated flexibility‖30, including basic employment standards and an entry-
level and/or piece work pay structure and benefits designed to allow flexible cost of employment 
packages based on actual needs – the proposals were never followed. Godfrey et al (2007:1) 
point out that collective bargaining aids the concept of ―regulated flexibility‖ – an important 
statement considering the role councils play in collective bargaining in South Africa. Still, 
collective agreements concluded in bargaining councils are usually detailed and refer to actual 
rands and cents in respect of wages - these are not general or policy-oriented agreements, but 
rigidly spell out the real practice.  
 
4.3.2.3 Two-tier bargaining 
 
A council agreement may make provision for two-tier bargaining should the parties to the 
agreement be amenable to this. Two-tier bargaining has its advantages and disadvantages. For 
instance, it is said that it may promote enterprise efficiency (eg through productivity-related 
compensation schemes), whilst still ensuring standardisation in sectors on minimum 
employment conditions. However, the most appropriate level of negotiation will depend on the 
issues negotiated and the traditional practices of that industry. 
 
The LMC (1996:55-57) supported a certain degree of structured decentralised bargaining - 
councils can play a role by providing guidelines to promote supplementary bargaining. Councils 
                                                 
30 Godfrey et al (2007:1) explain the critical importance of collective bargaining as the mechanism through which  
―regulated flexibility‖ can be achieved  as ―the ability … to set wages and conditions that balance employees‘ needs 
with those of employers [which] is critical for the ability of the new labour relations system to balance the imperatives 
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should set the rules of the game, dealing with some items centrally and channelling others to 
company-level negotiations. A system of two-tier bargaining may, for example, set minimum 
conditions and outline the parameters within which supplementary bargaining could take place. 
For instance, compliance with minimum hours can be ensured, but the actual scheduling of 
hours can be bargained for at enterprise level, linking it to, say, productivity or profit-sharing 
arrangements. This approach would ―promote enterprise efficiency, grant workers a share in the 
fruits of such gains and set realistic minima for the less profitable enterprises, while at the same 
time moderating undue wage drift between enterprises within one sector.‖ SEIFSA indicated 
(NMC 1995:16) that there was scope for greater flexibility and productivity improvement at 
company level within the structure of broader collective agreements. Even so, evidence 
suggests that very little or no productivity bargaining is taking place in South Africa, and that 
even in cases where a framework agreement was negotiated at central level, not much interest 
was shown at plant level (Godfrey et al 2007). Godfrey et al (2007) maintain that most 
agreements prohibit plant-level bargaining over issues covered in the council agreement.  
 
Schulten (Du Toit 2007:1416) explains multilevel flexible bargaining as the general global 
tendency – in most countries that still have a domination of intersectoral or sectoral bargaining, 
higher-level agreements have widened the possibility for further bargaining at plant level. 
Seemingly this is not popular in South Africa. Cheadle (2007:52) criticises government, saying 
that the DOL should have written a ―model bargaining council agreement‖ to be incorporated 
into a clear policy on minimum and actual wages, and that councils should ―set minima that 
expand the compliance net and don‘t constitute a barrier to job creation and to allow actuals to 
be determined at plant-level‖.  
 
4.3.2.4 Bargaining chambers 
 
A council agreement may make provision for various bargaining chambers of subsectors in an 
industry should the parties to the agreement accept this. The LMC (1996:56) states the aim of 
centralised bargaining to bring together in one bargaining forum broadly similar products or 
service providers, taking into consideration issues such as product market, economies of scale 
(for social benefit purposes) and the specific nature and labour intensity of the various 
subsections of an industry, ensuring that the same conditions do not automatically apply to 
vastly different situations. 
 
However, Barker (2003:327) contends that bargaining councils introduce an element of 
inflexibility, and do not take into account that circumstances may vary radically from one 
organisation to the next or from one area to the next. As such, they are a significant source of 
labour market inflexibility. The NMC (1995:15) highlighted the disadvantage of centralised 
bargaining and inflexibility - in this study the demarcation of industries was mentioned as a 
concern - the metal industry is a case in point: 
There is a particular problem with the metal industry in that on the employers‘ side 
SEIFSA is made up of 50 different associations representing very different industries, for 
example, Iron and Steel Manufacture, the Construction Industry, Electronics Gate and 
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It was emphasised that the bargaining system must cater for both the uniqueness of individual 
operations and for flexibility in the system (NMC 1995:16). This point is supported by Anstey 
(2004:1860), who argues that if bargaining processes are used wisely, collective bargaining (in 
this instance in the clothing sector) for an industry may develop effective responses to 
challenges posed in that sector: ―Nothing constrains the parties from negotiating flexibilities for 
certain sectors of the industry operating under difficult conditions.‖ 
 
It appears that various measures are adopted by councils to accommodate, or at least consider, 
employer diversity. One way of doing this is by establishing subsectoral bargaining chambers, 
which has been done in the chemical industry (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004:21-22). The DOL 
concurs that different bargaining chambers generally succeed in addressing specific industry 
needs. The needs of the industry would be decisive in this regard, and issues such as 
differences and interfaces between various subsectors would have to be taken into account. 
Different agreements could be structured to accommodate general issues (such as sick leave or 
overtime and overtime pay) that have found application throughout the industry, while chamber-
specific agreements could deal with subsectoral issues in more detail. There would be no need 
for a central and overarching chamber, the Department added, because the plenary bargaining 
council itself would fulfil this function. Alternatively, the council could have a single constitution 
and a single substantive agreement, such an agreement, however, providing for different 
categories of employees.  
 
4.3.2.5 Extension of agreements to non-parties 
 
The LMC (1996:58) explains the aim of extending agreements as ensuring that all employers 
are bound by collective agreements reached in representative bargaining councils or where 
extensions are needed to support stable sectoral bargaining. 
 
The LRA (s 32) makes provision for the extension of agreements to non-parties by the MOL. In 
addition to extension at the instance of majority parties (s 32[1]), it allows for the possibility of 
extension when parties to the council are sufficiently representative within the registered scope 
of the council in the area in which the extension is sought; or where failure to extend the 
agreement may undermine collective bargaining at sectoral level (s 32[b]). A council is deemed 
to be representative in a sector if the employer party on the council employs more than 50% of 
the employees covered by the council, and the trade union party represents more than 50% of 
the employees. In such cases, and when all requirements have been met, the Minister is 
obliged to extend a council‘s agreement if requested to do so (Godfrey et al 2006:741-742). 
However, this does not seem to be strictly applied - in 2004, even where councils were not 
representative on both counts, agreements were extended. The authors conclude that councils 
must have been either sufficiently representative, or not extending the agreement would have 
threatened bargaining at sectoral level. The Minister had thus used his discretion to extend the 
agreements, although evidence shows that the DOL is much sterner in exercising this discretion 
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Nonetheless, the extension of agreements to non-parties has, and will always be, a much 
debated point (see Moll 1996; Cooper 2000:240). It is seen as a stabilising factor and a 
condition of labour peace, on the one hand, and creates unemployment, on the other. According 
to Barker (2003:326), because wages are standardised throughout the industry, it might be that 
employers, in the interest of labour peace, agree to higher wages than they would have, had 
there be no bargaining council. Since all employers are then paying this higher wage, and 
because this can be passed on to the consumer, this reduces the incentive to resist wage 
demands. Furthermore, because competition on the basis of wages is eliminated, the operation 
of the market mechanism is interfered with, which may have a negative impact on international 
competitiveness. Moll (1996) contends that organisations may adopt more capital-intensive 
means of production, because some organisations will be incapable of paying the negotiated 
wages, and in the long run will go out of business. Over time, ―compulsory‖ centralisation raises 
wages to a new level. This is because management are deprived of the example of uncovered 
nonunionised workers in the same industry who are earning lower wages.  
 
Other questions are raised, for example, on the ethics of enforcing agreements on parties who 
were not party to the agreement that was reached. Small employers in particular argue that it 
often results in agreements with which smaller organisations cannot comply. Furthermore, it is 
argued that it is against the principle of freedom of association, and nullifies the principle of 
voluntary membership of councils (Bendix 2004:275). The major justification for it is to support 
sectoral bargaining, the argument being that if it is cheaper to compete from outside the council, 
employers might resign from their employers‘ organisation, which would lead to an increasingly 
unrepresentative employers‘ organisation, and the ultimate collapse of the council (Barker 
2003:325).  
 
However, Du Toit et al (1995:9) found that party employers‘ organisations and party trade 
unions showed strong support for the extension of agreements, citing the levelling of the playing 
field as their reason for supporting extensions. Of the 50 parties they interviewed in their 
research, only one was against the extension of agreements.  
 
The real influence of extensions should be considered. At the end of 2004, councils covered a 
total of 2 358 012 employees, of whom 335 420 were covered by extended council agreements 
(Godfrey et al 2006a:734-735). Figures from the September 2004 Labour Force Survey implied 
that broadly 20.3% of all workers were covered by bargaining councils, and councils‘ extensions 
covered 2.9% of all workers. Godfrey et al (2006a:735-742) state that opponents of councils will 
argue that these figures are inflated because they count employees who should not be included, 
and that one should compare the total coverage of councils with the number of employees in the 
economy who fall within the range of occupations generally covered by collective bargaining 
and bargaining councils. This calculation (admitting some imperfections) concluded that an 
amended, more accurate calculation for the share of employees covered by bargaining councils 
is 32.6%, with 4.6% of employees covered by extended agreements. Councils‘ agreements 
therefore cover just under a third of all employees that fall within the occupational categories 
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5% of such employees31. Even in sectors where extensions of agreements are significant (say, 
manufacturing), the proportion of workers covered by councils is in the minority, with a mere 
15% employed at nonparty employers. As such, one may conclude that despite the huge 
criticism directed at them, these councils will have an impact on the labour market and may 
cause problems for small firms.  
 
4.3.2.6 Exemptions from agreements 
 
The general consensus is that the only way for an employer to avoid the rigidity of council 
agreements is through using the exemption procedure to its full extent. 
 
The LRA has at its heart a system of self-regulation through collective bargaining by the two 
primary parties. Legally, section 30(1)(k) requires the constitution of a bargaining council to 
include an exemption procedure from collective agreements. Companies can apply for an 
exemption from some or all provisions in the council‘s agreement – which therefore serves as 
the ―‗escape route‖ should a business need to apply for a concession from the agreements. The 
council must establish an independent body to hear appeals from non-parties when exemption 
applications are refused – thereby ensuring a more impartial process. Some argue that the LRA 
is thus an empowering Act, which provides ample scope for unions and employers to reach 
agreements that suit their circumstances (eg Patel 1999).  
 
However, the ILO Review (Standing et al 1996:150, 180) lists a number of criticisms against the 
system of exemptions, most importantly that there would be a smaller need for exemptions if 
simpler, less arduous ―framework‖ agreements were concluded at sectoral level. This view is 
widely supported. Baskin (1998) argues that bargaining coverage is more likely to be extended 
to the most vulnerable in sectors if sectoral agreements focus more on ―modest, enforceable 
agreements‖, while Cheadle (2007:52) states that the Minister should be strict on collective 
agreements that prove to be ―too bureaucratic or onerous‖. 
 
Nonetheless, not many firms apply for exemptions. Macun (2008) found that only 12% of 
organisations applied for exemptions from the (then) industrial council system, and that most of 
these were larger firms employing more than 151 workers. The South African Enterprise Labour 
Flexibility Survey (Vettori 2001; Bezuidenhout 2000) also indicated that it is mainly larger 
employers (with between 150 and 400 workers) that apply for exemptions. However, the 
research is contradicted by Godfrey et al (2006b:1378-1380), who indicate that mainly small 
firms apply for exemptions32 - although these findings are limited by the number of responses 
                                                 
31 Godfrey et al (2006a:730-731) highlight one problem in this data: bargaining councils do not know about those 
firms that should be registered with a council, but fail to (or refuse to) do so – had they known about them, they could 
be pursued to encourage them to register. However, this shortcoming means that the failure to include employees at 
noncompliant firms (which are technically covered by extended agreements) to some extent discounts the above 
figures. The overall coverage of councils and the coverage of non-parties are therefore higher – although it is 
practically impossible to know by how much. 
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received regarding this matter in their research. Data provided by the DOL supported their 
research - in respect of 44 bargaining councils examined in 2003, 7 373 applications for 
exemption were made – 59% of these from small firms. Of these applications, 77% were 
granted in total, and if one looks only at small firms, a total of 78% was granted. Research also 
indicates that most exemptions that are applied for are granted - either in full, at least partially or 
subject to conditions (Godfrey et al 2006b:1375-1377). It further shows that only a limited 
number of refused exemptions are taken on appeal. 
 
Godfrey et al (2006b:1381) also studied the accessibility to, and use of the exemption system by 
nonparty firms. When comparing the number of party as opposed to nonparty applications, the 
vast majority come from non-parties. Few of these applications were for full exemptions, but 
were mainly focused on exemption from council benefit funds and wage clauses. 
 
Hence in practice, all councils must make provision for exemptions from collective agreements. 
In most cases it was a subcommittee of the council – if there was no subcommittee, the full 
council would take responsibility (Godfrey et al 2006b:1371-1372). The subcommittees 
comprised lawyers, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) 
commissioners, ex-trade unionists, academics with labour relations credentials and people with 
financial expertise. With regard to the appeals body, some councils structure it along bipartite or 
tripartite lines, whilst others see this role more as an adjudicative one, in which appeals are 
heard by a single person instead of a whole committee. Such a person is chosen from a panel 
of ombudsmen or from independent bodies (e.g. Tokiso). Alternatively, appeals are referred to 
the CCMA. In some very small councils, no independent body to hear appeals has been 
established, even though this is a prerequisite for the extensions of agreements (s 32(3)). Most 
bargaining councils use a standard form for the application process, although other written 
applications are accepted (Godfrey et al 2006b:1374-1375). In addition, an applicant may also 
appear in person before a committee that will hear such an application. Relevant unions are 
contacted to hear their views. The time from the receipt of the application, until it is processed is 
not unreasonable, with the majority of councils taking an average of four weeks to process the 
application.  
 
Most councils have exemption criteria and publish these in their collective agreement, their 
constitution, or in both (Godfrey et al 2006b:1373). The criteria (often regarded as guidelines, 
and not hard-and-fast rules) include the size and geographic location of the workforce, whether 
it is a new or an established undertaking and the company‘s financial situation. Other factors 
considered are the circumstances prevailing in the industry as a whole or the sectors likely to be 
affected by the application, and whether the granting of the exemption will prejudice the 
objectives of the council. In some instances, a business plan must be submitted. Whether the 
granting of the exemption will impact negatively on local competitors who are complying with 
collective agreements, is a factor considered in the textile industry. In the clothing industry, no 
application for exemption affecting terms and conditions of employment is considered unless the 
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employees or their representatives have been properly consulted and their views fully recorded 
in a document to accompany the exemption application.  
 
Exemptions are sometimes granted subject to conditions – for instance, provisions for a 
phasing-in period of minimum standards or that the implementation thereof will be monitored 
(Godfrey et al 2006b:1375; 1385). These authors recommend that shorter lists of criteria should 
be considered and that criteria should be weighted – thus benefiting a more transparent system.  
 
Automatic exemptions33 exist in a minority of councils – applying mainly to the small business 
employing fewer than five or only one employee (eg an owner-driver in the road-freight industry) 
(Godfrey et al 2006b:1382-1385). The authors recommend that councils should explore the 
option of blanket exemptions for particular categories of business, specifically new and small 
businesses. 
 
4.3.2.7 Non-compliance and enforcement of agreements 
 
Another problem area is non-compliance and enforcement of agreements, relating to two areas: 
registered firms not complying with the agreement, and firms not registering and thus also 
presumably not complying (see Bosch 2003:24-25; Cooper, in Biagi 2000:240). According to the 
LRA (s 33), designated agents may be appointed by the Minister to promote, monitor and 
enforce any of the collective agreements concluded in the council. If necessary, agreements 
can be enforced by means of arbitration (s 33a) (Du Toit et al 2003:51).  
 
Non-compliance poses a huge challenge for councils – the clothing sector is a case in point. 
Anstey (2004:1859) estimated that 61% of companies employing about 51% of employees in 
the industry do not comply with the council agreement. Skinner and Valodia (2002:61-63) cite 
examples of clothing sector firms (KwaZulu-Natal region) that opted out of the bargaining 
council as a strategy to cope with the result of increased import competition. Figures as high as 
300 employers, employing approximately 20 000 workers, who do not comply with some (or all) 
collective agreements, are cited. The employers‘ organisation in the industry confirmed these 
figures, saying that about half of the industry (43%) is noncompliant (Bisseker 2010). 
 
Godfrey et al (2006a:739-741) also examined the problem of firms that do not register with 
councils. In the NBCCMI, 24% of employees are employed by unregistered employers. In two 
other sectors, non-compliance was even higher, with only 54% of all workers in the textile 
industry, and only 39% of workers in the leather industry, covered by council regulations.  
However, research (Godfrey et al 2007) indicates that some councils saw the nonregistration of 
firms - a possible consequence of limited enforcement - not as a major threat, but believed that 
enforcement at councils was effective. Godfrey et al (2007) also point out that councils often do 
not know how high the levels of nonregistration are, even though they are dangerously high at 
some councils.  
                                                 
33 Automatic/blanket exemptions refer to a situation where an organisation is exempt from a collective agreement 
purely by belonging to a specific category of business, without having to formally apply for the exemption. At some 
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Ensuring compliance becomes a hugely expensive and virtually impossible task. The task is 
undertaken by bargaining council agents. Godfrey et al (2006a:740) argue that even though 
larger councils employ more agents than the smaller councils, they still have fewer agents in 
relation to the number of employers and employees they cover. For instance, in the NBCCMI, 
the ratio is one agent for every 73 employers and 6 122 employees; in the textile sector, the 
ratio is one agent for every 137 employers and almost 24 000 employees! This indicates an 
overstretched enforcement function, especially if one considers the fact that these agents have 
many other functions to perform. Both the clothing and textile sectors‘ bargaining council‘s 
agents spent about 30% of their time on tracing unregistered firms. It is argued that a more 
flexible approach towards enforcement and exemption applications may encourage compliance, 
instead of avoidance of sectoral agreements. In practice, it was found that the NBCCMI was 
inflexible in its approach towards agreement enforcement (Groenewald 2006:95).  
 
In order to reduce the number of agents and thus lower costs, it has been suggested (eg by 
trade unions involved in the BIBC [Gauteng]), that shop stewards be given the responsibility of 
policing agreements (Van Meelis 1999:68-69). The employers agreed that because of the 
number of shop stewards in the industry, this might be a more effective solution. However, the 
secretary of the council at that time pointed out that even though this sounded excellent on 
paper, when implemented in previous years, it had failed because ―unions did not play their 
role‖. Various other problems were mentioned. For instance, employers felt that shop stewards 
should be trained by the councils, whereas unions felt that it was their responsibility. However, 
in Horwitz‘s research (2000), close to half of the respondents argued that increased policing is 
not the answer to non-compliance. A better option would be a package of services and benefits 
that make registering at a council attractive. 
 
4.3.2.8 Labour rights and the changing workforce 
 
The growth in atypical work and the informal sectors as discussed above raises questions on 
the protection of labour rights to the self-employed and to informal sector employees, and the 
implication of this challenge for councils. How can labour rights and the stipulations found in the 
main agreement of a council be applied and extended to these two groups? According to 
Benjamin (2008:1580-1581), South African workers who fall within the conventional definition of 
an employee are entitled to receive the full protection of the law. However, a worker who falls 
outside this definition does not have this protection, and little or no entitlement to social 
insurance benefits. For instance, the self-employed are not regarded as employees and thus not 
covered by labour law. Whilst the informal sector‘s employees are covered by labour laws, in 
practice they cannot actually enforce these rights.  
 
Certain ILO conventions (eg Convention 87 of 1948 on Freedom of Association and the Right to 
Organise) are applicable to all workers – including self-employed workers, corresponding with 
its mandate to protect all workers. It can thus be argued that international law obligations require 
countries to broaden aspects of their labour law to workers other than employees. The South 
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all workers to engage in collective bargaining – the rationale being to confirm the democratic 
values of human dignity, equal rights and freedom. Labour law under South African conditions 
has a more integrative function, which includes the ―... need to combat the social exclusion of an 
underclass of unemployed or partially employed people‖ (Du Toit 2007:1423-1427). This leaves 
the questions of how employees can effectively affirm their right to bargain collectively in this 
globalised production process; and how trade unions can engage meaningfully with 
multinational employers, another result of globalisation.34  
 
DOL research indicated that the increase of nonstandard employment has eroded the quality of 
labour protection and a reassessment of policies and legislative provisions may be called for. 
For instance, the existence of a bargaining council in a sector prevents the MOL from setting 
special minimum conditions for informal workers in that sector because all employees in that 
sector fall under the jurisdiction of the council. The current scenario does not take into account 
the fact that a council may only have the capacity to protect some of the workers in the sector 
(Benjamin 2008:1584-1594). The Minister should therefore perhaps be granted more flexibility 
to set minimum conditions of employment for informal workers, including those sectors with 
bargaining councils.35  
 
Theron (2003:1255; 1276-1277) argues that casualisation and externalisation (ie businesses 
making use of sub-contractors, temporary employment services or other forms of 
intermediaries) contribute to the decline in the number of councils. Extending the current scope 
of council coverage appears extremely limited, and councils are already struggling with the 
enforcement of agreements. Macun (2008:35) emphasises the importance of centralised 
bargaining arrangements in this matter, because it will gain legitimacy and contribute to overall 
stability if these arrangements can sustain more equal income distribution and extend wage 
agreements to more vulnerable workers without putting jobs at risk. Benjamin (2008:1587-1589) 
draws the following conclusion:  
[It] is not an overstatement to say that conventional legal regimes establishing labour 
rights are undergoing what can be termed a crisis of application. This arises from the fact 
that in most labour markets an increasing proportion of workers ... are unprotected or 
inadequately protected by labour rights.  
There does not appear to be any ‗‖universal‖ solution to the regulation of informal work. 
 
According to Godfrey (Benjamin 2008:1592-1594), some council responses to protect 
vulnerable employment have emerged: 
 The BIBC (CGH) uses a variety of strategies to regulate outsourcing to labour-only sub-
contractors and achieve compliance with their agreements. An agreement was reached 
with large-scale housing financial institutions to allow contracting of builders registered 
                                                 
34 Also, in South Africa, the decentralisation of production poses major challenges for traditional bargaining 
structures, and the internationalisation of production an even greater challenge (Du Toit 2007:1428-1429). 
Internationally this has led to either international collective bargaining between international trade union structures 
and international employers‘ organisations, the coordination of bargaining activities internationally or international 
framework agreements between international trade unions and multinational employers (ILO 2000:31-32). One can 
but wonder what the effect of this would be on bargaining councils.  
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with the council only. Other services such as payroll services and an employment bureau 
have been established to attract smaller firms. All of the above have resulted in more, and 
smaller, firms registering with the council, and complying with its agreements.  
 Another example is the Leather Industry Bargaining Council. This sector was brought to 
the brink of collapse because of trade liberalisation and the huge influx of cheap shoes. 
However, employers and trade unions responded by revising the footwear collective 
agreement: they classified businesses in one of three categories: formal businesses pay 
100% of the set wage and have to comply with the full agreement; semiformal firms differ 
from the previous category in that they only have to pay 75% of the set wage rates. 
Informal firms are fully excluded from the agreement, but must still register with the 
council. Additional negotiations are allowed at plant level, which can reduce the wage rate 
even further.  
 A number of councils have regulated the operations of temporary employment services in 
their respective sectors by requiring these services to register with the council, and by 
limiting the percentage of workers who can be engaged by them, or the work they may 
perform. 
 




Among a bargaining council‘s range of powers and obligations are those relating to the 
establishment of social benefit funds. Section 28 (LRA) gives councils the power ―to establish 
and administer pension, provident, medical aid, sick pay, holiday, unemployment and training 
schemes or funds or any similar schemes or funds for the benefit of one or more of the parties 
to the bargaining council or their members‖. Councils have to report each year to the Registrar 
on these funds. Section 33A(2) states that collective agreements that include ―the rules of any 
fund or scheme established by the bargaining council‖ may be extended to non-parties. The 
benefit funds of councils form part of either the main agreement or fall under separate 
agreements. Agreements regarding funds are not renegotiated on a regular basis, and often 
remain in place longer than the main agreement (Bhorat et al 2009:6).  
 
Criticism regarding flexibility is cited against these benefit systems. In general, small firm 
perceptions of benefit funds are negative, with complaints ranging from the cost of the funds, to 
allegations that benefits were poor with difficult access (Godfrey et al 2007). In the BIBC (CGH), 
complaints were raised about the inflexibility and costliness of social benefit schemes because 
employers feel that having to buy the full range of benefits (holiday, pension and sick fund) 
takes away any form of flexibility (Horwitz 2000). Even so, they indicated that although the 
pension/provident fund was deemed to be costly, the council system may still be less expensive 
than individual employer schemes. It was suggested that councils should be more flexible, and 
that a stamp purchase system be offered similar to a ‖cafeteria system‖ whereby employers and 
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The question remains on how well councils can – if at all – deal with the challenges of providing 
social protection to the informal sector. Nonetheless, it has become an agenda point. Benjamin 
(2008:1585-1586) mentions that the challenge of how labour law can engage with the social 
security systems to extend forms of protection to those who currently fall outside of the social 
safety net, has been raised. The complexity of the problem is acknowledged because of the 
diversity in the informal sector.  
 
4.3.3.2 Legislative changes  
 
Recent years have seen significant changes in legislation that directly affect bargaining councils 
in respect of both retirement (provident and pension) and medical schemes. Budlender and 
Sadeck (2007) explain that the first major change came with the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act of 1998, which amended section 28 of the 1995 LRA to say that ―the provisions of the laws 
relating to pension, provident or medical aid schemes or funds must be complied with in 
establishing any pension, provident or medical aid scheme or fund‖ by a council, and that the 
relevant laws would apply to all such funds and schemes previously established.  
 
More far-reaching changes are expected in the coming years. In 2007, research was 
commissioned by the National Treasury as part of a larger group of papers investigating 
different aspects of the current situation in respect of social security arrangements in South 
Africa.36 One particular paper looked at the benefit schemes of bargaining councils and related 
bodies. The research aimed to establish which of the councils have particular types of funds 
and, subsequently, the basic characteristics of those funds (Budlender & Sadeck 2007). Most of 
the discussion that follows is based on this research. 
 
4.3.3.3 Bargaining councils with funds 
 
In their research, Budlender and Sadeck (2007) and Macun (2008:34) indicated that a total of 
27 private sector councils37 had at least one fund. This constitutes about two-thirds of all private 
sector councils. According to estimates, a total of over 800 000, and close on 50 000 employers, 
are covered. However, in practice, there are at least two reasons why fewer employees than 
this would be covered by funds. Firstly, some bargaining councils have funds that do not cover 
all employees in their scope, for instance, funds covering only metropolitan workers. Secondly, 
some council funds are not extended to non-parties. Twenty of the 27 councils said their main 
agreement is extended to non-parties. The variation in both size and geographical range 
represents two of the many characteristics in terms of which council funds are diverse.  
 
                                                 
36 The proposed reforms include the introduction of a multipillar system consisting of improvements to social 
assistance grants, unemployment insurance and death and disability benefits. It also includes obligatory participation 
by all employees in a national social security fund; additional compulsory participation in private occupational or 
individual retirement funds by employees earning in excess of an earnings threshold to a prescribed level (yet to be 
determined), and the introduction of a wage subsidy to ease the brunt of the proposed new social security tax on 
lower paid employees. The Interdepartmental Task Team completed a position paper in 2009 (still not giving a united 
view), which contains the areas of agreement, and the balance of issues that will be put out for stakeholder comment. 
Government has regularly confirmed its approach towards an integrated social security system (www.fpi.co.za). 
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4.3.3.4 Different types of bargaining council funds 
 
a Pension and provident funds 
Pension and provident funds provide benefits to employees at the time of retirement. According 
to Budlender and Sadeck (2007), in the past, pension funds tended to be found among higher-
paid and more highly skilled workers, while provident funds were found among lower-paid and 
less skilled workers beause the ability to have access to the full amount made provident funds 
particularly attractive to these workers. However, this picture has changed - provident funds now 
outnumber pension funds. Bargaining councils adapted to this trend by, for instance, closing 
pension funds and transferring members to provident funds. In other cases, the pension fund 
remained for those previously covered, while a provident fund was established for the 
uncovered workers. The MIBCO fund is a case in point that covers only pensioners, because 
the council moved its active members from their pension to their provident fund at the end of 
2004. 
 
b Pension funds 
According to Budlender and Sadecks‘ research (2007), 13 councils had pension funds. All of the 
pension funds covered only employees from that particular bargaining council. Seven of the 
pension funds were said to be part of the main agreement, with the remaining six established by 
way of a separate agreement. In some instances, pension funds in separate agreements were 
not extended to non-parties. In such instances, these funds can act as an encouragement to 
employers and employees to become members of the parties to the council, thereby promoting 
an increase in the representivity of councils. Another possible outcome of having a fund 
separate from the main agreement is that it may cover a longer period and will then not be 
affected if the main agreement is not extended because of hold-ups in annual wage 
negotiations. Employers and employees contributed the same amount each month to these 
funds. Funds are predominantly administered by external administrators; but the MEIBC has an 
in-house section 21 company for this purpose.  
 
c Provident funds 
Budlender and Sadeck (2007) found that 22 of the 27 councils had a provident fund agreement. 
The MEIBC‘s provident fund was the only one that covered some employees outside the 
council. It covered an additional 107 firms, with 3 047 employees, who had voluntarily registered 
with the fund, and whose numbers were included in the total provided by the council in respect 
of the provident fund.  
 
d Medical and sick benefit funds 
In 1979, a total of 16 of the 101 industrial councils then in existence had medical aids and 29 
had medical benefit schemes (Cooper in Budlender & Sadeck 2007). By 1994, there was a total 
of 34 bargaining council medical schemes. In 2007, a much smaller total of 15 councils 
indicated that they had a medical or sick benefit fund or scheme of some sort (Budlender & 
Sadeck 2007). Membership of the medical fund was not compulsory in seven councils. For 
instance, in the NBCCMI, it is not compulsory outside metropolitan areas. MIBCO has the 










MME Holtzhausen Page 66 
 
clothing sector in the Western Cape, coverage of dependants was introduced in 1994 as part of 
ongoing improvement of benefits.  
 
e Sick pay funds 
In 2007, 14 councils reported that they had sick pay funds (Budlender & Sadeck 2007), of which 
seven funds had separate agreements for this purpose. It appears that while some funds are 
currently offering less than is provided by the BCEA, others offer more. For instance, the MEIBC 
sick fund affords full pay for ten days, cumulative over a three-year phase. This fund also covers 
50% of wages over a period of 26 weeks in respect of maternity payment, thereby topping up 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) maternity benefits. Furthermore, at the time of the current 
research, there were moves to extend the fund to cover compassionate leave days in addition to 
those provided for by the BCEA. Horwitz (2000) cites a further example, namely that the Sick 
Leave Pay Fund of the BIBC (CGH) works on a system of credits for employees. These credits 
are retained as employees move to new employers. This arrangement thus acknowledges the 
work patterns of the building industry. 
 
The MEIBC indicated that membership was under review in consultation with the DOL in order 
to make it compulsory for everyone in the industry – currently, the fund is compulsory only for 
firms that were members of the party employers‘ association and employees belonging to party 
trade unions. In most cases, bargaining councils administer the sick pay fund themselves, 
although the MEIBC has a section 21 company, which takes care of the administration. 
 
f Disability cover 
Disability cover provides relief to employees who lose their income because of permanent 
disability. This income is in addition to what an employee might receive from the Workmen‘s 
Compensation Fund (WCF) (Budlender & Sadeck 2007). However, disability cover in the council 
funds is not restricted to work-related injuries or illness, but may even be linked to the inability to 
work in the particular industry or similar occupation, even if the person is capable of being 
employed in another sector or job. In most cases, the benefit is the same as the retirement 
benefit, and the beneficiary loses the right to the retirement benefit. Seventeen councils had 
funds that provided disability cover, mostly covered under the pension or provident fund. None 
of the funds required additional contributions from employees for disability cover. 
 
g Survivor benefits 
Survivor benefits (also referred to as death benefits) provide assistance in the form of a lump 
sum to family members when an employee dies. It is similar to death benefits for surviving 
dependants provided through the WCF in respect of employees who die as a result of a work-
related injury or illness, but with the bargaining council funds, benefits are not restricted to work-
related causes (Budlender & Sadeck 2007).  
 
h Leave and holiday pay 
Leave and holiday pay funds usually provide for extra days of paid leave a year (over and above 
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employer makes contributions to the fund during the year and the bargaining council then pays 
the worker the leave pay when applicable.  
 
Fourteen councils reported that they had a leave or holiday pay fund agreement, of which three 
councils said that it was a separate agreement. In the MEIBC, it was reported that a company 
could be exempt if it was struggling, but that it still had to contribute to a trust fund during the 
exemption period. It would also not be allowed to apply a second time for exemption.  
 
Budlender and Sadeck (2007) explain that to some extent leave pay funds may be the result of 
historical times when basic labour legislation did not guarantee paid leave for all employees. 
However, there are reasons why some of these funds remain in usage: in the case of the 
building industry, for instance, employees mostly have several different employers during the 
year. Paying the money to the council increases the probability that the employee will receive 
the full amount due at the end of the year. A further reason suggested is that if the employer 
goes out of business or disappears, the employee will still receive his/her holiday pay for the 
period in which contributions were made. According to Horwitz (2000), this system may also be 
less costly to employers who wish to provide these benefits, because cost is based on full 
weeks worked only.  
 
i Unemployment benefits 
Only one bargaining council – Diamond Cutting – reported having an unemployment fund over 
and above the UIF. Benefits were calculated to pay out a percentage in addition to what the UIF 
paid - and thus give the unemployed person almost 100% of former earnings (Budlender & 
Sadeck 2007).  
 
j Other funds 
Budlender and Sadeck (2007) also investigated maternity, housing and funeral benefits, asking 
whether councils had such provisions and, if so, under which fund these benefits were covered. 
Five councils reported providing maternity benefits, mostly through sick pay or sick benefit 
funds. Nine councils provided some form of housing benefits. Twenty funds provided funeral 
benefits, predominantly through the provident or pension funds. Only two of the five councils in 
this research named additional funds when asked if there were any others. These were as 
follows: 
 NBCCMI: Supplementary Benefits in the Eastern Cape, Industry Protection Fund in the 
Northern and Western Cape and Trade Union Capacity Building Fund in Western Cape 
 MEIBC: Compliance Fund 
 
4.3.4 Dispute resolution 
 
A key function of bargaining councils is dispute resolution. It is seen by both employers and 
trade unions as vital – in fact, in a study on the effectiveness of councils, employers rated it as 
the most important function of councils, whilst it was also in the top five reasons trade unions 
supported councils (Reynolds & Backer 1992:46-47). Subsequent research confirms this finding 
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One of the changes in the 1995 LRA is the accreditation of councils to perform conciliations and 
arbitrations for their sectors38. According to Du Toit et al (2003:44-45), the intention of the LRA 
is to accredit councils to take over the function of workplace dispute resolution in their 
respective industries. Councils settle about 17 000 disputes referred to them every year, thereby 
lessening the load of the CCMA (Barker 2003:325). According to Brand (2002:1735), one of 
bargaining councils‘ main dispute resolution functions is to enforce collective agreements and 
deal with disputes relating to their application and interpretation through the processes of 
conciliation and arbitration. However, Brand (2002:1742) cautions that the dispute resolution 
function as prescribed by the LRA for councils is intricate and far reaching – councils therefore 
have to act cautiously because they run the risk of acting outside their statutory powers.  
 
One contentious area relates to subsidies councils receive from the state for dispute resolution 
(Godfrey et al 2005:19; Du Toit et al 2003; Barker 2005; Brand 2002:1741). An accredited 
council or agency may apply for a subsidy from the CCMA to perform accredited dispute 
resolution functions. However, this subsidy is usually somewhat limited (currently R450 per 
resolved dispute) and normally covers only a fraction of the actual cost of the dispute resolution, 
and puts a drain on council funding39. An additional burden is also placed on the inspectorate of 
councils since many councils train their agents to perform conciliations and, in some instances, 
arbitrations.  
 
Examples supporting these arguments are easy to find. The employers of the (now collapsed) 
BIBC (Gauteng) said councils being accredited to do dispute resolution have an added cost to 
the already burdened councils. According to De Kock (Van Meelis 1999:71), ―if you do not have 
an accredited bargaining council you can go to the CCMA for free. We are therefore penalised 
for being in a bargaining council.‖40 Subsidies due to them by the CCMA were also not 
forthcoming. However, research by Horwitz (2000) indicates that dispute resolution by the BIBC 
(CGH) – thus in the same industry as the previous example – is regarded as more favourable to 
both employers and employees than use of the CCMA.  
 
This function is mainly dealt with in-house, in conjunction with a panel of outside commissioners 
(Godfrey et al 2007). However, neither route solves the problems of expense and capacity. 
Councils are faced with a difficult balancing act in taking on the dispute resolution function 
(Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004; Godfrey et al 2005). Expenses vary according to how many 
outsiders the council has on its conciliation and arbitration panels (Godfrey et al 2005:19-20). 
For example, the road freight industry conducts dispute resolution in-house, but with outsiders 
                                                 
38 Ichharam (2003) states that many bargaining councils are still only accredited for conciliations, and not arbitrations, 
and that this has a negative impact on the role these councils can play in dispute resolution.  
39 This problem was also brought to the Labour Court in the case between East Cape Master Builders & Allied 
Industries Association & another v Building Industry Bargaining Council (Southern & Eastern Cape) & others (2004). 
In this case, the employers indicated that one of the reasons for the application of the winding up of the bargaining 
council was the cost of the council‘s dispute resolution system. However, the court found that the allegation that the 
dispute resolution costs far exceeded the CCMA subsidy was found to be unhelpful in that the applicants failed to 
submit details of the actual costs or average costs incurred in resolving disputes. Still, it was not disputed that the 
subsidy of the CCMA was a fraction of the actual cost of performing the total dispute resolution function. 
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on its panels because its personnel do not have the skills to conduct conciliations and/or 
arbitrations.  
 
According to Godfrey et al (2005:20) and Brand (2002:1741), one way of easing the burden 
would be to charge a dispute resolution levy, which could also be extended to non-parties in 
terms of section 132 (LRA). However, this is likely to enrage small firms, which complain that 
the costs imposed by bargaining councils are already too high. Alternatively, the new section 
33A (LRA)41 may assist in reducing costs. The arbitrator will then have all the powers of a 
CCMA commissioner, and may make an award that includes (Brand 2002:1735-1736) the 
following: 
 ordering the payment of any amount owing in terms of a collective agreement 
 imposing a prescribed fine 
 ordering the parties to pay an arbitration fee  
 ordering a party to pay the costs of the arbitration 
Charging a party an arbitration fee and the ability to order to pay costs are of paramount 
importance – they enable the council to shift the costs of the arbitration to the defaulter instead 
of depending entirely on state subsidies or council levies. This could greatly assist councils with 
their payment of the dispute resolution function.  
 
However, arbitration can only be funded by charging a party an arbitration fee if the council is 
accredited, and in the case of a dismissal that is found to be procedurally unfair, or in 
enforcement arbitration in terms of section 33A (LRA). A more radical option would be to 
substantially increase the subsidy to councils or, failing that, transfer the dispute resolution 
function back to the CCMA (Godfrey et al 2005:20). Parties to a dispute can also agree to refer 
the dispute to private conciliation or arbitration, thereby lessening the financial burden of dispute 
resolution on them by shifting it on to the parties. According to Brand (2002:1742), even though 
the parties will then have to pay for the process themselves, the benefit to them is that they 
could choose the dispute resolver, adding legitimacy and quality to the process, thereby 
reducing the probability of a review. The process is usually conducted promptly and efficiently, 
and at a time and place convenient to the parties involved. According to Brown (1995), this may 
make this route worthwhile to the parties.  
 
Proposed amendments to the LRA tabled in December 2010 clarify that a council‘s agreement 
may include a dispute resolution levy, and that councils may charge a fee for dispute resolution 
services (under the same guidelines as those of the CCMA) (www.labour.gov.za, accessed on 
29 January 2011). It is hoped that this amendment, if promulgated, will alleviate at least some of 
these financial challenges. 
 
The question remains whether bargaining councils are successful in dispute resolution. 
According to Du Toit et al (2003:44-45), the quality of dispute resolution services in councils is 
                                                 
41 Section 33A (LRA) provides that a collective agreement may authorise a designated agent to issue a compliance 
order which requires any person bound by the collective agreement to comply with it for a specified period of time. If a 
dispute regarding compliance remains unresolved, the council may refer the dispute to arbitration by an arbitrator 
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sometimes worrisome. Ichharam (2003) found that certain councils play a significant role in the 
dispute resolution process, and that disputes are processed effectively and speedily. However, 
many bargaining councils were ineffective in resolving disputes, often attributed to logistical 
problems of convening hearings (eg in the road freight industry), resulting in matters being 
withdrawn (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004). Another view states that councils often succeed in 
conciliating disputes within the 30-day period stipulated by the LRA - the MEIBC is a case in 
point, with only 0.5% of conciliations falling outside the statutory 30-day period (Deale 2003:23). 
According to Macun (2008:33), a vast improvement could be seen in dispute settlement rates 
for councils – bargaining councils are currently reporting settlement rates of between 50 and 
60%, as opposed to about 30% in the past. 
 
An interesting development is the promotion of a shared services concept among bargaining 
councils – driven by the MEIBC (Centre for Dispute Resolution 2008:23). The idea centres 
around the concept of allowing councils to draw on each other‘s resources to increase 
effectiveness, whilst decreasing costs. According to the MEIBC, this principle applies 
particularly to the dispute resolution function where councils could benefit from economies of 
scale and have a basis from which to benchmark councils against one another. One such pilot 
project was entered into in 2008 between the South African Road Passenger Bargaining 




The chapter provided a summary of the most important writings on bargaining councils. It 
started off with a brief historical overview, indicating that bargaining councils are the direct 
descendants of the industrial councils that were first formed in 1924.  
 
With the democratisation of South Africa around 1994, councils were seen as a platform for 
social dialogue between management and labour, ideally situated to deal with both economic 
and social concerns. Many unions regarded the strengthening of centralised collective 
bargaining as their primary goal. Employers often welcome the institutional support in managing 
their labour relations better, and some regard the council system as having enough flexibility to 
make participation worthwhile. Moreover, they believe that it is a way to protect themselves from 
a strong state alliance with dominant unions. However, it remains a relationship based on 
compromise between contesting parties. The new government saw collective bargaining, and 
specifically bargaining councils, as a vital part of the future, and as integral in, for instance, 
implementing the RDP. The 1995 LRA brought changes to the council system, and has the 
vision of increasing industry level bargaining. Although bargaining councils have decreased in 
numbers over the years, the coverage of workers remains significant and has increased when 
public sectors bargaining councils are taken into consideration.  
 
The discussion then focused on the four key aspects identified as part of the research question, 
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Regarding representivity, it became clear that a decline in trade union membership is evident, 
placing councils under a lot of stress. The main reasons given for this trend is the increase in 
atypical work, tough economic times resulting in an increase in unemployment and growing 
informal and small business sectors – all difficult conditions for trade unions to recruit members 
in.  
 
The main agreements (including aspects of wages and working conditions) of councils were 
discussed. The fact that the parties to the council can themselves regulate conditions of service 
ideal to their industries, is regarded as a huge advantage. However, more flexibility 
arrangements would be welcomed. Although two-tier bargaining addresses the need for 
flexibility, it seems to be unpopular. Councils can also introduce bargaining chambers, thus 
addressing the needs of subsectors and accommodating employer diversity. The extensions of 
agreements remain a contentious issue. Although they are seen as contributing to labour peace 
and a stabilising factor, they are also deemed to lead to greater unemployment. Nevertheless, 
the literature showed that even in sectors where the extensions of agreements are significant, 
the proportion of workers covered by councils is in the minority, with only about 15% of workers 
employed by nonparty employers. Employers can also request to be exempt from some or all of 
the provisions of the council‘s agreement. This is done through a set exemption procedure. 
However, not many firms apply for exemptions; mainly small firms fall in the category of those 
that do apply. Automatic exemptions are rare. Compliance and enforcement of agreements 
remain a huge challenge. Designated agents are appointed to assist with enforcement, but this 
does not address the problems of firms not registering with the council, and which are thus often 
unknown to the agents. Ensuring compliance becomes an almost impossible task and is 
extremely costly.   
 
Bargaining councils may establish social benefit funds. Research indicates that at least two-
thirds of private sector councils have at least one fund, covering a total of over 800 000 
employees, and almost 50 000 employers. Significant legislative changes are expected in 
coming years. The benefit funds of councils are criticised for being inflexible, with the small 
businesses in particular complaining about costs and the inaccessibility of benefits. However, 
council funds are generally strong and well supported. 
 
Dispute resolution is viewed as a key function of councils by both parties, in fact research 
indicates that it may be regarded as the most significant and beneficial function. Since 1995, 
councils have been accredited for conciliations and arbitrations in their sectors. Funding 
remains a problem and the subsidy received from the state is seen as inadequate. Councils are 
generally seen to be effective in performing this function.    
 
From the above it is evident that many challenges remain. In 1994, Von Holdt (1994:33) stated 
that in order for councils to survive, they need  
a new vision in which they are seen as dynamic forums for the renewal of industry. They 
will have to generate and support industrial policy, facilitate new approaches ... stimulate 
... innovation and small business – in short they will have to generate competitive 










MME Holtzhausen Page 72 
 
It is now 15 years later, and this study aims to determine how councils have adapted to the 
changing environment over the past 15 years. This chapter provided a literature review of 
councils, laying the foundation for the empirical research that follows in the next chapter. 
Chapter 5 offers insights into whether councils responded to the proposed new vision above, 





















The previous two chapters laid the foundation for the empirical research, of which the most 
important findings are discussed in this chapter. Chapter 3 discussed pluralism – the 
perspective from which the interviews were conducted with representatives of the main trade 
union and employers‘ organisation. Representatives from the council secretariats were also 
interviewed. The starting point for the descriptive part of the research was the literature review 
of available research on centralised collective bargaining and the bargaining council system 
(chapters 3 and 4). As in the exploratory study (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004), it contributed 
extensively to the study because it helped identify key issues to research and provided a 
benchmark for comparison. The aim of this research is to answer the question of how 
bargaining councils have adapted to their environment in the past 15 years. The research 
focused on four subsidiary themes, namely representivity, the main agreement (wages and 
conditions of service), benefit funds and dispute resolution. The questions asked in the 
interviews were largely based on the information described in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
In addition, to explain and add depth to the results of the exploratory and descriptive parts of the 
study, an explanatory component was introduced. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify why 
and how councils have changed in the last 15 years. As explained in chapters 1 and 2, this 
dissertation does this by examining a number of environmental threats and opportunities, and 
by relating possible changes to specific characteristics of councils42 – including but not limited to 
their size, the structure and nature of the industry it operates in, the nature of the employment 
relationship, the nature and size of the parties to the councils and a council‘s age and financial 
strength. It was argued that these characteristics are the most important variables that influence 
the way councils have adapted to their changing environment. Hence questions were asked to 
determine their effect, benefiting the aim of the research to describe and explain what has 
happened to councils in the last 15 years. Lastly, questions were posed about the four key 
areas in order to determine whether any changes were prevalent. These questions included 
factors that could identify South Africa‘s centralised collective bargaining trends, thus also 
making it possible to compare these trends with international trends (as discussed in chapter 3) 
in the concluding chapter.  
 
The chapter reports on the results by first providing a brief background on the five councils 
selected for the research. It then describes some of the environmental factors councils have 
been exposed to in the past 15 years. The second section deals with possible characteristics 
that could affect councils. This is followed by a discussion of the four identified key areas. The 
discussion concludes with a few general comments on the council system. 
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5.2 COUNCILS RESEARCHED 
 
Five bargaining councils were researched - a short description of each (in no particular order) 
follows43: 
 
5.2.1 The MEIBC 
 
The MEIBC, which was established in 1946, is the largest private sector council. It is a national 
council, with its head office in Johannesburg, and six regional offices. It employs 120 people.  
The main employers‘ organisation is the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South 
Africa (SEIFSA); the umbrella body for 35 independent employer associations representing all 
the various sectors which form the metal and engineering industry. Three other employers‘ 
organisations are party to the council. The employers‘ organisations collectively represent about 
8 800 employers in the industry, employing approximately 270 000 scheduled employees. The 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), one of six unions on the council, is 
the largest metalworkers union, and second largest trade union in South Africa, with about    
232 000 members.    
 
5.2.2 The NBCCI 
 
This is one of the newest bargaining councils, having registered in 2001. It is a national council 
with no regional offices. It serves five sectors in the chemical industry, and a strong sectoral 
approach forms the basis of all its operations. Four unions are party to the council, of which the 
Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU) is the majority 
union. There are nine employers‘ organisations party to the council, with one full-time appointed 
coordinator for all. The council currently consists of approximately 220 employers‘ parties and 
about 70 000 unionised employees.  
 
5.2.3 The NBCCMI  
 
The clothing industry had five regional councils which consolidated to form a national council in 
2002. SACTWU is the only trade union. It has 111 000 members of whom 72 600 (in mid-2002) 
were estimated to work in clothing manufacturing enterprises. The employers‘ parties consisted 
out of six regional associations which amalgamated in 2009 to form one employers‘ association, 




This is a national council consisting of approximately 14 000 employers and 182 000 
employees.  The majority union is NUMSA, with one other union, the Motor Industry Staff 
                                                 
43 Due to ethical considerations, the names of interviewees are not provided in the thesis, although a detailed list of 
the councils‘ researched are given. Appendix C also provides a list of the councils, the date of each interview, as well 
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Association. The Retail Motor Industry Organisation (RMI) is the largest employers‘ association, 
and together with the Fuel Retailers Association (FRA), represents employers. 
 
5.2.5 The BIBC (CGH) 
 
The council has been operating for more than 80 years, and is a sector and area-specific 
council with jurisdiction over approximately 200 sq km. About 50 000 people are active in the 
building industry in this area. The council employs 65 people. Two employers‘ associations – 
the largest of which is the Masters Builders and Allied Trades‘ Association (MBA), and five trade 
unions, of which the Building Workers‘ Union (BWU) is the largest union – are party to the 
council.  
 
As stated above, for each bargaining council in this research a representative of the council 
secretariat, and the strongest trade union and employers‘ organisation respectively were 
interviewed. In the case of the BIBC (CGH), two representatives of the council secretariat were 
interviewed (see Annexure C for detail on the interviews held).  
 
5.3 THE RESULTS 
 
5.3.1  Threats, opportunities and subsequent changes  
 
Interviewees were asked to identify the threats and opportunities their councils had been 
exposed to over the period 1995 to 2010 (or part thereof), and to indicate how the councils had 
adapted to the changing environment. The two main external threats (mentioned by all the 
parties) related to the economy (eg the current global economic crisis) and the changing world 
of work. The principal changes mentioned were better relationships formed over the past years 
between the parties and the fact that parties saw no better way to regulate their respective 
industries. These changes were also regarded as significant opportunities. These factors are 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
5.3.1.1 Economic influences  
 
There is no doubt that the economy has a huge impact on councils. Interviewees all 
emphasised economic issues as an environmental factor influencing the way councils change. 
When the economy is growing, industries are successful, job losses are not a constant threat 
(also impacting on representivity levels) and bargaining becomes generally easier. However, the 
converse is also true. Tough economic times lead to retrenchments, short-time and other 
variations in working arrangements, and an increase in exemption requests. Enforcement 
becomes a challenge. In addition to economic fluctuations, South African businesses were 
faced with post-apartheid challenges of democratisation and subsequent transformation, and 
the opening up of the economy after 1994. Industries, especially clothing and steel, were 
increasingly exposed to the threat of growing economies such as China and India, requiring 
initiatives to counteract the problem. Towards the end of the 1990s, rapid trade liberalisation 
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initiatives. These factors have influenced all the councils in the past 15 years in their respective 
industries in varying degrees. (This has also led to parties realising that they need to work 
together - see the discussion later on.) Examples of how councils have adapted to these 
environmental factors are discussed below. 
 
Most interviewees mentioned the current global economic crisis and its significant impact on the 
national economy and manufacturing in particular. As a result, all five industries reported job 
losses over the past 15 years. The metal and engineering industry is a case in point. Export 
markets have dwindled considerably and employers have been forced to implement extensive 
short-time working arrangements and large-scale retrenchments in an attempt to remain 
financially viable in the face of acute trading conditions. Employment reached a ten-year peak of 
scheduled jobs in February 2009, but then dramatically shed over 75 000 jobs in the space of 
ten months. The SEIFSA interviewee stated: ―There can be no doubt that our membership 
remains faced with an unusually difficult, unpredictable and uncertain year ahead. The events of 
the past year have left the world a very different place from what it was this time last year.‖  
 
The CEPPWAWU interviewee stated that the economic recession had resulted in more 
employers asking for exemptions in the last three to four years, while variations in working hours 
(especially overtime) became more prominent, particularly in medium-sized businesses 
employing up to 100 employees.  
 
The clothing industry is known to be under pressure. Mounting levels of imports are resulting in 
considerable job losses. The SACTWU and AMSA interviewees explained that a ‗‖Rescue 
Package‖ initiative had been formed in 2009 to address the impact of this crisis on the industry. 
The Department of Trade and Industry, SACTWU and AMSA - under the auspices of the 
NBCCMI – identified 12 policy measures to be implemented. One of these was a coordinated 
and well-resourced skills development programme constructed to cover the full spectrum of 
skills requirements in support of future growth areas. The programme determines that 
employees who ordinarily would be retrenched would, where possible, be offered training 
discharges, which would keep them in employment during the economic recession but reskill 
them for future economic recovery.  
 
BIBC (CGH) officials take consolation in the fact that their industry is cyclical and should return 
to higher levels. They attempt to avoid retrenchments by allowing temporary layoffs for a 
continuous period not exceeding 20 working days (collective agreement clause 8(9)). According 
to this, an employer may temporarily lay off employees on account of inclement weather, a 
shortage of material owing to circumstances beyond the control of the employer or a temporary 
shortage of work. If, at the end of this 20-day period, the employer wishes to extend the lay-off 
period for a further 20 working days, the employee is first given the choice to be retrenched in 
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5.3.1.2 The changing world of work 
  
The research showed that the workers‘ profile has changed in the past 15 years, and that – in 
line with international trends – increasingly more workers find themselves in atypical 
employment with casualisation, the use of sub-contractors, labour brokers and temporary 
employment on the rise. A growing informal sector is evident. Councils are severely threatened 
by this phenomenon because a decline in permanent employment leads to a decrease in 
membership numbers of parties, thus threatening parties‘ representivity levels. A few examples 
are provided below. 
 
All parties, with the exception of the NBCCI secretariat, indicated that the changing world of 
work has threatened councils. The SEIFSA interviewee explained this as follows: ―From 1995-
2010 the industry has moved progressively into atypical employment. Fixed-term contracts are 
renewed and rolled-over, labour brokering has grown a lot. Permanent employment has 
declined. This is mainly because of our inflexible labour policies‖. According to the MEIBC 
representative, the industry has always had atypical work, often necessitated by the very nature 
of the industry – for instance, a major infrastructure project that requires the increase of atypical 
employment for the period of the project. Still, the use of labour brokers has increased 
dramatically and is fairly new in this industry – it was estimated at about 5% of their workforce in 
1999, whilst the current estimate is about 20 to 25%. He indicated that similar to other 
employment, labour brokering is also influenced by economic growth, or the lack thereof (eg  a 
recession). In tough times, the use of labour brokers also declines. However, employers 
sometimes also view it as a way to ―bypass the hassles and difficulties of hiring and firing‖. The 
MEIBC interviewee stated the following: ―Lots of pressure exists for mobility, this should be 
encouraged, but then a skills and safety net is needed. There is still a competitive dimension to 
all of this. It is a reality – we need to promote competitiveness within the agenda of decent 
work.‖ According to the ILO the Decent Work concept ―... is based on the understanding that 
work is a source of personal dignity, family stability, peace in the community, democracies that 
deliver for people, and economic growth that expands opportunities for productive jobs and 
enterprise development‖ (www.ilo.org). 
 
The greatest current challenge is that of labour brokers. In 2009, the MOL presented to 
NEDLAC a report and a range of proposed legislative amendments – including the introduction 
of ministerial power to prohibit labour broking in any particular sector of the economy. A draft 
amendment Bill was formulated for consideration by the Cabinet and Parliament with the 
intention of introducing legislative changes. Employer parties regard the possible restriction of 
labour brokers as a threat to their businesses. Labour, however, sees labour brokering and 
other atypical forms of work as a threat to its own existence (eg the difficulty of recruiting 
members under such circumstances), and to its members (eg the lack of security employees 
have on account of flexible employment practices).  
 
The following are specific examples: SEIFSA came out strongly against the possible 
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presumptions, powers and new employer liabilities into labour law, making the South African 
labour market more inflexible. SEIFSA believes that proper enforcement of current legislation is 
the key to eliminating the various alleged employment abuses referred to in the Minister‘s 
report, and does not support further regulation in the absence of a meticulous effort focused on 
ensuring effective and proper adherence of existing labour legislation. SEIFSA argued that 
further restrictions on employers regarding their use of labour will have a serious detrimental 
effect on anticipated industry growth and have an adverse impact on the numbers of workers 
employed. It will thus do everything in its power to protect its members‘ rights to use flexible 
employment practices and services provided by labour brokers. However, the AMSA 
representative argued that the industry has seen only marginal changes in labour brokering 
usage, and that at least 90% of employment contracts are still permanent. Casualisation is 
limited. Still, all indications are that there has been huge informalisation of clothing operations.  
 
Another case in point is the BIBC. The council representative emphasised that ―fragmentation is 
the main threat to the council, as it leads to representivity problems‖. He explained that large 
firms that used to employ more than 6 000 employees have adapted a new business model: 
―Sub-contracting then became fashionable, and they are now project managers. This happens 
in big and smaller businesses. The threat lies in that it becomes more difficult to control.‖  
 
The methods councils employ to deal with the changing world of work are discussed in section 
5.3.2. 
 
5.3.1.3 Level of cooperation between the respective parties 
 
One of the most significant opportunities reiterated by all interviewees was the more mature 
relationship that has emerged between the respective parties in the past 15 years. To a certain 
extent this was a result of difficult and changing economic circumstances (as discussed above), 
and crippling industrial action – both of which forced the respective parties to seek a different 
approach. Negotiations now tend to centre more around win-win situations – considering the 
overall effect of the outcomes on the respective industries. The chemical industry attributes its 
sector‘s improved relationships to the formation of the council. More detail follows. 
 
Earlier research (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) confirmed considerable tension, controversy 
and continuous debate between parties, especially from the employers‘ side. Trade unions 
indicated that they could not trust employers because they were set on undermining or 
eliminating unions. In the current research, the MIBCO, MEIBC and NBCCMI interviewees all 
indicated that in the last 15 years, a concerted effort had been made to turn their relationships 
around. In many instances, this had been a long and difficult process. The NUMSA interviewee 
indicated that major strikes in the motor industry had been seen as turnaround points. The 2004 
strike, in particular, had resulted in parties realising that change and transformation were 
inevitable. 
 
The MEIBC and SEIFSA interviewees explained that their bargaining process had been through 
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extremely ―strategic (big business offered to bargain at plant-level) and a crippling strike 
changed the nature of engagement‖. Relationships had worsened, and positional bargaining in 
its extreme forms had occurred. In 1999, the industry had experienced another major strike, 
resulting in a different approach referred to as ―The New Deal‖. NUMSA had been accepted as 
a party, although the relationship was still adversarial. Parties had moved away from positional44 
to interest bargaining. Parties had agreed to prenegotiation conferences in order to facilitate a 
common understanding of the key economic issues that faced the industry, demands were 
limited to a few key issues, the negotiation process was carefully managed and even the venue 
and physical layout and structure of the negotiations were changed. A landmark agreement of 
two years was reached, introducing a 40-hour workweek, flexible working time arrangements for 
voluntary implementation at plant level and the commitment to the joint formulation of an 
industry strategy to promote economic and employment growth.  The MEIBC interviewee 
explained this as follows:  
The vision of a more benign growth path was born. Parties realised this was a lose-lose 
scenario. They needed to do things differently. Restructuring started. An outside facilitator 
was appointed to accompany the process right through. The bargaining council itself 
became less of a secretariat, and got more active in the process. Its core focus and key 
value proposition became the promotion of collective bargaining. The council became a 
strategic facilitator. Annual negotiations are now merely a phase of the negotiations and 
getting the parties together. But the process is constant, and at times very formal – at 
times 1 000 NUMSA shop stewards are present. We need to be very realistic; we need to 
deal with it respectfully. It is almost a ceremony, and we need to take people through that 
dance. People get antagonistic, they play from the gulley. The council need to sensitise all 
the parties, to explain the process, but behind the scenes. Only thereafter can the process 
start. Then the parties sense prioritisation. Then it becomes very informal and bilateral. 
But still it is adversarial. Parties almost see it as universal, as if it is a particular standard, 
part of a custom they have to acknowledge. Then - let‘s get down to serious business. We 
have to allow space for this increasingly. We must never allow the conversation to end, 
even when in dispute. We have to ensure that. At all times the relationship remains 
cordial. We need to see to contact time to connect. We need to build up trust, to keep a bit 
of the magic alive. The captains of industry are different, they are more informal, and at 
the end a deal is cracked somewhere. 
 
The year 2007 witnessed a groundbreaking three-year agreement in the industry.  
 
Other examples of improved more cooperative relationships were provided. The CEPPWAWU 
representative indicated that ―only a few companies remain bullish – relationships with 
employers have improved a lot over the past five years‖. He cites the regulation of the chemical 
industry through the NBCCI as the main reason for this: ―Both parties now know their 
parameters on wages, taking away unnecessary conflict.‖ The employers‘ representative agreed 
– working together on the council gives parties the time to get to know each other, and to better 
                                                 
44 In 1998, over 90 individual demands were submitted for negotiations. SEIFSA responded by initially rejecting them 
all. From this basis, the parties were slowly forced off their divergent positions in an attempt to reach an agreement 
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understand their respective needs. The MIBCO interviewee attested to more cooperation and a 
needs-based bargaining environment – needs are identified by the respective parties, and 
negotiations follow to see how these needs can be met. However, the RMI interviewee indicated 
that there is still some mistrust, and that the country‘s past has influenced decisions; often 
because business is not understood and known to lower-skilled shop stewards who form part of 
negotiating teams.  
 
Another case in point is the building industry. An MBA representative explained as follows: 
―There is no ‗us and them‘ – that‘s the big thing.‖ It is becoming easier to structure their 
agreements – the council representative confirmed: ―Three meetings, that‘s all it takes, and we 
have our agreements.‖   
 
The employers‘ representative of the NBCCMI elaborated as follows: ―We are constantly 
pushing the boundaries of the traditional relationship ... we are more partnership-orientated. 
There are much more participation in strategies – also with regards to flexibility and productivity 
issues. In fact, the ‗common interest-issues agenda‘ is growing.‖ He explained that current 
economic challenges forced the role players to stand together, and to put behind them any 
conflicting, adversarial relationships. Moreover, they were compelled to find other ways, to focus 
on mutual interests and to support joint collaborative projects. In his words: ―[I]n clothing the 
enemy is international competitors, they can shut the trade unions and the industry down. It is 
not only a threat any more, it is terminal. Therefore we have more participation, more 
partnership between the unions and management.‖  
 
This is not to say that it is always easy. The NUMSA interviewee indicated that even though 
relationships had matured a lot, challenges still remained. The MEIBC representative agreed: ―It 
is challenging to change one‘s business hat for a bargaining hat. Parties are more cordial, more 
respectful, but have not yet succeeded fully.‖ In order to succeed, he reiterated, one needs 
commitment, maturity and the capacity to deal with these issues at a strategic level. The 
SACTWU respondent saw one of the major past challenges of his council as the attempt by 
some employers‘ associations to collapse the council. The AMSA interviewee responded to this 
allegation as follows:  
There was never a decision taken at any meeting, nor was it ever discussed to undermine 
the council. I am aware that groupings of individuals may or may not have had such 
discussions in the past. However, I cannot respond to an unsubstantiated industry rumour. 
It has never been a mandated decision. This is talk in the industry; it is rumour ... 
speculation ... of individuals as opposed to employers‘ institutions and employer policy.   
It is evident that challenges remain. Also, the parties will not hesitate to resort to any measures 
necessary to attain their objectives – a fact clearly proven by the recent industrial action such as 
that evident in the motor industry.  
 
5.3.1.4 The need for councils 
 
Another significant change of the past 15 years mentioned by all interviewees was that parties 
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In earlier research (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004), some employers‘ organisations 
representatives had indicated a complete and utter lack of a sense of ownership – there was no 
sense of the employers‘ organisations or the employers they represented having any real stake 
in the bargaining council or being in a position to change anything. The perception was more a 
matter of being ―subjected‖ to the will of the council, not entirely voluntarily. The council 
appeared as something that had to be endured – this burden on employers and their employers‘ 
organisation occasioning considerable resentment. Generally speaking, employers were 
considerably less enthusiastic about the bargaining councils in which they were involved, 
whereas trade unions did not express a similar view. Trade unions seemingly viewed councils 
as appropriate, effective and efficient forums. The mere existence of a bargaining council does 
not necessarily improve differences between employers and unions, even though councils are 
sometimes established as a result of particularly difficult collective relationships; hard, 
aggressive and overly adversarial position-based collective bargaining; or protracted and costly 
industrial action. In these situations, a council is seen as a solution to a breakdown in the 
collective relationship or as a means of improving the relationship; even as a measure to 
prevent or minimise future strike action. Real differences may still persist. A council does not 
appear to be a quick fix for collective bargaining problems and issues; if the bargaining 
relationship is strained, these stresses, strains, problems and concerns become institutionalised 
with the bargaining process itself. One exception was the NBCCI – the parties displayed a 
sense of enthusiasm and willingness to make the council work and meet the needs of the 
parties. At the time it was said that this could prove to be a vital attribute, should councils wish 
to play an active role in the success of their industries.   
 
Contrary to the above, in this research, all interviewees expressed their support for councils, 
saying that this is the only way that both employers and employees can bargain collectively and 
fairly for a whole industry: ―Employers still have a big say‖, mentioned the NBCCI employers‘ 
representative. The BIBC (CGH) interviewee added that the main advantage of councils lies in 
the fact that ―the industry can govern itself. Nobody is better qualified to govern them but the 
employers and employees of the industry. Yes, I believe in the system.‖ Another BIBC (CGH) 
council interviewee added that the council contributed to labour peace, and thus to LRA goals. 
The MIBCO secretariat stated that at least 80% of parties share the view that there is no 
alternative: ―Here industry has a voice in what happens in the industry.‖ The RMI interviewee 
agreed - research conducted in 2005/2006 indicated employer support for the council. He added 
that the MIBCO adds value to businesses that do not have labour relations knowledge. Another 
MBA respondent added: ―We constantly monitor our members who each time vote unanimously 
for retaining collective bargaining.‖ The AMSA interviewee explained this as follows: ―[I]t is what 
the parties do with the structure‖. The fact that it is on a voluntary basis was reiterated time and 
again. All agreed that they see no other or better way to deal with the challenges of their 
respective industries. This is markedly different from earlier findings (Holtzhausen & Mischke 
2004) when many employers‘ representatives indicated that they had no real stake in the 
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The SACTWU respondent aptly summarised this as follows:  
The bargaining council system has been central to industrial relations stability in the 
industry. It has, importantly, played a major role to resolve disputes between the parties, 
provided a stable institutional vehicle to deliver social benefits to our members (eg 
healthcare and retirement provisions), provided a forum for the development of important 
industry policy and promoted jobs. Undoubtedly it has helped to promote labour peace 
(only one national collective bargaining strike over the last 15 years), and provided the 
forum to develop industrial policy (such as the recent Rescue Package for the industry). 
Established a fund to protect and promote the industry, actively promoted compliance and 
been central to promote general social dialogue. It has also helped to promote union 
membership growth (eg through union security arrangements such as the closed and 
agency shop provisions) and employer association viability (such as agency provision). 
 
5.3.2 Influencing factors 
 
In chapters 1 and 2 it was explained that various characteristics had guided the researcher‘s 
choice of councils to research. It was also argued that these characteristics are variables that 
influence councils. Interviewees were probed to determine whether these factors played a role 
in the way councils had changed in the preceding 15 years. 
 
5.3.2.1 Size of a council  
 
Interviewees agreed that the size of a council, and whether or not it has regional offices, 
influence its operation. 
 
National councils strong enough to have regional offices (eg MIBCO and the MEIBC) mentioned 
that this assists greatly in servicing their members, although both councils‘ interviewees 
indicated that regional offices sometimes work too much on their own, and should be well 
managed. NUMSA indicated that even more regional offices are necessary to service all 
members efficiently. The CEPPWAWU representative indicated that it preferred national to 
regional councils because benefits are better streamlined nationally. The chemical industry 
parties confirmed that the larger the council, the more services it can render, but also the more 
expenses it has to deal with.   
 
Interviewees in the BIBC (CGH) disagreed, saying that regional councils allow more for factors 
specific to that region. Also, a smaller council can adopt a more ―hands-on approach‖, and 
better facilitate dispute resolution because of its more service-oriented nature.  
 
The most significant change in the past 15 years regarding a council‘s size was evident in the 
clothing sector where regional councils had amalgamated to form one large national council. 
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5.3.2.2 Structure of the industry 
  
The structure of the industry – especially whether the sector consists mostly of small or big 
business – affects councils in varying ways and degrees. All parties indicated that larger 
businesses bring stability and reliability to the council – especially from a financial perspective. 
Levies are paid, and a professional relationship exists between the council and big business.  
 
In the MEIBC, about two-thirds (approximately 6 000 from 9 000 businesses) are small firms, 
employing fewer than 20 employees. Thus, almost 30% of the employers employ about 70% of 
the employees. About 100 employers employ more than a 1 000 employees. In the motor 
industry, more than 80% of all firms employ 20 and fewer employees, although the industry also 
has some large businesses. In the NBCCI, approximately 90% of businesses are medium to 
large (eg Sasol employs approximately 10% of all workers party to the council). However, this 
varies according to the different sectors – the petroleum sector, for instance, has smaller firms. 
The RMI and CEPPWAWU interviewees agreed that the diversity of large and small businesses 
in one industry is a huge challenge. The CEPPWAWU interviewee cited the example of big 
businesses that sometimes agree to benefits (eg number of leave days) smaller business 
cannot. 
 
Some councils have had to adapt to an increase in smaller businesses. According to the MBA 
interviewee, the last 15 years had seen building industry employers becoming smaller – this 
does not mean that employment is down in their area, but that larger businesses tend to use 
sub-contractors and focus on project management. The BIBC (CGH) now has mostly small 
firms as members, which are well represented by the MBA. The SACTWU respondent stated 
that the clothing industry had an even spread of small, medium and big business, and as such 
this was not a factor impacting on the effectiveness of the council. However, the AMSA 
interviewee differed, saying the number of small firms in the clothing industry was increasing, 
with a decline in bigger business, making it increasingly difficult. He explained this as follows: ―It 
is much more complex. It is difficult to find appropriate regulatory measures in an industry 
ranging from 1 200 manufacturers ranging from three men doing embroidery, to manufacturers 
that has 2 300 people which are vertically integrated into a retail operation. It is a massive 
challenge.‖ They attempt to address this challenge by multiskilling the workforce, thus promoting 
greater mobility between the manufacturers of various products. Although the council advocates 
multiskilling, Sector Education Training Authorities (SETAs) and employers, not the council, are 
responsible for facilitating training initiatives.  
 
5.3.2.3 Nature of the employment relationship in the industry 
 
Interviewees agreed that the changing world of work (discussed above) necessitates innovative 
ways of strategically approaching and solving emerging challenges. The last few years in 
particular have witnessed some changes in councils‘ agreements and other initiatives to deal 
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Most industries deal with the use of labour brokers by also applying the industry‘s agreement to 
them. Employers remain accountable to ensure that the labour broker complies with it. The 
building and chemical industries are a case in point. According to the CEPPWAWU 
spokesperson, during 2009, it was agreed in three of the chemical sectors to also apply sector 
agreements to employers using labour brokers, thereby protecting these workers. This is 
especially important in some of the sectors (eg in the Fast Moving Consumer Goods [FMCG]) 
where many casuals are used. He explained their strategy as encouraging all employers to 
register with the council and complying with agreements. According to the NBCCI 
representative, labour brokers contact the council and ask for assistance in ensuring that they 
comply with agreements in the sector. Employers in this sector have also agreed only to use 
labour brokers in the industry when they comply with labour legislation. The building industry 
follows the same approach. 
 
The MIBCO representative confirmed a similar approach. They have a special arrangement 
regarding labour brokers in their 2010 agreement, namely that all staff are employed according 
to at least MIBCO minimum agreements, and that by the end of their current agreement (2013), 
no more than 35% of the workforce of any employers will consist of labour brokering employees. 
Furthermore, employers acknowledge the growth of the informal sector and are looking at ways 
to involve this sector more. According to the MEIBC representative, in 2004, a Registry of 
Labour Brokers was started. A clause in the council‘s 2003 agreement stipulates that workers 
working for more than 12 months for a specific employer should be permanently employed.  
 
The growth in the informal sector is evident. The BWU interviewee explained that building 
contractors are encouraged to involve the informal sector when tendering for a project such as a 
school. The AMSA representative gave details on the clothing industry: ―There is a growing 
phenomenon of cottage industries and garage operations. The last three to four years have also 
seen a growing trend of one operation posing as five or more separate smaller outlets in order 
to gain council‘s blanket exemption for firms employing less than six employees.‖ Much 
emphasis is placed on compliance strategies (see below) to overcome the problem. The RMI 
launched a forum in 2006 to develop small businesses in previously disadvantaged areas by 
providing training and equipment – the initiative currently represents about 1 400 
informal/semiformal firms in rural areas and townships. The aim is to create a mechanism to 
migrate informal trade into the formal sector. Although this is not a MIBCO initiative, it will affect 
the council in the long run. 
 
5.3.2.4 Nature and size of council parties 
 
The nature and size and number of unions and employers‘ organisations party to a council 
influence the bargaining process. Apart from the general decline in trade unions‘ membership 
numbers (discussed in sec 3.5.1), the merger in employers‘ associations in the clothing sector 
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Councils are sometimes dominated by huge players: powerful employers‘ organisations and 
numerically strong trade unions (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004:9). Councils with mainly large 
well-established businesses (eg the NBCCI) said it adds permanence and security. Historical 
factors also play a role, especially in the case of the older more established councils. Small 
trade unions or those that historically represented white (or white-collar) employees may remain 
members to a bargaining council by virtue of the fact that it was a founding member of the 
bargaining council and that it succeeds (even if only barely) in maintaining the required 
membership number.  
 
A council deals with various trade unions and employers‘ organisations by allocating seats 
according to representivity figures. The MIBCO interviewee indicated that this ensures 
representation of all parties at all council forums. Also, when issues concern more than one 
party, a combined caucus represents the respective parties, and a unified position is presented 
to the council forum. This remains a challenge for parties. NUMSA, for example, has 12 regions 
– all represented at council level during negotiations.  
 
The chemical industry has nine diverse employers‘ associations registered with the council, 
which appointed one coordinator. It is said that they have a more unified front than their labour 
counterparts – employers negotiate per sector, but still caucus together, and consider the effect 
of the whole industry before they start with their own sectoral bargaining. A great deal more 
internal politics are evident between the four chemical industry unions. The CEPPWAWU 
representative mentioned that it was often quite difficult for the various trade unions to work 
together, although the unions come to negotiations as a group. Trade unions are more diverse, 
and serve different federations with different ideologies; a factor the employers‘ representatives 
do not have. Nevertheless, the different unions still decide among themselves – based on their 
representivity – how many seats each union will have. According to the council secretariat, this 
process has improved immensely over the years.  
 
In the clothing industry, the trade union representative raised a similar point: ―SACTWU is the 
sole trade union representative. This has made it easier to mandate settlements.‖ He mentioned 
that in other industries, ―it is more difficult as we are still a minority union and generally get over-
ruled by the majority union‖. He also mentioned that the existence of many employers‘ 
organisation in the council also causes problems in bargaining because of their differences. The 
AMSA interviewee agreed: ―One union and one employers‘ organisation is much better on a 
council.‖ He explained that the growth in smaller businesses in the industry posed challenges 
for the employers‘ parties, because the council has a proportional voting structure (ie one vote 
for any size business). This was cited as one of the main reasons for the merger of the 
employers‘ organisations in the industry about a year ago. Regional employers‘ organisations 
merged to form one national body (AMSA). As explained by the AMSA interviewee: ―the 
development brought about one national voice. We are one employer‘s body who speaks on 
both labour and trade matters.‖ At the time of this research, AMSA was approximately one year 
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The BIBC (CGH) secretariat and employers‘ interviewees indicated that politics in trade union 
federations also play a role - both trade unions in this council are non-Cosatu affiliated – a factor 
that adds to improved relationships between the employers and trade unions. In Gauteng, it was 
said, the Cosatu union became too militant, in part, the reason for the collapse of that council.  
 
5.3.2.5 Age of the council 
 
Both newer and older councils experience advantages and disadvantages linked to their 
respective ages, and changes have occurred over the past 15 years to accommodate these.  
 
The NBCCI, a fairly young council formed in 2001, indicated that it has structured its services 
more with time. However, not all services are offered, because it takes time to put in place and 
implement them. Teething problems arise. However, the CEPPWAWU representative indicated 
that a young council has a more flexible approach, making it easier to have new ideas 
implemented.   
 
The converse was also true – according to the MIBCO interviewee, an older council can 
become set in its ways – and not always to the good of the parties. Previous research 
(Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) supports this view. However, since then, definite changes have 
been evident. Councils now advocate newer business approaches. MIBCO is an example of 
how new leadership has effected numerous changes in the council over the last couple of years, 
especially regarding service delivery such as implementing new technology. MIBCO has also 
restructured its service delivery processes so that regional offices are now only responsible for 
enforcement and collection of levies, with one centralised shared services centre at head office. 
The MEIBC interviewee emphasised that older councils have a ―deep-rooted way of doing 
things‖. He suggested that change management programmes may be necessary to ensure 
adequate responses by secretariat employees to new ideas and work processes. The SEIFSA 
interviewee indicated that up to 1995, the age of the council had acted against it, because of 
―white craft unions resulting in a white council. We played a significant role in bringing African 
workers on board.‖ 
 
The AMSA representative cautioned that there is often a correlation between the age of an 
organisation and institutional collapse because of a lack of growth and innovation. A great deal 
depends on management to know at what point to respond and to reinvent the organisation. He 
stressed the importance of strong leadership, and mentioned that the NBCCMI is well managed 
and measured against set criteria (eg budgets). This was also the view of SACTWU: ―Generally, 
the older the bargaining council the better it operates and the better the bargaining.‖  
 
The BIBC (CGH) secretariat stated that older councils are seen as well-established, well-proven 
institutions, and not ―fly-by-nights‖. However, part of the success of this council lies in the fact 
that it has been ―pretty progressive in moving with the times‖. The BWU representative agreed, 
saying that the council has developed a good infrastructure, and that years of experience have 
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5.3.2.6 Financial circumstances of councils 
  
All the councils currently have a relatively stable financial outlook, and regard this as imperative 
for their healthy functioning. However, the financial circumstances of councils are hugely 
influenced by their own financial management, their membership and other external influences. 
Councils have implemented changes in the past 15 years to counteract negative influences.  
 
Large businesses contribute greatly to financial stability.  
 
Difficult economic times influence councils‘ financial outlook negatively, as enforcement 
becomes more challenging and levies fall behind. The AMSA interviewee aptly summarised this: 
―if the industry battles, the council battles.‖ Another case in point is steel and engineering – 
according to the MEIBC interviewee, the council was on the verge of bankruptcy in 1999. 
Benefit collections are necessary to assist with cash flow, and they try to break even with their 
dispute resolution levy. Furthermore, there is scope to increase the number of agents to ensure 
higher levels of compliance. Inflation also plays a role – the BIBC (CGH) indicated that it keeps 
abreast by having an equal percentage increase in levies to wages. This ensures that it moves 
with economic changes. The MIBCO interviewee mentioned that the council did not increase 
their levies for a period of ten years, and had to dip into their reserves to keep abreast. Since 
2004, levies have been reviewed annually to avoid similar situations.  
 
Furthermore, the SACTWU respondent commented that councils with better resources make 
the union‘s role easier (eg some councils pay all the costs associated with trade union 
participation in councils).  
 
5.3.3 Key area 1: representivity 
 
Representivity of parties remains one of the primary council challenges especially because 
trade union membership has declined in the past 15 years. The next section deals with this in 




All parties mentioned the importance of representivity for extending agreements, but also as 
general support for the council system.  
 
As discussed above, interviewees agreed that the decline in representivity can generally be 
ascribed to the economic recession and subsequent job losses, and changing work patterns. 
The potential threat to their own existence (eg the difficulty of recruiting members under such 
circumstances, and workers moving in and out of employment contracts), and to their members 
(eg the lack of security employees experience because of flexible employment practices) is 
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Other external factors also impact on representation – for example, the MIBCO interviewee 
indicated that in 2008, the MOL extended their scope to include the former Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) states, and that this currently reflects negatively on 
union membership. However, the RMI interviewee indicated that in the past, membership was 
artificially held high because social benefit schemes were compulsory and linked to employer 
and union membership. However, membership of these schemes is now optional. This implies 
that whereas in the past, employers automatically enrolled staff for trade union membership in 
order to provide medical benefits, this no longer happens. Trade unions now have to recruit 
members. The BIBC interviewees indicated that some industries are cyclical – sometimes 
impacting on representivity.  
 
Table 5.1 below indicates the registered membership numbers for the three councils that 
provided figures. The loss in employee numbers is evident, although the numbers in the 
chemical industry have not changed much over the years. According to the NBCCI interviewee, 
the various trade unions in the chemical industry are all strong and stable, and employees 
generally only change jobs within the sector. The influence of the economic downturn is 
apparent when comparing 2005 with 2010 figures. 
 
Table 5.1: Registered parties’ strength (includes non-parties) 
Year Registered employees Registered employers 
NBCCI 
2001 83 643 197 
2005 79 332 240 
2010 72 427 210 
BIBC (CGH) 
1995 29 337 1 409 
2000 21 102 1 091 
2005 33 584 1 641 
2010 31 940 1 474 
NBCCMI* 
1998 80 635 834 
2000 69 954 702 
2005 83 081 1 138 
2010 57 021 965 
Source: Figures provided by interviewees. (MIBCO and the MEIBC did not provide any figures.)  
*The NBCCMI‘s scope was changed to cover the whole of South Africa after 2003. Figures provided for 
1998 and 2000 reflect only metro areas, whereas the 2005 and 2010 figures include non-metro areas. 
 
5.3.3.2 Trade union membership 
 
Trade union membership and power are on the decline. 
 
Unions were generally not forthcoming on their membership figures. However, it was the view of 
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because of job losses. Still, SACTWU indicated that this did not mean that its power has 
diminished, but had stayed the same – it is still the sole labour party at the NBCCMI.  
 
In three of the industries (building, chemical, and metal and engineering), interviewees indicated 
that trade unions have lost touch with their members, a factor that contributes to declining 
membership. For example, the BIBC secretariat interviewee stated the following: ―Trade unions 
have little to offer. The non-trade-union guy also gets an increase. They have lost some status. 
Often now the bargaining councils will do what the unions used to do. It is almost as if the 
councils are eroding the power of the trade unions.‖ In addition, the lack of resources and skills 
to deal with new employment practices is cited as the main reason for declining membership. ―In 
fact‖, he says, ―if left to their [the trade unions‘] own device, they may not always survive. It is 
the bargaining council that often keeps them up‖. The MEIBC and RMI spokespersons 
emphasised that unions battled because of the exodus of skilled and experienced trade 
unionists after 1994, and had not managed to rebuild their strength. Moreover, trade unions 
often focus too much on political issues. The MIBCO representative indicated that unions are 
understaffed, and lack the time and resources to address all the needs in an industry. The RMI 
interviewee added that unions are expensive for lower-paid employees. NUMSA, for example, 
asks 1% of the wages of employees as membership fees – a costly contribution when earning 
relatively low wages.  
 
When asked whether unions participate in membership recruitment drives to increase their 
numbers, the CEPPWAWU representative answered that ―although recruitment drives are being 
planned and constantly talked about, it doesn‘t get past that‖. The BWU interviewees agreed. 
However, SACTWU has engaged in a R1 million/annum recruitment campaign, and launched 
an aggressive ―Save Jobs Campaign‖; the combination has slowed job losses and membership 
decline. Furthermore, SACTWU has strengthened its participation in council affairs; spend more 
time preparing for council meetings; and promote the ―value adding‖ agenda of bargaining 
councils. All of these were done in response to the challenges they have experienced over the 
last 15 years. 
 
SACTWU‘s membership figures indicate a decline in numbers (see table 5.2). Note that 
SACTWU serves other industries, and that all members are reflected, not only clothing industry 
employees. 
 
Table 5.2: SACTWU membership numbers 
Year Membership 
1995 107 114* 
2000 106 213 
2005 105 276 
2010   95 605 
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5.3.3.3 Membership of employers’ organisations 
 
It appears as if membership to employers‘ organisations is less exposed to representation 
problems. According to the SACTWU respondent, the clothing sector has been the one 
exception in the last 15 years. The employers‘ organisations responded with a strong 
recruitment drive.  
 
This is not to say that employers‘ organisations are not affected by macro-external influences. 
The BIBC (CGH) cautioned that the number of employers (and therefore also perhaps 
membership numbers) may increase because of the fragmentation of the industry as a result of 
increased subcontracting and other atypical employment trends – in their area, 90% of 
employers employ fewer than ten employees. However, as a rule they are less affected by the 
recession. Many of these organisations (eg the MBA and SEIFSA) have existed for a number of 
years, giving them stability and credibility. Moreover, they offer other services, enhancing 
membership support. Some of these services also generate income, for instance, the 
consultancy services offered by SEIFSA. 
 
Table 5.3 below provides example of SEIFSA membership numbers over the period of the 
research. From the figures it is evident that the number of firms declined in the early 2000. 
Among other factors, a recruitment drive was launched at that time, and additional services 
offered to members at a fee. The number of firms peaked in 2007/2008, and declined thereafter, 
mostly because of the economic downturn. The number of employees also increased up to the 
mid-2000s, but has declined by almost 20 000 since then. 
 
Table 5.3: SEIFSA membership numbers 
Year Firms Total number of employees 
1993/1994 2600 192 500 
2000/2001 2150 162 440 
2005/2006 2590 257 550 
2007/2008 2713 248 899 
2008/2009 2483 244 543 
2009/2010 2379 239 773 
Source: SEIFSA  
 
5.3.4 Key area 2: the main agreement (wages, conditions of service and related factors) 
 
The next section deals specifically with issues relating to the main agreement. From the 
discussion it is clear that many changes have occurred in the past 15 years, and councils have 
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5.3.4.1 Centralised versus decentralised bargaining 
   
All interviewees agreed that bargaining became more centralised over the 15-year period. This 
is especially true in two of the industries: chemical (a new bargaining council was formed in 
2001), and clothing (with the consolidation of five regional councils into a national council).  
 
In the clothing industry, the SACTWU representative stated that this was ―in consequence of the 
union pursuing its strategic bargaining objectives for stronger national centralised bargaining to 
exploit economies of scale and to pursue national employment conditions‘ standards‖. The 
AMSA interviewee explained that the previous system of regional councils had been 
unsuccessful – these councils were autonomous, insufficient and uncoordinated. All parties 
agreed that a national council better looks after the interests of the industry as a whole: 
―Integrating institutional structures were much better. It is not the structure of the institution that 
determines bureaucracy. Large institutions are not necessarily bureaucratic.‖ Nonetheless, the 
last four years have seen a greater devolution of power to plant-level work arrangements 
without bargaining council or trade union involvement on non-substantive issues. This enabling 
clause (19B) in the agreement allows for flexible practices on condition that even though 
employers can structure shifts, working times and so forth, according to their own needs, the 
package value of every worker should, over a period of one year, average the agreed-upon full 
package. Workers should thus not receive less than what they would have, had no flexibility 
been allowed.  
 
Once the NBCCI‘s agreement is extended to non-parties, the industry will be even more 
centralised. According to the employers‘ representative, employers were initially opposed to the 
formation of the council. The advantage of not having to negotiate at plant level was the main 
reason for ultimately agreeing to the formation of a council.  
 
In the metal and engineering industry, some significant changes were reported. In 1992, a 
trade-off was reached between the parties when, in return for percentage increases on actual 
wages, plant-level bargaining would be limited. Up to then, the industry had had two-tier 
bargaining. In 1995, it was stipulated in their main agreement that there is no compulsion on any 
firm to bargain at plant level on any substantive issues. Currently there is no plant-level 
bargaining, except for historical ―house agreements‖ (ie an agreement catering for a specific 
huge company).  
 
The building industry is the one exception where collective bargaining is happening less at 
centralised level. Two bargaining councils (Durban and Johannesburg) have collapsed, and the 
Port Elizabeth council is reported to be struggling. According to the BIBC (CGH) representative, 
from a national perspective, the building industry may thus be moving away from centralised 
collective bargaining. However, in their council specifically, the same level of centralised 
collective bargaining remains. The MBA respondent indicated that it may even be more 
centralised, because of their enforcement drive. The BIBC (CGH)‘s agreement is structured to 
allow some plant-level negotiations on issues other than those fixed in their agreement. At 
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This more centralised approach is often ascribed to the need to move away from any form of 
two-tier bargaining. In a previous study (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004), the representative of 
FRA in the motor industry indicated that the loss of flexibility for employers was a trade-off 
against the benefits of centralised regulation of the entire industry. Considerations of flexibility 
were accommodated by the exemptions procedure. In some cases, total inflexibility was in the 
interest of the industry as a whole – for example, regulating (at centralised level) health and 
safety issues. In the current research, the NUMSA interviewee stated that they want to move 
away completely from any plant-level bargaining, except for issues such as employment equity 
and skills development that could be discussed at plant level.  
 
Another reason cited for the more centralised approach was the benefits derived from councils 
(also see the discussion above). The employers‘ coordinator of the NBCCI saw the trend of 
greater centralised bargaining as a direct result – and advantage – of their council: working 
together on the council gives parties the time to get to know each other, and to better 
understand the varying needs of both parties. The BIBC (CGH) employers‘ representatives 
indicated that they were increasingly aware of the benefits of centralised bargaining. A MBA 
representative stated the following: ―We now know the bargaining council is out there to help 
us.‖ The MEIBC representative had a similar view, stating that SEIFSA is a strong pillar of the 
council, and the organisation ―embraces the transformation of the last years, and also the 
council.‖  
 
5.3.4.2 Flexibility arrangements 
  
Flexibility arrangements exist in some but not all of the councils. Interviewees mainly feel that 
exemption procedures adequately address flexibility, although employers would prefer more 
flexibility, especially towards small businesses. In earlier research (Holtzhausen & Mischke 
2004), the representative of the MBA (Gauteng) expressed the view that bargaining councils 
and flexibility are two mutually exclusive concepts, and that the lack of flexibility, especially 
manifested in the rigidity of the trade unions, was, for this employers‘ organisation at least, the 
final straw that led to the collapse of the council.  
 
The existing forms of flexibility arrangements are discussed below. 
 
a Based on subsectors/categories of business/chambers 
The majority of interviewees highlighted the difficulty of dealing with various types and 
categories of businesses within centralised bargaining structures.  
 
In the NBCCI, the constitution provides for five sectoral chambers set out in Schedule 1 of the 
constitution. The employers‘ representative indicated that there is only one cycle of bargaining 
per council, that negotiations in all chambers commence at the same time and that parties are 
expected to submit proposals by a certain date. One chamber may not veto the decision of 
another. However, a right to veto a decision is retained by the central bargaining council for 
exceptional cases where the constitution of the bargaining council is being contravened or 










MME Holtzhausen Page 93 
 
(Constitution, Schedules 2-4). Some examples of issues that are negotiated at each level are 
provided below: 
 
Table 5.4: NBCCI bargaining levels 
National bargaining 
council level 
Sectoral/chamber level Plant level 
 Enforcement of 
agreements 
 Various industry benefit 
funds 




 Wages (both minimum and 
rand/% increases on actual 
wages) 
 Shift allowances 
 Actual terms and conditions 
in respect of issues such as 
various forms of leave, an 
annual bonus and hours of 
work  
 Actual conditions in respect 
of affirmative action and 
productivity 
 Performance bonuses 
 Company-specific issues 
such as training, dispute 
resolution, retrenchments 
and job grading  
Source: NBCCI (2003) 
 
The council‘s constitution thus reflects minimum standards and policy frameworks, thereby 
allowing more operational flexibility and detailed implementation at plant level. However, the 
council holds jurisdiction and plant level agreements are still well coordinated and governed by 
the council. All three chemical industry interviewees indicated that a list such as the above can 
never be extensive, and that new issues crop up on a regular basis. If this happens, it is decided 
at national level where the issue should be dealt with. In principle, however, this three-level 
bargaining has remained the same since the registration of the council, and no major changes 
are foreseen. The CEPPWAWU representative stated that they are against any other special 
arrangements, as exemption procedures are created to deal with special circumstances. 
 
In the case of both the MEIBC and MIBCO, there are no bargaining chambers: instead, the 
main agreements concluded by the parties in these councils refer to specific technical fields or 
types of work. In the MEIBC, the sizeable and complex main agreement relates to terms and 
conditions of employment. When it comes to specific wage rates, however, a myriad of technical 
schedules set out details applicable to specific occupations or types of work. The plastic sector 
was historically not part of the council, but was a fairly new addition in approximately 2002, and 
as such, had a different dispensation. The SEIFSA interviewee explained they had ―automatic 
exemption‖ (however, they still needed to apply for it even though it was standard practice to 
allow the exemption) for approximately five years up to 2007, when it was further complicated 
because of the Plastic Convertors Association breaking away from SEIFSA. Discussions are still 
ongoing on how to deal with this sector.   
 
The approach of MIBCO more resembles the use of chambers, even though its constitution 
does not provide for chambers. Seven different MIBCO sectors were identified, all with their own 
specific arrangements, although the basic conditions of employment are the same (with some 
minor exceptions) across the board. Some flexibility arrangements exist in wage structures – all 
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researching different models. Employers prefer one industry, but with different agreements for 
the different sectors. Trade unions, he explained, believe in a one-size-fits-all approach. Earlier 
research (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) mentioned this challenge, with the RMI indicating at 
that stage that they were looking into different approaches and bargaining models to cater for 
sectoral differences. It was also said that NUMSA had ignored this fragmentation, and sought to 
deal with the motor industry as a whole, disregarding differences. The MIBCO has now formed 
a tripartite Industry Policy Forum (IPF), facilitated by the CCMA as part of their 2010 agreement. 
The parties are hoping that the outside facilitation process will help to resolve some of the 
issues on the table. The IPF‘s purpose is to secure a living wage and industry sustainability via 
research and engagement. The issues under investigation are working hours, shift allowances, 
hourly pay rates and job grading. The overall purpose of the forum is to find a better way to deal 
with the complexities of the different sectors within the council.  
 
In the clothing sector, the AMSA interviewee indicated that no flexibility arrangements based on 
sectors exist, mainly because the industry is so complex. Different products (eg jeans versus 
swimwear) have completely different markets, manufacturing and management skills. 
Furthermore the sizes of firms vary – from three to a 1 000 employees. This complicates the 
solution on how to divide the industry into subsectors. However, this could probably be said of 
all the councils. 
 
b Based on regional differences and/or metro/non-metro 
Up to 2010, the BIBC (CGH) made provision for differing wages according to rural and nonrural 
areas. However, it was argued that within the small area covered by the council, circumstances 
did not really differ. The variation was subsequently scrapped. The new agreement will be 
phased in over a nine-year period.  
 
The AMSA and SACTWU interviewees elucidated that the main agreement of the clothing 
sector caters for three regional-specific areas (KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Northern 
areas) in three different sections. Policy matters are dealt with nationally, while execution and 
compliance issues are dealt with regionally. This federal structure is in the process of being 
converted to a unitary structure. The change is possible because employers have recently 
agreed to it because of economies of scale and cost savings when duplication is eliminated. 
Furthermore, the NBCCMI‘s main agreement caters for different wage rates according to metro 
or non-metro areas, with the latter paying lower wages than the former. Even so, the AMSA 
interviewee stated that the market is still indicating that the council has out-priced labour in the 
rural areas. The parties to the council are looking at a multitiered wage model. The AMSA 
interviewee explained as follows: ―We have to find a more flexible multitiered agreement – but 
then for all employers. At a minimum it should be metro and non-metro wages, with non-metro 
being significantly lower. Ratios should be further adjusted.‖  
 
At the time of the research, MIBCO had three different regions stipulated in its main agreement: 
metro, non-metro and the TBVC states (given a 3-year period – ending 2013 – to become 
compliant with the council agreement and for the various parties to become regulated and 
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however, in the fuel sector it was decided to close the gap on regional differentiation because 
fuel prices were the same nationally. The MIBCO interviewee indicated that all other sectors are 
moving to a situation of no regional variation.  
 
c Based on a firm’s size 
Only one example was found in the clothing sector that has blanket exemption for firms 
employing fewer than six workers. The RMI interviewee stated the following: ―There has to be a 
better model, a special dispensation for small business.‖  
 
d Based on a firm’s age 
As a rule, blanket exemptions are not supported as a flexibility arrangement, except in the 
clothing sector. The SACTWU respondent indicated that exemptions are rarely requested and 
rarely granted, unless they emerge as part of a collective bargaining settlement. However, they 
do support blanket exemptions: ―Sometimes it can help to settle disputes, promote council 
representivity or set new agreed industry standards.‖  
 
The MIBCO secretariat interviewee indicated that their council do not support blanket 
exemptions because they ―focus on needs as they arise. With blanket exemptions one falls into 
the trap of not going back to the business to keep up with new realities.‖  
 
Although SEIFSA indicated in the earlier research (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) that more 
flexibility would be welcomed, possibly in the form of automatic exemptions for companies of a 
certain size, no such exemptions have since been agreed upon. The MEIBC has a flexibility 
arrangement for businesses of three years and newer. Although exemptions are normally 
granted, firms must still apply to be exempt from the normal wage rate and pay only 50% of the 
rate.  
 
e Other forms of flexibility arrangements 
In the BIBC (CGH), for the past approximately eight years, the council agreement makes 
provision for ―new entry-level employees‖ to earn lower wages and benefits for the first 250 
days. This assists sub-contractors when they employ less experienced workers, to build up 
skills in the industry, and to ease entry-level employment creation for young builders entering 
the formal market.  
 
Clause 19(b) in the NBCCMI‘s main agreement caters for some flexible workplace 
arrangements on issues such as working time. The SACTWU respondent also indicated various 
levels of pay structures – from entry level to qualified employees. However, ―the union does not 
accept flexibility where such is simply used as an excuse for downward variation in conditions of 
employment‖. 
 
In 1999, the last MEIBC ―house agreement‖ was reached. These agreements were concluded 
for very large companies, and conditions specific to the company were agreed upon. Today, 
bargaining takes place on issues such as long-service allowances, although the majority of 










MME Holtzhausen Page 96 
 
these companies under the main agreement. Furthermore, labour brokers have a special 
dispensation that exempts them from MEIBC pension fund contributions, although employers 
still have to pay death and disability contributions. Employers are also exempt from granting 
annual leave, and so forth, to labour brokering workers. However, benefits that are not received 
by the labour brokering worker (say, leave not granted) has to be paid by the employer to the 
employee. The payment must equal what should have been due, had the worker been 
employed full time – thus compensating in monetary value those benefits not received by the 
worker. During the period of its first two-year agreement (1999), this industry also reduced 
working hours whilst introducing flexible work time arrangements at individual companies in the 
industry. 
 
5.3.4.3 Time period of agreement 
 
In general, agreements are negotiated for longer periods of time – agreements used to be 
mostly for a one year period, but are now agreed upon for periods of two years and longer.  
 
MIBCO had one year agreements prior to 2004 and three year agreements since. The MIBCO 
interviewee explained: ―Longer agreements bring stability, employers can plan properly, and it 
gives clear direction to what the parties can expect.‖ The SEIFSA interviewee explained their 
situation prior to ―The New Deal‖ (see above): 
The consequent obligation to engage in protracted and adversarial bargaining over most 
of the year created a single-minded focus on negotiations to the detriment of other equally 
important objectives. The need to address the industry‘s employment crisis, the 
formulation of competitive strategies and the like suffer when there is an unbalanced focus 
on wage negotiations each year. 
Most parties agreed with this view, and added that it is also a much cheaper option as the 
negotiation process is costly. 
 
The MEIBC was one of the first councils that adopted a multi-year agreement. They deal with 
any unforeseen circumstances as they arise – the negotiations of 2007 are a case in point. 
Unions agreed to a three year agreement with a flat rate increase – a problem when the mostly 
unforeseen sharp rise in inflation occurred. An appeal from the trade unions necessitated a 
review of the agreement; hence it was agreed to supplement the previously agreed fixed level of 
wage increases. The trade unions, in return, agreed to extend the duration of the main 
agreement by a further year – effectively introducing a four-year wage agreement into the 
industry – a historical first. The MEIBC interviewee indicated that this process was made 
possible because their collective bargaining process is seen as an ongoing, facilitated process. 
A similar situation resulted in the BIBC (CGH). In both these cases the employers supported a 
decent work agenda and illustrated good will.  
 
The BIBC (CGH) has been negotiating three year agreements for a number of years. However, 
the agreements did not include annual wage increases, but only other conditions of service. 
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agreement – implying that representivity had to be proven annually. To counteract this problem, 
agreements have, for the past six years, also included wage increases. 
 
The NBCCI has changed its practices slightly to have a two-year agreement concluded in 2009 
for the first time within two sectors – petroleum and glass. It is accepted that there are varying 
needs in the different sectors, and each sector motivates its own needs. Previously, all 
agreements were for a one-year period. The CEPPWAWU official indicated that a decision was 
made within the trade union to explore multiyear agreements, although they saw two years as 
the maximum.  
 
In the clothing industry, agreements are for one year. The SACTWU respondent supported this: 
―Yes it is ideal, as it is the most important aspect around which to keep a mobilised 
membership. In general, we extend our agreements for longer than a year but still negotiate 
annually. This is to prevent having periods when no agreement is applicable.‖ However, the 
AMSA interviewee preferred longer agreements (say, two years), and said that in principle there 
is accord for this with the union, although no agreement exists on how to do it.   
 
5.3.4.4 Level of detail contained in agreement 
 
The level of detail contained in national agreements is generally not decreasing, even though 
the content is more user-friendly and simplified. 
 
According to the NBCCI, its collective agreements were simplified but kept specific – according 
to the DOL‘s advice and requirements.  
 
The BIBC (CGH) and MIBCO indicated that its main agreement was simplified, using simpler, 
easier English, although all legal requirements are still met. According to the BIBC (CGH) 
representative, this is essential as councils deal increasingly more with the smaller employer 
who does not have the time or the knowledge to deal with lengthy complicated agreements. The 
agreement is also structured in such a way that everything stipulated in the agreement is fixed, 
whilst all matters over and above those covered in the agreement may be negotiated at plant 
level. However, plant-level bargaining is not encouraged, and parties strive to deal with most 
aspects via their main agreement. The council representative argued that only allowing minimal 
plant-level bargaining contributes to stability in the industry because most matters are still 
covered by the industry agreement itself. 
 
According to the SACTWU representative, their agreement is elaborate and covers regional and 
area aspects, which is consolidated into one national gazetted agreement. The variety of 
regional and area matters complicates comparisons. Parties are working towards a more 
standardised approach.  
 
Although all parties agree that they need to simplify the agreement, it has to remain a legal 
document, which by its very nature, remains complex. MIBCO, the MEIBC and NBCCMI 
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agreements – mainly because of disagreements between parties about details on job grading 
and categories. A case in point is the NBCCMI, with more than 20 different job categories, and 
no agreement between the parties on how to downscale the categories. The MEIBC interviewee 
indicated that they are also endeavouring to simplify their main agreement and to ―clean up the 
very complex grading system‖ with the assistance of a specially formed working group. 
 
5.3.4.5 Two-tier bargaining  
 
Two-tier bargaining is limited, although some forms of operational flexibility are present. Both 
business and labour are mainly against it. According to the SACTWU respondent: ―Two-tier 
bargaining causes confusion and results in non-standardised employment conditions.‖  
 
Regarding the motor industry, the RMI interviewee explained that employers want no form of 
two-tier bargaining. He elaborated as follows: ―[T]his was always the intention, but clauses in 
our agreement were open to interpretation. Now it [the 2010 agreement] states it clearly: no two-
tier bargaining on any matter of mutual interest.‖ There is one exception in this industry where 
plant-level bargaining is allowed on actual wages. The reason for this exception is to be found in 
the type of sector – dealer sales and distribution establishment payment structures are 
characterised by the use of incentive schemes and commission structures.  
 
5.3.4.6 Minimum versus actual wages 
 
Councils negotiate mostly on minimum wages, although different wage models exist.  
 
The NBCCI constitution indicates that minimum wages and rand or actual percentage increases 
on actual wages for each sector within the industry are determined at sector level (ie not at 
national/plant level). However, all three NBCCI interviewees indicated that bargaining only takes 
place on minimum wages.   
 
In the case of the BIBC (CGH), minimum wages have always been negotiated. However, there 
is a provision in the agreement that states that if a worker is earning in excess of the prescribed 
minimum wage, he/she is entitled to the monetary increase negotiated. For instance, if the 
minimum wage is R10 and the worker is earning R15 and the negotiated increase is 10%, 
he/she is entitled to the monetary value, which is 10% of R10, equalling R1. He/she will then 
earn at least R16. The same provision applies in the clothing sector.  
 
According to the SACTWU respondent, negotiations should be on minimum wages, because 
they are ―the agreed industry standards‖. However, in the clothing industry, there is hardly any 
difference between agreed minimum wages and actual wages. The AMSA interviewee 
elaborated as follows: ―[I]t is supposed to be minimum wages. But because of increased 
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The SEIFSA interviewee explained that the MEIBC has a schedule of minimum wages in its 
collective agreement – these are guaranteed and regularly adjusted. However, annual increases 
are negotiated as a percentage increase on actuals. 
 
The motor industry has a more complex agreement. The RMI interviewee explained that the 
wage model has three levels. Level 1 negotiates minimum wages and guaranteed monetary 
increases for the whole industry (similar to the clothing and building industries). Level 2 
negotiates actual wage increases for the component manufacturing sector. Level 3 negotiates 
only minimum wages for sector 6 (because of the incentive-type payment relevant to this 
sector). This variation is mainly because of the huge differences and needs of the respective 
sectors within the industry. As explained by the MIBCO interviewee:  
We have 220 000 employees and 20 000 businesses in diverse sectors. Take fuel and 
tyres. We have to acknowledge differences ... the fuel sector is for instance regulated ... 
manufacturing companies on the other hand have problems with Eskom, and the strong 
rand we have to take cognisance of. We need much more mature collective bargaining. 
Different sectors are divided into different categories in the main agreement. However, 
historically, the council is still overarching. 
The RMI interviewee disagreed with NUMSA‘s drive towards one dispensation for all sectors. 
Employers want minimum wages to be paid throughout the sector, so that different sectors can 
negotiate a dispensation on top of that in order to suit the respective needs and circumstances 
of that sector. NUMSA indicated that it prefers negotiating on actual wages because ―minimum 
wages are artificial. Minimum levels are not well researched in SA. Minimum is relative, the 
ability to afford wages and skills levels must be compensated.‖ The industry is currently in the 
process of researching a new wage model.  
 
5.3.4.7 Small firm representation 
 
In general, there is no special dispensation for small businesses. 
 
Both the MEIBC and BIBC (CGH) secretariat interviewees pointed to the increased pressure 
from small businesses in their respective sectors, and government policy towards enhancing 
small business development in South Africa. 
 
All industries have some form of small business representation at council meetings. MIBCO 
mainly comprises of small businesses, and the council allocates seats for SMMEs on all its 
committees, as does the MEIBC. Even in sectors where large businesses are present (eg the 
fuel sector with SASOL as member), small business owners are elected by other businesses to 
represent their views. The council interviewee indicated that small business needs are also 
reflected in ―the needs-based culture of the council‖. NUMSA felt that SMMEs were adequately 
represented at the MEIBC and MIBCO. In the clothing industry, small business has specifically 
appointed representatives at council level from the labour and employer side. However, the 
AMSA interview emphasised that larger firms still carry the burden of representing all employers 
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Still, SMMEs see some advantages in councils. The NBCCI employers‘ representative 
mentioned that small businesses see the hands-on availability of industrial relations services as 
a huge advantage. The BIBC (CGH) offers many services to assist smaller firms, for example, 
payroll services, and assistance with costing of contracts, taxation and unemployment 
insurance. A separate levy is payable by firms wishing to make use of these services. 
Nonetheless, research by the MEIBC (which also assists small firms in a number of ways) 
highlighted the fact that small businesses feel left out in the cold and do not perceive the council 
to be meeting their expectations. 
 
5.3.4.8 Extension of agreements to non-parties 
 
a The past and present situation 
In four of the five councils, agreements have always been extended, albeit not without 
problems. The MIBCO spokesperson indicated that 2010 was the first year in which they had 
really experienced problems having their agreement extended. The RMI interviewee indicated 
that from 1999 to 2010, only once did they manage to obtain a certificate of representation. 
 
The NBCCI is the one exception, although enormous changes are foreseen. All three 
interviewees indicated that the council is preparing for extensions – not only is it reviewing their 
constitution, agreements and policies, but it is also putting in place all the necessary structures 
and procedures. An exemption appeal procedure for the industry is currently being negotiated. 
These changes are deemed to be necessary because the DOL will not consider extending 
agreements otherwise. The employers‘ representative was adamant about the need for 
extensions: ―Agreements that are not extended to non-parties lead to unfair competition, as 
these non-parties may keep their wages lower than the negotiated rates. Our agreements have 
to be extended‖45.  
 
However, neither the trade union, nor the employers‘ representative was overly optimistic about 
reaching a workable solution soon. The CEPPWAWU representative explained that currently no 
agreement exists among the various trade union parties in the council about appropriate 
bargaining units. Before this problem is sorted out, no agreements can be extended. The 
employers‘ representative agreed, and explained that reaching an agreement on an adequate 
job grading system for the industry is an extremely complex problem:  
Approximately 200 firms are members of the council. Each one has its own grading 
system and bargaining unit. Theoretically that means that 200 bargaining units exist. A 
common bargaining unit is necessary. There is no agreement on this between the 
employers, and also not between the employers and the employees.  
He also emphasised that representivity figures remain challenging: 
Part of this lies with figures used to determine representivity. The DOL came up with a 
figure from the UIF database of over 7 000 firms in the chemical industry. It just cannot be! 
At most there are 300 firms. This indicates a problem with the definition of the chemical 
industry. 
                                                 
45 This interview was in Afrikaans. The researcher translated all the quotations from the interview with the 
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All interviewees in the chemical industry stressed that employers sometimes threaten to leave 
the council if their demands or wage offers are not met, or if the trade union‘s demands – 
according to them – are too extravagant. As stated by the employers‘ representative: 
―Agreements not extended to non-parties become a ‗bargaining chip‘ in the hands of 
employers.‖  However, the NBCCI secretariat mentioned that because agreements are not 
extended to non-parties, the council has the advantage that membership is totally voluntary, 
which means that compliance is not an issue – parties that are members to the council want to 
be and thus comply. 
 
All interviewees agreed that extending agreements brings stability to industries because 
everybody knows what is expected. The SACTWU respondent explained this as follows: 
―Instability at plant-level is avoided, as everyone is aware that there are centrally prescribed and 
extended conditions of employment.‖ 
 
b The DOL’s stance   
All interviewees agreed that the DOL‘s stance towards representivity figures is stricter than 
before. This is also supported by previous research (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) – at the time 
no difficulties were experienced with extensions; it was rather a matter of course. Currently, 
however, the AMSA interviewee indicated that extremely compelling submissions and 
arguments are necessary. Although no clear policy is forthcoming from the DOL, figures of 
above 40% representivity are said to be the norm for sufficient representation.  
 
On the question why the DOL is sterner, a variety of responses were evident. The BIBC (CGH) 
secretariat indicated that the reason for this could be the fact that the Minister was faced with a 
couple of court cases where employers took to court the matter of extending agreements 
without the necessary representivity figures. Another reason is to provide legitimacy to the 
process. The AMSA representative agreed and stressed that extended agreements must have 
legitimacy in order to protect the bargaining council system.  
 
However, many of the interviewees indicated that the Minister has to take the new employment 
structures and the related impact on representivity figures into consideration. The AMSA 
interviewee argued that in the clothing industry, employment levels have dropped, but the 
number of firms has remained constant and are on the increase. Big companies are closing 
down, resulting in many job losses. However, increasingly smaller firms are established. The 
Minister should rather focus on whether the relevant parties have the interests of the industry at 
heart (e.g. by looking at the history of the council), as this is more important than the numbers 
they represent. At the end, it is argued, the stability of the industry is more important than any 
numbers. According to MIBCO, mature councils should not be hindered by representivity levels: 
















Councils deal with exemptions on a needs basis, according to exemption procedures. Parties 
indicated that this is essential in order to grant exemptions only when really necessary – doing it 
differently would defy the purpose of centralised bargaining.  
 
a Exemption committees 
All councils have either an exemption committee, or if there is not a specific committee, another 
arrangement exists. This is usually the responsibility of a specific standing committee 
established for this purpose (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004). The MIBCO interviewee explained 
as follows: ―We have to embrace the different needs of different sectors. There is no one-size-
fits-all. We need a very structured approach ... exemptions are one way.‖ An appeal procedure 
is imperative. Most interviewees felt it vital to have an independent committee, at the very least, 
at the appeal level.  
 
Even though the council‘s agreement is not extended to non-parties, the NBCCI also has an 
exemption committee comprising three officials. Parties that cannot comply with the stipulations 
of the agreement can thus still apply for exemptions. The decision reached at this level is final 
and binding, although, according to LRA regulations, parties may ask for a review. The parties 
to the council nominate a person to sit on the committee; thereafter the council approaches the 
CCMA, which makes a recommendation on the approval of the candidate. The appointment is 
confirmed at the AGM. Normally only one exemption meeting is held a year. In an effort to 
minimise applications for exemptions, employers provide a list during wage negotiations to 
unions of firms that will apply for exemptions. If an agreement is reached, notice is given to the 
council. However, if not, a conciliation process is facilitated by the council, and if agreed upon, 
so noted. Finally, if no agreement is reached, it is referred as an arbitration process to the 
exemptions committee, which then makes a decision. It is believed that because of this 
approach, as few as 10 applications per annum are received from the 220 employers registered 
at the council. Exemptions are linked to their agreement period – thus generally for a year. Most 
firms do not apply a second time. However, the council is in the process of amending its 
exemption procedure to also include a pre-exemption trial by the parties to the exemption 
hearing in order to simplify this process even more. Parties indicated that a review process is 
necessary because the current procedures were inadequate, mainly because it does not include 
an appeal procedure, but follows the route of conciliations and arbitrations.  
 
In the BIBC (CGH), the compliance committee deals with exemptions. If the exemption request 
is from a party member, then the decision taken at this level is final. However, if the request is 
from a nonparty member, the applicant may appeal to the Independent Exemptions Board of 
Appeal for a final and binding decision. Most exemption requests deal with employers who have 
defaulted on levy payments, and who request an exemption on arrears and/or penalties 
accrued. Exemptions that are granted are always conditional (eg for certain time periods), 
according to the merits of the case. Meetings are held on a needs basis only since just two 











MME Holtzhausen Page 103 
 
With the NBCCMI, the exemption committee evaluates each application against set criteria, thus 
ensuring objectivity. The council now has one national executive committee, instead of several 
regional committees, as in the past (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004). The application is referred 
to an Independent Appeals Committee that makes a final decision. The exemption committee 
sits approximately once every two months, while the appeals committee meets on a needs only 
basis.  
 
In MIBCO, two committees exist (on both the initial application and the appeal), depending on 
whether the exemption application is from non-parties (an independent exemption board) or a 
party application (a council administrative committee makes the decision). Decisions may be 
appealed. This is a different approach from before (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) when regional 
offices dealt with applications for exemptions on a monthly basis with full decision-making 
powers (similar to the MEIBC at the time). In both instances, committees were either the full 
regional office or persons nominated by the regional office. The MEIBC now has an independent 
Exemption Committee and Appeals Board – according to the SEIFSA interviewee, this makes 
the process easier because its independent nature ensures that there are no vested interests. 
These committees have regular standing monthly meetings. The RMI interviewee indicated that 
exemptions are rarely granted. 
 
b Exemption procedures and criteria 
All councils agree that procedures and set criteria play a vital role in the effectiveness of the 
committees. The DOL emphasised that the criteria for exemptions were a topic for negotiation 
amongst the council parties, and that they support automatic exemptions if an employer 
employs, say, fewer than five employees (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004). 
 
According to the AMSA interviewee, the application procedure in the clothing industry is 
―completely ineffective if viewed from the employers‘ side. SACTWU will not agree. The 
exemption process should not start at an exemption committee with members with vested 
interests. There should be an independent exemption and appeals committee.‖ The NBCCMI 
has recently developed written criteria and procedures for their Appeals Committee against 
which each application must be evaluated. The criteria are generally available to the industry.  
 
Criteria normally include the disclosure of financial statements by the applicant. The chemical 
industry reiterated that it regards financial statements indicating clear evidence of financial 
difficulties as being imperative to the decision to grant exemptions; the industry‘s criteria were 
changed to include this matter. The CEPPWAWU interviewee mentioned the need for at least 
one financial specialist on an exemption committee. 
 
Criteria are generally regularly reviewed – in the case of MIBCO, on an annual basis. The 
interviewee indicated that changes are made to criteria ―according to market realities‖. NUMSA 
complained about the MIBCO exemption process, stating that copies of exemption applications 
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5.3.4.10 Non-compliance and enforcement of agreements 
 
a Level of non-compliance 
Only the NBCCI has no problem with compliance levels – purely because agreements are not 
extended to non-parties, implying that employers who are members to the Council support it. 
These firms want to be part of the council, know what lies ahead and plan accordingly. The 
council estimates that only one in a 100 cases may perhaps not comply with some aspect of the 
agreement.  
 
However, in other councils a different picture emerges. The MEIBC indicated that approximately 
3 000 (mostly small) firms are in arrears of up to three months and longer. The MIBCO 
secretariat indicated that they have ―some problem-children, but it is not a major threat‖. Their 
agents visit all businesses (also those with a clean record) at least once every 18 months. 
However, the NUMSA interviewee disagreed:  
Non-compliance is increasing. In some areas, all agents do is to give enforcement letters. 
They advise employers to apply for exemptions. Employers go to regional councils. By 
then there is a two-month‘s delay. ... It goes to dispute resolution. Employers do not 
attend. In the mean time, they get rid of the workers.  
NUMSA would rather see that an agent should issue a compliance order within seven days. If 
this is unsuccessful, the process should go directly to the Dispute Resolution Centre (DRC) for 
conciliation-arbitration. The RMI interviewee indicated that the enforcement model is wrong. 
Firms should be visited at least once a year. To enable this, the focus should be on the ―bad 
guys‖ – thus not big businesses that comply with the agreement. Furthermore, the focus should 
be on non-parties because they are usually guilty of non-compliance. 
 
Indications suggest that the clothing sector has the greatest problem. The AMSA interviewee 
indicated that non-compliance has ―mushroomed up, and ... is primarily driven by cheap 
imports, it is a competitive problem‖. He added that it impacts directly on the legitimacy of 
extended agreements. He elaborated on the problem as follows:  
We have huge problems with compliance. About half of the employers (about 43%) do not 
comply with minimum agreements. About 80% of these pay less than the minimum wage. 
Compliant firms complain about losing orders, as the noncompliant firms get huge cost 
advantages. During the last 18 months we have had a massive compliance drive. Now 70 
writs of execution to shut down have been issued to shut down these businesses, 
employing just less than 4 000 people. The union asked us to hold back. We had a special 
council meeting. Plan B is to have a multi-tiered wage model.  
The issue remains complex and a huge dilemma to both business and labour – does one follow 
the agenda of decent work, or cause job losses? According to the SACTWU respondent, the 
compliance problem is aggravated by the length of the enforcement procedure before a final 
determination is reached in the Labour Court.  
 
b Number of agents monitoring compliance 
The NBCCI has no appointed agents. According to the trade union interviewee, shop stewards 
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necessary. Shop stewards play an indirect role in alerting all councils to non-compliance. The 
other councils have agents, but more agents are needed in most cases. MIBCO in particular 
experiences problems with the number of agents since the incorporation of the former TBVC 
states. 
 
c Enforcement approach and innovative strategies 
All councils, with the exception of the MEIBC, indicated that they are moving away from a 
policing approach to one focusing on educating employers about the good of the council, decent 
work and thus compliance with agreements. According to the SEIFSA interviewee, in the 1980s, 
the approach was policing and enforcement; the early 1990s focused only on inspections and 
assistance, while from 1995, the council only inspected when they received a complaint. 
However, no other strategies have been put in place. 
 
This function is generally now referred to as monitoring compliance, rather than enforcement. 
Agents are trained on how to approach an employer, and to promote the benefits of the 
respective council. As explained by the SACTWU interviewee: ―The approach has changed. It 
has evolved into a combination of ‗carrot and stick‘. More incentives are made available to 
compliant companies while persistent non-compliance is aggressively pursued through 
enforcement procedures.‖ MIBCO has adopted a similar approach, and since 2006, has 
tightened its credit control measures (the council makes use of credit listings to identify 
businesses), with an even stricter approach since 2008, with the appointment of credit 
controllers.  
 
The BIBC (CGH) has adopted a proactive approach. It appoints more agents, but also ensures 
that the benefits of the council are more visible. This is done through the services of an 
appointed public relations officer who ―educates‖ and informs stakeholders. An active marketing 
approach has been followed in the past eight years, promoting the theme of ―because it is the 
moral thing to do‖, emphasising the importance of providing decent work to employees in the 
industry. Other avenues to ensure compliance are explored, say, by proactively looking at 
approved building plans to ensure that plans are from firms complying with agreements. The 
council also approaches the ―givers of work‖ (eg government, financial institutions and the local 
municipality) and advocates that construction tenders should only be given to registered firms 
complying with the agreements of the council. To promote this, the council, according to its main 
agreement, keeps a register of ―employers in good standing with the Council‖ (Clause 6A (1– 
4)), which is available to anybody on request. Furthermore, subcontracting and temporary 
employment services are only allowed to employers in good standing – if a firm makes use of a 
sub-contractor not in good standing, that firm is held liable for all obligations to all or any of the 
sub-contractor‘s employees.  
 
The NBCCMI has stepped up compliance enforcement processes and procedures. In order to 
deal with these challenges, a National Compliance Manager has been appointed as part of a 
new dedicated unit in the council. To counteract the phenomenon of a growing informal sector 
and non-compliance in the clothing industry, retailers are requested to support the drive towards 
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explained that the council introduced a so-called ―certificate of compliance‖ for compliant firms – 
it was hoped that this would serve as an incentive. Furthermore, noncompliant companies are 
offered a ―compliance plan‖. According to the AMSA interviewee, the aim is to seek ―creative 
and fast-tracked solutions‖. Their ―rescue package‖ also proposes that all three tiers of 
government, together with parastatals and other state institutions, should ensure that all the 
clothing and textiles procured by them are manufactured in South Africa, using South African 
inputs where available and by companies complying with labour laws and bargaining council 
agreements.  
 
5.3.5 Key area 3: benefit funds  
 
It is clear from the research that benefit funds are a vital agenda point, with many changes 
expected in the near future. The main expected changes come from government, which has 
announced a number of proposed elemental changes to social security and retirement 
arrangements in the country. Seven proposals have been suggested, including, inter alia, a 
wage subsidy, state old-age grant for all, mandatory contributions to the National Social Security 
Provident Fund, mandatory participation in private occupational or individual retirement funds, 
voluntary additional contributions to occupational or individual retirement funds, reform of the 
governance and regulation of the retirement funding industry and reform of the taxation system. 
The reform process will have major implications for industry funds – interviewees indicated that 
these possible reforms are taken into consideration when any changes or decisions are 
considered on the current state of affairs. In fact, most councils have placed future initiatives 
regarding their benefit funds on hold until more clarity is available from government. Some 
minor changes that have happened over the past 15 years are discussed below. 
 
Table 5.5 indicates the benefit funds of the four councils covered in the research that have 
funds (the NBCCI does not administer any benefit funds). Regarding employees, the first 
column represents those who enjoy the protection of the agreement, the second column how 
many are employed by party employers and the third column how many employees are 
members of party unions. For employers, the two columns represent those who are covered, 
followed by those who are actually party to the council (ie affiliated to the relevant employers‘ 
organisations). The different estimations are significant because, in some instances, funds 
cover all employees covered by the bargaining council, while in others the funds are limited to 
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Table 5.5:  Number of employers and employees party to and covered by the main 
agreement 
Bargaining council Employees Employers 
 Covered Party 
employers 
Party unions Covered Party 
BIBC (CGH) 34 000 9 400 6 112 1 000 244 
NBCCMI 74 456 35 339 56 044 1 048 270 
MEIBC 300 000 181 000 185 000 9 500 3 500 
MIBCO 200 000 130 032 146 217 18 000 9 000 
Source: Adapted from Budlender & Sadeck (2007:10) 
 
5.3.5.1 Bargaining council funds 
 
a The overall picture 
Table 5.6 below indicates the funds for the councils in this research, indicating that most kinds 
of funds are administered by these councils. 
 
Table 5.6: Council funds 
Bargaining 
council Pension Provident Medical Sick pay Disability Survivors Leave 
BIBC 
(CGH) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
NBCCMI  √ √ √ √ √  
MEIBC √ √  √ √ √ √ 
MIBCO √ √ √ √   √ 
Source: Adapted from Budlender & Sadeck (2007:45) and confirmed by the interviewees 
 
The 2007 MEIBC agreement provides for investigating the possible introduction of medical aid 
cover for industry workers – a project that is still ongoing. Since 2006, MIBCO provides 
collateral to enable employees to buy houses. It also assists employees exposed to business 
closures through its Contingency Reserves Fund (funded from other unclaimed moneys). 
NUMSA was satisfied with the benefit funds of the two industries, but felt that all funds should 
be extended to non-parties. This is currently not the case.  
 
The NBCCI employers‘ interviewee said that although the possibility of obtaining some funds 
has been on the bargaining menu for many years, it has never been a priority. Most firms in the 
industry already have their own established funds, and are not interested in further funds.  
 
Health care clinics have been established in the clothing sector which has also been extended 
to other industries. These clinics offer free services to retired workers. 
In the BIBC (CGH), much has been done to improve the pension fund, such as adding a 
funeral benefit. It also introduced a Bonus Fund in 1997. The fund was phased in over a period 
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period of 15 days in 2010. It is available to all workers, and is based on daily contributions 
according to the number of days worked. Contributions to all funds are entirely from employers, 
and are based on the number of days worked, thereby acknowledging the specific 
requirements of the industry. Stipulations include, for instance, a certain number of days that 
must be worked before a death benefit will apply – this leads to more stable employment 
because it encourages continuous employment. Benefits are transferable when employees 
change employers within the specific area of the council, thus ensuring continuity. The MBA 
respondent indicated that one of the major changes in their council over the last 15 years was 
the growth in benefits funds, especially in the Pension Fund from a value of R600 million in 
2002 to close to R2 billion today. 
 
5.3.6 Key area 4: dispute resolution 
 
One major change in bargaining councils over the past 15 years came with the provision in the 
LRA (1995) that councils can become accredited to deal with dispute resolution in their sectors 
through conciliations and arbitrations – a service well supported and complimented on by 
interviewees.  
 
All councils in this research are accredited for both conciliation and arbitration. For instance, the 
SACTWU respondent indicated that its dispute resolution was: ―Very effective. There has only 
been one national wage strike due to negotiations failure. It is well run with sufficient back-up 
support administration.‖ No real logistical problems are experienced – councils that have no 
regional offices (eg the NBCCI) make use of the DOL and CCMA venues. Only the NBCCI 
employers‘ representative indicated that the administration of the function could still be 
improved.  
 
In a previous study (Holtzhausen and Mischke 2004), it was found that the dispute resolution 
function is dealt with in one of two ways – it is either done in-house or contracted out. The 
exception was the MEIBC, which has contracted out its dispute resolution function in its entirety 
to an outside agency (Tokiso). This situation remains. The MEIBC confirmed that it is extremely 
costly to contract out dispute resolution, but indicated that it did not have the capacity (in terms 
of staff and skills) to run the dispute resolution function itself – because of the size of this 
council, nearly 5 000 disputes are generated every year. While the in-house option is less 
expensive, it still imposes a financial burden on the council and also puts pressure on staff.  
 
The NBCCI, BIBC (CGH) and NBCCMI appoint their own panel of conciliators and arbitrators, 
and in the case of the clothing industry, also senior arbitrators. In addition, the NBCCI has an in-
house dispute resolution department comprising four employees. According to interviewees, 
conciliations rarely go beyond the 30-day period as stipulated by the LRA. Conciliators and 
arbitrators are all well trained and efficient. The BIBC (CGH) also has four permanent 
employees who screen cases, hold telephone conversations, offer advice and try to solve any 
problems at that level. The MIBCO interviewee indicated that MIBCO‘s in-house DRC, which 
was started 15 years ago, was well regarded.  It functions from six regional centres and 62 
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The referral rate in the MEIBC DRC has increased from 394 cases per month in 2002/3 to 668 
cases per month in 2008/9 (MEIBC 2009:2). The council attributes this increase to a robust 
system which is accessible and understood in the industry, as well as to the increasing 
efficiency of the DRC. However, the increase of 12% in the referral rate during the period 
September 2008 to August 2009 was caused mainly by the economic recession. This is also 
evident in the number of retrenchments and non-renewals-of-contract cases that have 
increased. According to the report, similar trends are visible in the DRCs of other councils. The 
councils indicated that most of the cases they dealt with were dismissal referrals.  
 
Without exception, all parties indicated that the subsidy received from the DOL (still R450 per 
arbitration) (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) is inadequate. According to the MIBCO interviewee, 
dispute resolution costs about R2 000 per day, which means that the council has to subsidise 
this service. The NBCCI secretariat estimated the cost per arbitration at R6 000.  
 
5.3.7 General comments 
 
Interviewees were also asked a number of general questions as discussed below. The 
information gathered here indicates a few other areas of change in the past 15 years. 
 
5.3.7.1 Factors contributing to the success of councils  
 
Interviewees were asked whether they regarded their councils as successful or unsuccessful in 
their tasks as stipulated by the LRA. All agreed that their councils were successful. Interviewees 
were then asked to explain what, in their minds, contributed most to their success. 
 
a Improved relationships, the positive attitude of parties, good communication and a 
common commitment to the industry 
As stated earlier, the development of more mature relationships is one of the main changes that 
have occurred in the last 15 years. According to the majority of interviewees, it contributed 
hugely to their council‘s success. The BIBC (CGH) secretariat stated the following as the key to 
the council‘s success: ―The realisation by all parties that we are on the same page, serving the 
same industry‖. The SACTWU respondent commented as follows: ―It has been successful 
largely because of joint party commitment to make it work and by the parties taking its 
operations seriously. We play a very active role in it.‖ 
 
b Agenda of decent work 
In the clothing, building and steel and engineering industries, parties see the emphasis on a 
decent work agenda as a factor that contributes to better relationships, and as such, also to the 
success of the councils. The BWU representative remarked that a council creates a safe 
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c Service delivery 
The research shows that service delivery has become a priority among councils, thus 
contributing to their success. 
 
The BIBC (CGH) interviewee indicated that the council supplied updated, relevant and clear 
information to its members through effective communication methods and regular meetings. 
Processes and procedures are regularly revised. The belief is that being service oriented and 
striving for excellence maintain the efficient running of the council. An effective administrative 
system aids this goal, as do proper advanced planning and a fixed programme. Five different 
council meetings are held every month, but the meetings have changed from long and 
cumbersome to short and efficient. This is attributed to the provision of relevant, concise 
information to stakeholders beforehand, thereby eliminating unnecessary questions and 
arguments. Members are committed and come prepared. As stated by the secretariat: ―We get 
on with the business of the day.‖  
 
The MIBCO secretariat said that the council had become far more service oriented since 2004 
(when new leadership was appointed), and had upgraded its technology to better service its 
members – an ongoing project. The council had kept its regional footprints, but had centralised 
services to head office to offer a better coordinated approach. Furthermore, the council liaises 
with other councils in order to extend its services at a nominal fee, partly because it believes it 
will strengthen the collective bargaining process and promote business opportunities.  
 
In the clothing industry, the AMSA interviewee indicated that the NBCCMI had reinvented itself 
to move with the times, and is now more focused on value-adding services, not simply 
negotiation and enforcement.  
 
According to the MEIBC interviewee, this council has successfully transformed itself. His 
mandate in 2003 was to change the demographics of the council, without compromising service 
delivery. The council had previously functioned with strong regional entities and no uniformity. 
He had to change the council‘s culture from ―highly bureaucratic to one more geared to service 
delivery towards the industry‖. A new vision and mission had been implemented. At that stage, 
the council had had neither human resource policies and procedures nor any computer systems 
in place.  
 
d Leadership 
Another contributing factor is leadership in the council secretariat and among the respective 
parties. The loss in leadership of trade unions post-1994 was mentioned by the majority of 
interviewees as a huge challenge. Leadership in the council secretariat was deemed by all to be 
absolutely imperative. New leaders had introduced many necessary changes and ideas, 
especially to older councils stuck in their ways. The MEIBC interviewee stressed: ―...The old 
institution was challenged. We had to make the council more democratised, more transparent. 
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In both the building and metal and engineering industries, council interviewees emphasised the 
need for succession planning of leadership, emphasising the huge challenge of cascading 
knowledge down.   
 
The AMSA interviewee indicated that part of the success of the NBCCMI could be attributed to 
the fact that the council is ―well funded, with good managerial disciplines in place. It is a properly 
run institution. As an institution we have to be even more creative and responsive.‖  
 
The MIBCO interviewee mentioned the council‘s credit control ability (R7 billion had been under 
administration on a monthly basis from their provident fund) and effective communication as 
results stemming from solid leadership. The council had adopted a proactive approach, and 
endeavoured to react to problems immediately. He explained this as follows: ―[I]n 2003-2004 we 
had a change in leadership. The issues are still the same, but the management has changed. 
We offer sustainable services, new technology and improved bargaining processes. For this, a 
council needs strong and well-educated leadership.‖  
 
The fact that it is a challenging environment was repeatedly reiterated. The MEIBC interviewee 
elaborated as follows: 
Any change has to be modelled by leadership of the organisation. Governance and 
stakeholder commitment is important. It is risky to play this role, but there is an element of 
necessity for bureaucrats. The terrain is highly contested – all parties want to move 
forward. You have to take staff and stakeholders by their necks! You also often deal with 
people who are not competent to do this. You need to create stability through groups of 
negotiators and varying principles, in the beginning there are lots of teething problems. 
You work things out. You have new leaders and new players coming in. It is quite political 
to get roles stabilised. You have to constantly ask yourself what the roles are of structures, 
personnel, the regional councils. You need to be creative, to think through policy-making. 
You need clear rules, structures, buy-in and capacity for it to work. You need leadership 
renewal – it is all part of sustaining energy. You need to know what style of leadership you 
need. As a council you need to be a good administrator – of the agreement, enforcement 
and dispute resolution. You facilitate this, and are the back-up. Still you need to keep all 
this going, to suggest ways out of problems and impasses between parties. It is very 
challenging. 
He sees their role as that of a strategic partner. Apart from steering the bargaining process, they 
also assist the facilitator appointed to drive collective bargaining:  
There‘s a risk to all of this, you need to put limits on it. A mediator‘s role is a very 
precarious one, because you ask the parties to entrust an individual with the process. You 
need to point out uncomfortable feelings towards the process. You have to be hard, 
especially with reality checking. You need to ―live‖ with the stakeholders. The role of the 
council is rather a supportive facilitative role; you still need the key facilitator to drive the 
process, rather than leading the process. 
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5.3.7.2 Comments on the legal framework governing councils 
 
Interviewees were asked whether they would change any legislative regulations.  
 
a Criminalisation of non-compliance 
The BIBC (CGH) raised the matter of compliance and mentioned that post-1995, a process is 
followed of mediation and conciliation. According to the council, this takes much longer than the 
pre-1995 approach of criminalisation and referring non-compliance issues to a court of law. The 
SACTWU respondent also raised this point: ―The most important required legislative change is 
to criminalise non-compliance.‖ NUMSA agreed. 
 
b Industry policy proposals to NEDLAC 
No council has made any proposals to NEDLAC, mostly, it is said, because the respective 
parties normally differ on the solutions to problems. They therefore prefer to present their own 
views to NEDLAC. The initiative in the clothing industry to criminalise non-compliance is the 




The chapter reported on the research findings regarding the question of how bargaining 
councils have adapted to their environment in the past 15 years. The findings are only briefly 
summarised below as a detailed analysis follows in chapter 6. 
 
The chapter started with an indication of what parties regarded as the main threats and 
opportunities during this period of time and how councils had adapted to these. The research 
showed that the principal environmental threats had been the challenging economic times and 
the changing world of work. It further indicated that the most prominent opportunities lay in the 
fact that relationships between parties had matured in the past 15 years (mainly necessitated by 
economic conditions and major industrial conflict) and that parties had come to realise the 
significance and benefits of centralised bargaining through the council system.  
 
The discussion then focused on several characteristics of bargaining councils – their size, the 
structure and nature of the industry in which they operate, the nature of the employment 
relationship, the nature and size of the parties to the councils, and a council‘s age and financial 
strength.  The research showed that, in all instances, these characteristics had played a role in 
changes the councils had experienced.  
 
The research then highlighted the four subsidiary themes of representivity, the main agreement 
(wages and conditions of service), benefit funds and dispute resolution. It showed that in all four 
the areas significant changes had occurred and that councils had to constantly adapt to their 
changing environment if they wished to survive.   
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The research findings add to the body of knowledge as discussed in chapters 3 and 4, and 
broaden the awareness of centralised collective bargaining developments in South Africa. 
Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion on how South African centralised collective bargaining 
trends compare with international trends as previously discussed, as well as a summary and an 




















It is evident that bargaining councils are in the midst of an extremely uncertain period and that 
even though councils are often regarded as the only way forward, a number of pertinent 
problems and challenges exist.  This chapter summarises and highlights the most important 
trends against the background of the empirical research of the previous chapter, as well as the 
literature research of chapter 3 and 4. 
 
Previous research (Holtzhausen & Mischke 2004) made it clear that arguably, in some 
instances, bargaining councils represent centralisation under strain. In other instances, neither 
the employers‘ organisation(s) nor the trade union(s) could conceive of a viable alternative for 
regulating not only terms and conditions of employment, but also other issues affecting an 
industry or sector as a whole. This study explored and answered many council-related 
questions, but also left many areas unanswered, prompting further research.  
 
In this study, the researcher aimed to determine how bargaining councils adapted to the 
changing environment over the 15-year period from 1995 to 2010. Subsequently, a vast 
literature review was undertaken, focusing on collective bargaining (chapter 3), and bargaining 
councils (chapter 4), pointing to unanswered questions and forming the basis for descriptive 
research. It built on the previous exploratory study referred to above, making comparative 
research possible. The research encompassed qualitative research methods which included 
conducting interviews and reviewing documents (see chapter 2). The empirical research 
(chapter 5) elaborated on how and why councils have changed in the ways they have 
(explanatory research). 
 
This concluding chapter summarises the findings of the study. This is done by focusing on three 
factors – international developments, factors that influence councils and four key areas of 
bargaining councils. Throughout the study it became clear that these three factors overlap and 
should be read as a whole – elements relevant to one factor are often also relevant to the next, 
but will not be repeated. The summary starts by comparing the data from the empirical research 
with international trends (discussed in chapter 3). Thereafter it summarises the findings on the 
influencing factors and the four key areas (identified in chapters 1 and 2) and provides an 
analytical discussion thereof. The summary and discussion of the three factors provide reasons 













MME Holtzhausen Page 115 
 
6.2  A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
 
6.2.1 A global comparison 
 
The findings of the study pointed to a number of factors that can be related to international 
trends. The next section compares South African and international trends, also indicating the 
implications of these trends for councils. Each international trend is summarised in a heading 
and followed by a discussion of the South African situation. 
 
6.2.1.1 Trend 1: a decline in trade union membership and power 
 
In all the industries researched, trade union membership has declined in the past 15 years. 
However, a decrease in membership numbers does not necessarily mean that a union‘s power 
has diminished – it may remain the same.  
 
All interviewees agreed that the decline in representivity can mostly be ascribed to economic 
challenges and subsequent job losses (which have been evident in the last few years), and the 
changing world of work. Job losses imply a loss in membership numbers. The potentially 
threatening situation of atypical employment to the existence of unions (eg the difficulty of 
recruiting members in atypical employment and workers moving in and out of employment 
contracts), as well as to their members (eg the lack of security linked to flexible employment 
practices) is widely acknowledged. Not all industries are equally affected.  
 
In addition, in three industries (building, chemical, and metal and engineering), interviewees 
indicated that trade unions have lost touch with their members, contributing to the decline in 
membership. Unions also battle because of the exodus of skilled and experienced trade 
unionists after 1994; and have not yet rebuilt their strength. They regularly focus too much on 
political issues. Unions are often understaffed and lack the time and resources to address all the 
needs in an industry. Although recruitment drives normally succeed, not many unions use this 
avenue.  
 
One exception is SACTWU. In response to the challenges of the past 15 years, the union has 
successfully launched recruitment and aggressive ―Save Jobs‖ campaigns. It is also actively 
involved in council affairs and promotes the ―value adding‖ agenda of councils.  
 
a Implications for councils 
Declining membership impacts on councils‘ representivity levels and thus on extensions of 
agreements (discussed below). In severe cases, it could even lead to the collapse of a council. 
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6.2.1.2 Trend 2: employers’ organisations facing similar challenges to trade unions and thus 
reducing the services associated with (centralised) collective bargaining 
 
Contrary to this international trend, all employers indicated support for centralised bargaining. 
However, membership numbers declined in the past 15 years and the clothing sector reported 
representivity problems. The research indicates that changes in the world of work and tough 
economic times have affected a decline in membership numbers of employers‘ organisations – 
although to a lesser extent than trade unions. Many employers‘ organisations have existed for a 
number of years, giving them stability and credibility.  
 
a Implications for councils 
As stated above, a decline in membership affects representivity, leading to problems in the 
extension of agreements. It also results in higher non-compliance levels that councils have to 
combat through increasing enforcement activities.  In many instances, councils have changed 
their approach on enforcement by introducing new strategies to alleviate the problem, for 
instance, by marketing the benefits of the council to employers. Declining membership, when 
evident, is addressed through strong recruitment drives. Employers‘ organisations also 
continuously expand their services according to market requirements – SEIFSA is a case in 
point. The research indicated that councils need to focus on service delivery, making it worth the 
employers‘ while to stay involved in the process.  
 
6.2.1.3 Trend 3: a decline in collective bargaining as a mechanism to determine wages and 
conditions of service, with a steady move towards the individual contract 
 
In none of the industries researched had this been the case for the past 15 years – in fact the 
converse was true (although a different picture may emerge in industries without councils). 
Substantive issues are collectively bargained and agreed upon at council level and only minor 
plant level bargaining and operational flexibility exists. All parties indicated that centralised 
bargaining has increased, whilst decentralised bargaining has decreased.  
 
This is mostly ascribed to more mature relationships fostered between the parties. Bargaining in 
the past 15 years has changed from adversarial positional bargaining to interest bargaining with 
a win-win-outcome approach. Councils are pushing the boundaries of the traditional relationship 
and are more partnership oriented. In fact, the common interest issues agenda is on the 
increase – both parties showing evidence of considering the good of the whole industry. This is 
generally because of the enormous challenges facing these industries – it has forced parties to 
stand together, and as far as possible, put behind them conflicting adversarial relationships. 
Parties indicated that they could see no other way of regulating their respective industries, but 
through the councils. 
 
Nevertheless, balancing the conflicting needs of the parties to councils still poses a huge 
challenge. It is ultimately a fight for power between two contesting parties. At the end of the day, 
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a Implications for councils 
To succeed, parties need the commitment, maturity and capacity to deal with issues at a 
strategic level. Council officials need to play a more facilitating role in the collective bargaining 
process, thus steering the process and keeping communication alive. It is evident that the 
transformation of relationships goes hand in hand with a firm decision to change, and often 
necessitates the facilitation of an outside change management expert. The MEIBC is an 
example of a council in which this approach is successfully followed. 
 
6.2.1.4 Trend 4: a decline in the coverage of collective agreements through extensions 
 
When including the public sector in South Africa, coverage increased from 1995 to 2005, but 
private sector coverage declined substantially. According to the literature review (ch 4), in 2005, 
bargaining councils covered just less than a third of employees who were potentially covered by 
collective bargaining (including the public sector), and 13% when coverage in the public sector 
was excluded. About 5% of such employees are nonparty employees (thus covered by 
extensions). Coverage declined substantially in both the manufacturing (7%) and construction 
(50%) sectors during the period, 1995 to 2005 (Bhorat et al 2009:27).  
 
a Implications for councils 
Except for the NBCCI, all other council agreements in this research have always been 
extended. Parties support the extension of agreements, since not extending agreements to non-
parties could lead to unfair competition. As indicated above, lower representivity figures and 
their consequent effect on the extension of agreements pose a serious problem, and need to be 
actively and strategically addressed. In addition, the MOL has adopted a much sterner approach 
to agreement extensions in the past few years.  
 
In cases where agreements are not extended, as in the NBCCI, employers sometimes threaten 
to leave the council if their demands or wage offers are not met, or if they feel that the trade 
union‘s demands are too extravagant. This becomes a ―bargaining chip‖ in the hands of 
employers. This council is in the process of preparing itself in all the areas required by the DOL 
necessary to have its agreement extended.  
 
6.2.1.5 Trend 5: where there is collective bargaining, the level at which it is conducted, is 
diminishing - if at national level there is an apparent shift to industry level and then to plant level 
 
In all five councils researched, the level of bargaining did not diminish in the preceding 15 years 
– if anything, the converse was true. With the exception of the NBCCI, all councils had been in 
existence since before 1995. Collective bargaining had thus remained centralised for a number 
of years – although the details of some of the agreements changed. In the chemical industry, 
collective bargaining became centralised with the formation of the council in 2001. Once the 
council‘s agreement is extended to non-parties, the industry will be even more centralised. The 
clothing industry is an example of bargaining becoming even more centralised, with the 
amalgamation of five regional councils into one national council – a move now highly supported 
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change. According to all interviewees, bargaining about substantive issues has also become 
more centralised.  
 
The building industry is one sector showing significant signs that centralised collective 
bargaining is on the decline. Two councils have collapsed, and a third is struggling. According to 
a BIBC (CGH) interviewee, from a national perspective, the building industry is thus moving 
away from centralised bargaining. However, in this council specifically, the same level of 
centralised collective bargaining remains.  
 
a Implications for councils 
As stated above, the councils in the research show signs of becoming more centralised. 
Nevertheless, the council secretariats and employers‘ organisations interviewees stated that 
they had difficulty finding solutions to apply to vastly different sectors and situations, but as yet 
had not come up with a solution to the problem. Trade unions prefer one set of agreements 
applicable to all sectors within an industry. In the research, the NBCCI emerged as the only 
example of a council that is structured to allow bargaining at more levels. The council‘s 
constitution stipulates the exact negotiating scope for national, sectoral/chamber and plant-level 
bargaining. MIBCO is the only council in the process of investigating different bargaining models 
to better deal with the needs of its industry‘s various subsectors needs, and intends appointing a 
CCMA representative to mediate the process. 
 
6.2.1.6 Trend 6: a decrease in the level of detail in collective agreements – agreements at the 
highest level increasingly reflecting minimum standards and policy frameworks or objectives, 
with more operational flexibility possible at implementation level 
 
This was not the case in most of the industries, in fact, the opposite was true. Only limited 
flexible work arrangements exist in industries. When they do exist, it is normally only in respect 
of plant-level work arrangements.  
 
One exception is the NBCCI. Its constitution reflects minimum standards and policy frameworks, 
thereby allowing more operational flexibility and detailed implementation at plant level. The 
BIBC (CGH) agreement is structured in such a way that everything stipulated in the agreement 
is fixed, while all aspects over and above those may be negotiated at plant level, although this is 
not encouraged. In the clothing sector, the last four years have seen a greater devolution of 
power to plant-level work arrangements without council or trade union involvement; there are a 
few flexible work arrangements (eg for shifts and working times) in the industry.  
 
a Implications for councils 
There is pressure within councils to provide some kind of flexibility through, say, variations in 
agreements. The clothing sector is currently in negotiations seeking a possible solution to its 
industry‘s challenges, perhaps differentiating more between metro and non-metro areas. 
MIBCO is researching alternatives. The current research showed that the majority of trade 
unions are against flexible arrangements because they maintain that exemption procedures 
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of plant-level bargaining (with the only exception of issues such as employment equity and skills 
development). However, employers would welcome more flexibility.  
 
There is a trend towards simplifying agreements. However, this normally goes no further than 
using simpler, more understandable English. All parties concurred that the agreement has to 
remain a legal document, which, by its very nature, is complex46. When referring to the content 
of the agreement, the MIBCO, MEIBC and NBCCMI secretariat interviewees indicated that they 
could not manage to simplify their respective agreements – mainly because of disagreements 
between parties about the details of job grading and categories.  
 
6.2.2 Influencing factors 
 
In chapters 1 and 2, various characteristics guided the choice of councils to research. 
Interviewees were probed to determine whether these factors also influence councils, and in 
what way. 
 
6.2.2.1 A council’s size  
 
All councils indicated that their size, especially whether they are regional or national councils, 
influences their performance. In the past 15 years, the clothing sector has amalgamated into a 
national council, while other councils have remained the same. 
 
It is generally believed that national councils with regional offices render a better service to the 
parties. The head office normally acts as a centralised shared services centre, whilst regional 
offices are responsible for monitoring compliance and levy payments. Often, the larger the 
council is, the more services it can deliver and the more streamlined it is, but it also has to deal 
with more expenses.  Regional offices sometimes work too independently, and should be well 
managed. Interviewees in the building industry disagreed, saying that regional councils are able 
to cater for services specific to that area. Also, a smaller council can adopt a more ―hands-on 
approach‖, and better facilitate dispute resolution because it is more service oriented.  
 
a Implications for councils 
The research confirmed the importance of effective leadership and solid management 
principles. It was repeatedly stressed that councils are also organisations that need to be well 
managed. Clear strategies, policies, procedures, role clarification and a proactive approach are 
necessary to manage big councils, especially those with regional offices. Both MIBCO and the 
MEIBC indicated that much time and effort go into proper management and effective 
                                                 
46 However, one should question whether legal documents are really that complex – or is it rather a case that 
everyone understands what the existing agreements mean, despite their complexity. Once one starts changing 
agreements, introducing new terms, and so forth, everything might become less clear than it was in the first place. 
People have different interpretations of what appear to be simple terms – thus opening up a whole new arena for 
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communication, and that they have adapted various strategies and procedures to better deal 
with the current challenges faced by sizeable operations such as theirs. 
 
6.2.2.2 The industry’s structure  
 
The structure of the industry – especially whether the sector consists mostly of small or big 
business – affects councils in varying ways and degrees. The number of small firms in 
industries has increased in the past 15 years, with a decline in larger business - the diversity 
making it increasingly difficult and far more complex for councils to deal with.  
 
a Implications for councils 
The majority of parties to the councils are SMMEs. Big businesses sometimes agree to benefits 
SMMEs cannot provide. Interviewees indicated that larger businesses bring stability and 
reliability to the council – especially from a financial perspective. Levies are paid and 
professional relationships exist. Big business seems to carry the burden of representing the 
SMMEs at council level.  
 
The fragmentation of big business was mentioned by the BIBC (CGH) secretariat as one of its 
main challenges – smaller businesses are more difficult to control. Small firms are often 
dominated by their larger counterparts, even when they belong to employers‘ organisations, and 
do not really influence the bargaining process, but are rather influenced by it. No special 
dispensations exist for SMME, although they are represented at all council forums. At the same 
time, councils face increasing pressure from SMMEs and government to develop policies to 
enhance small business development.  
 
Councils are working towards assisting small business. The BIBC (CGH), for instance, assists 
with payroll, taxation and other services. Dispute resolution by councils is a huge advantage for 
SMMEs. Nevertheless, research indicates that SMMEs still feel left out in the cold and 
dominated by their larger counterparts. 
 
Indications are that the mix of small and big business in one council poses a challenge. 
Councils find it difficult to formulate appropriate regulatory measures in industries ranging from 
micro one-man businesses, to huge corporate giants. Employers contend that a one-size-fits-all 
approach cannot cater for differences, whereas the unions support such an approach, arguing 
that exemption procedures deal adequately with all issues. 
 
6.2.2.3 The nature of the industry’s employment relationship  
 
Interviewees agreed that the changing world of work has become a reality in the past 15 years, 
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a Implications for councils 
A range of critical proposed amendments to the LRA were tabled by the MOL, including the 
proposed introduction of Ministerial power to prohibit labour broking in any particular sector of 
the economy. Employers do not agree, but believe that the proper enforcement of current 
legislation is the key to eliminating the various alleged employment abuses referred to in the 
Minister‘s report. Most industries deal with labour brokering by making employers responsible 
for complying with agreements, even when using the services of a labour broker – they are 
therefore already complying with suggested amendments to the LRA tabled in 2010. In addition, 
the MIBCO parties agreed in 2010 that by 2013 (the end of the current agreement), no more 
than 35% of the workforce would consist of labour brokering employees.  
 
Employers acknowledge the growth of the informal sector and are looking at ways to involve the 
sector more. Some initiatives are evident, although these are the exception – for instance, the 
RMI has initiated a programme to assist the transfer of the informal businesses to the formal 
sector, whilst the BIBC (CGH) encourages the inclusion of the informal sector in certain tenders. 
 
6.2.2.4 Nature and size of council parties 
 
The nature, size and number of unions and employers‘ organisations party to a council influence 
the bargaining process. The most significant change in this area during the research period was 
the merger of employers‘ organisations in the clothing industry into one national body (AMSA) in 
2009.  
 
a Implications for councils 
Interviewees concurred that having one employers‘ organisation and one trade union simplifies 
the bargaining process. However, when this is not the case councils deal with various trade 
unions and employers‘ organisations by allocating seats according to representivity figures. 
When issues affect more than one party, a combined caucus represents the respective parties, 
and a unified position is presented to the council forum. In the NBCCI, nine employers‘ 
organisations have appointed one coordinator for their caucus. Some trade unions find it difficult 
to work together, although unions come to negotiations as a united group. Trade unions are 
more diverse and serve different federations with different ideologies, a function the employers‘ 
representatives do not have.  
 
Councils are sometimes dominated by big players – powerful employers‘ organisations and 
numerically strong trade unions. Historical factors also play a role – and smaller parties may 
remain members of a bargaining council by virtue of the fact that it were a founding member of 
the bargaining council and that it succeeds (even if only barely) in maintaining the required 
membership number.  
 
6.2.2.5 A council’s age 
 
Both younger and older councils experience advantages and disadvantages linked to their 
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a Implications for councils 
Younger councils cannot offer all services because it takes time to put the necessary structures 
in place to render these services. Teething problems arise. However, younger councils have a 
more flexible approach, making it easier to implement new ideas.  The converse is also true – 
an older council may become extremely set in its ways, which is not always beneficial for the 
parties. However, definite changes are evident in this regard. Councils advocate newer 
proactive business approaches and communication initiatives, change management 
programmes and strong leadership.  
 
6.2.2.6 Financial circumstances  
 
All the councils have a relatively stable financial outlook, and regard this as imperative for their 
healthy functioning. Large businesses contribute greatly to financial stability in councils. 
 
a Implications for councils 
Most interviewees indicated that difficult economic times influence them negatively –  
enforcement becomes more challenging as levies fall behind and enforcement approaches have 
changed (as discussed above). Councils implemented strategies in the preceding 15 years to 
ensure a stable financial outlook. This occurs mainly through the management of levies. For 
instance, levies are reviewed annually to keep abreast of inflation, and in some instances, they 
are increased annually at the same rate as wage increases.  
 




As stated above, representivity figures are a huge concern for councils. Both trade unions and 
employers‘ organisations have seen a decline in membership in the 15 years under 
investigation. The DOL has become stricter about this issue, and not being representative 
poses a real threat to the extension of a council‘s agreement to non-parties. This can ultimately 
lead to the demise of a council.  
 
a Implications for councils 
Unions need to be more active in recruiting members in order to combat their decline in 
membership numbers, and should ensure strong leadership with adequate skills in order to stay 
relevant to their members‘ needs. Employers have increasingly used atypical forms of work (eg 
labour brokering), and now need to look at innovative ways to deal with the sterner approach 
adopted by the DOL.  Interviewees cautioned that the Minister should take into consideration 
new employment structures and the related impact on representivity figures. It is argued that the 
Minister should rather focus on whether the relevant parties have the interests of the industry at 
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6.2.3.2 The main agreement 
 
In addition to what has been discussed above, the following factors and changes in the past 15 
years merit brief mention.  
 
The need for flexibility is mainly dealt with through the process of exemptions, although some 
subsectoral (business chambers) and area (eg non-metro/metro) arrangements exist. Blanket 
exemptions are extremely rare, with only one exception for micro-firms in the clothing industry. 
The BIBC (CGH) made provision for new entry-level employees eight years ago, whilst the   
MEIBC has flexibility arrangements for firms that are three years and younger. 
 
With the exception of the NBCCMI, as a rule, multiyear agreements are now reached. Parties to 
councils are constantly working towards streamlining these agreements. Minimum wages with 
guaranteed monetary increases are usually negotiated, although different wage models exist. In 
some rare instances, negotiations on actual wages take place. 
 
Exemptions are dealt with through specific procedures and criteria.  
 
There is no two-tier bargaining, except for the arrangements of the NBCCI.  
 
Non-compliance remains a huge challenge, in some sectors more so than in others. Although 
enforcement still takes place, councils attempt to tackle this through innovative strategies, such 
as supporting decent work agendas – the BIBC (CGH) is a case in point with its media drive of 
complying with the council‘s main agreement ―because it is the right thing to do‖. 
 
a Implications for councils 
The research has shown that councils are continuously looking at new ways to address 
challenges they face and various changes are evident (see ch 5).  When confronted with 
unplanned circumstances (eg in the building and steel and engineering industries, when their 
multiyear agreement did not include inflationary precautions), parties addressed these through 
goodwill and negotiations.  
 
6.2.3.3 Benefit funds 
 
Four of the councils in this research have a satisfactory selection of benefits funds. In the last 15 
years, not much has changed in these funds – mostly because they have existed successfully 
for many years. Both parties indicated that they regarded the funds administered by councils as 
important and beneficial to their members. 
 
a Implications for councils 
Councils are also awaiting changes in South African legislation regarding an increased social 
net, and any suggested changes have been placed on hold until further indications of what can 
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6.2.2.4 Dispute resolution 
 
Dispute resolution is widely regarded by all interviewees as hugely successful. With the 
exception of some minor administrative problems, it works well and disputes are resolved within 
specified time limits. In the 15 years covered in this research, the accreditation of councils for 
conciliations and arbitrations was probably the one functional change most beneficial to these 
institutions. The cost of the function was the only bone of contention mentioned in the research.  
 
a Implications for councils 
Proposed amendments to the LRA tabled in December 2010 clarify that a council‘s agreement 
may include a dispute resolution levy, and that councils may charge a fee for dispute resolution 
services (under the same guidelines as those of the CCMA). It is hoped that this, if so 
promulgated, will ease the financial burden councils experience, although the small business 
sector will not welcome an additional levy. 
 
6.2.4 Reasons for Council’s Adaptability 
 
One question remains – why have these councils been able to adapt and survive relatively well 
in the face of so many challenges? There is no simple answer to this question. The research 
points to two main strengths in the current council system. Firstly, it indicates one positive 
change in all five of the councils in the last 15 years, namely the fact that the relationships 
between the parties have matured substantially (even though the approach that was followed to 
reach this point differed). The reason given throughout for this significant change was that the 
councils‘ challenges were so massive, industrial action so severe and negotiations so lengthy 
and costly, that both parties realised something had to change – it was obvious that the 
relationship between the parties had to change. This aspect may have contributed significantly 
to the positive demeanour of parties to their councils. Secondly, the research findings also 
suggest the possibility that the relative strength and success of the council system is to be found 
in the limited legislative (but voluntarist) framework governing bargaining councils, because this 
allows councils to address their diverse needs as they see fit. This possibility came to the fore 
because the councils have all approached their various challenges individually, despite 
similarities, differences and overlapping. Councils thus sought ways to solve their challenges as 
best they could; what worked for one council, did not necessarily work for another, and they all 
had to address challenges in their own unique way. In other words, the main strength of the 
system is probably the ability of different councils to adapt differently to different dynamics and 
pressures in different sectors. One may thus conclude that the improved relationship between 
parties has allowed councils to do different things to help them remain stable – and the limited 
framework has accommodated these different approaches.  
 
6.3 IN CLOSING 
 
It has been argued that the reason why bargaining councils have survived for so long is 
because they serve the interests of large corporations, powerful trade unions and the state – the 
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afford to pay and then have the agreement extended to the whole industry in order to eliminate 
wage cost competition from small and other firms. The powerful unions are content with the 
relatively high wages they have negotiated and councils provide all the machinery to extend and 
enforce the agreement. The fact that the agreement could result in reduced employment does 
not concern the unions because their members are generally well protected. The state is 
complicit in all of this because it helps to reduce industrial conflict. At the end of the day, the 
whole process remains a power play between dominant parties. 
 
Most of these arguments are valid – the research clearly indicated that the big firms are in fact 
the stabilising factor in councils. The needs of small firms are mostly addressed only 
superficially. Powerful unions are the driving force, and remain committed to the quest of 
councils. The DOL functions in the background. It is possibly against this backdrop that the 
generally positive comments of the role players in this research should be read. After all, it was 
the largest employers‘ organisation and powerful trade union in each council that was 
interviewed.  
 
Nonetheless, one cannot deny that councils play a massive role in the South African economy. 
Clearly, if nothing else, they are hardy, robust institutions, capable of surviving fundamental 
legislative and political changes. More importantly, the tremendous positive trends of the past 
15 years in the system should not be underplayed – in clothing, steel and engineering and in the 
motor industries, the role players have succeeded in changing extremely adversarial bargaining 
and relationships into positive, respected and cooperative bargaining relationships. Contrary to 
other examples in the construction industry, the BIBC (CGH) has been innovative in its 
approach to contributing to the success of its sector and area. The NBCCI has succeeded in 
selecting a model that works for its industry. Overall, the beginnings of striving towards a decent 
work culture are indeed visible. 
 
However, a number of vital conditions for the continuous survival and success of councils linger 
(see Godfrey et al 2006a & 2007) – such as becoming more responsive and adapting to the 
changing needs of South African society, the industries and the employers/employees they 
serve. Councils should strive to be more democratic, participatory, accountable and transparent. 
Greater flexibility towards the small business sector is necessary. Compliance issues have to be 
solved and addressed innovatively by educating businesses and improving communication. 
More adequate financial support for the council‘s dispute resolution function is imperative. 
Councils need to improve their representivity, and the trade unions in particular, need to act on 
the criticisms directed at them. Councils should explore the types of benefits they can offer 
organisations and how to be more active in terms of the services they provide. Further 
challenges brought about by the worldwide trend of an increase in atypical employment should 
be proactively approached. In all of these issues, the council secretariat should play a more 
facilitating role, driving the process. A major challenge also lies in balancing the need for greater 
economic efficiency with the needs of workers for decent work and social protection. The DOL 
should fulfil a more hands-on role towards councils, by, say, developing support programmes, 
disseminating best practices and coordinating resources and systems. As Anstey (2004:1863) 
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Where multi-employer collective bargaining ... was centred as a concept of market control 
based in ―levelling‖ labour costs across industries, its ... [new] test will be the extent to 
which it can become a market sensitive mechanism for wage setting in industries 
reflecting increasingly diverse conditions as a consequence of variable levels of enterprise 
integration into the global economy.  
 
At the start of this study it was mentioned that the challenges facing these councils necessitate 
―a process of interest accommodation which includes all sorts of bipartite or tripartite 
discussions ... and aim[ed] at ascertaining a view of the other party, obtaining a concession, or 
reaching a compromise‖ (Cordova 1985:307). Furthermore, it seems clear that the bargaining 
process should rest on the assumption that ―... neither party is completely wrong, that 
concessions by either party do not necessarily signify weakness in that party, and that, while the 
individual goals of the parties may be important ... it should not occur at the cost of disrupting 
the organisation as a whole‖ (Bendix in Steenkamp et al 2004:945). A pluralist approach was 
thus advocated.  
 
However, the research indicates a trend towards a developing social corporatism at the meso-
level. This should be critically examined – is the greater cooperation between parties really a 
result of weakening (previously militant) trade unions? Or is it – as indicated – an approach born 
of the need to counteract extremely adversarial bargaining and crippling industrial action and 
thus sustainable because both parties see no other way forward? Does it thus indicate a 
maturity of the relationship between the parties? After all, councils are made up of contesting 
parties, and whatever they agree upon will almost always be based on some form of 
compromise. The answer to this will probably only emerge in years to come, but it seems clear 
that it is only with an approach in which both parties (with their respective needs) are seen as 
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Name of Trade Union / Employers‘ organisation:   
Sector:        
Geographical Area:       
Bargaining Council affiliated to:     
Name of interviewee/person supplying information:   
Position in organisation:      
Time period in the organisation:  
Date of interview:       
 
 
1  GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1.1  What were the most important changes in your bargaining council over the past 15 year 
(1995-2010) and to what can you ascribe these? Were there any developments over this 
period that posed either as threats or opportunities to your trade union/employers’ 
organisation and its participation in the bargaining council? 
 
1.2 How has your trade union/employers‘ organisation adapted to the changing environment 
over the last 15 years? 
 
1.3  Has bargaining become more decentralised (i.e. shifting from national to regional level, 
and from regional to plant-level) / stayed the same  / more centralised over the past 15 
years? Please elaborate?  
 
1.4 Has the size of your bargaining council (e.g. regional versus national councils; and 
number of employers/employees covered) influenced its effectiveness in answering the 
needs of your members, and if so, in what way? 
 
1.5 Has the structure of the industrial sector you operate in (e.g. serving overwhelmingly 
small organisations, or whether the sector is dominated by a few large organisations) 
influenced the effectiveness of your organisation - and therefore also the council‘s 
effectiveness - in answering to the needs of your members, and if so, in what way? 
 
1.6  Has the nature of the employment relationship in the industrial sector you operate in 
(e.g. whether the sector still has fairly standardised employment, or whether the sector 
uses labour brokers, is highly casualised, etc) influenced the effectiveness of your 
organisation - and therefore also the council‘s effectiveness - in answering to the needs 
of your members, and if so, in what way?         
 
 
1.7  Has the nature and size of the representative parties on the council (e.g. small versus 
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organisation – and therefore also the council‘s effectiveness - in answering to the needs 
of your members, and if so, in what way? 
 
1.8  Has the age of the council (e.g. whether it is fairly new, or has been in existence for 
many years) influenced the council‘s effectiveness in answering to the needs of their 
members, and if so, in what way? 
 
 
2 FOUR KEY AREAS 
 
2.1 Key Area 1: Collective bargaining, focusing on the main collective agreement of the council 
 
2.1.1  Collective agreements 
a) Are there any changes over the last 15 years in the structuring etcetera of agreements 
reached (e.g. do agreements tend to be more modest and enforceable? More of a 
framework from which to work from?). Please elaborate. 
 
b) What flexibility arrangements (if any) have been catered for in the main agreement? 
Have the number of, and kind of arrangements changed over the past 15 years? 
 
Aspects Yes/No Explain 
Based on regional differences   






Size/age of firms   
Other   
 
c) Is the time period of the current main agreement (e.g. one year.) optimal or would you 
prefer a shorter or longer period? Specify. 
 
Did the time period for the main agreement change over the past 15 years, and if so 
why? 
 
d) How has your bargaining council, as well as your own organisation responded to the 
concept of ―regulated flexibility‖ (eg basic conditions and entry-level pay-structures, but 
with a flexible cost of employment package) over the past 15 years? 
 
2.1.2  Extension of agreements to non-parties 
a)  Has the council ever experienced problems getting the main agreement extended? If so, 
what were the reasons? In particular, has representivity of one or both parties been a 
problem in the past or currently (or are you concerned about this in future)? 
 
b)     Has the DOL become more or less strict on representivity figures being adequate before 
extending agreements since 1995, or has the department‘s approach remained the 
same? Why? 
 
c) Are small businesses exempted from some aspects of the agreement when it is extended 
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d) Has the extension of agreements over the past 15 years brought stability to the industrial 
relations environment in your sector? Please elaborate? 
 
2.1.3  Exemptions 
 
a) Do the criteria set for exemptions in your council contribute to making the exemption 
procedure effective, or not? Please explain why / why not. Have this changed over the 




   
b) Does the composition of the exemption committee in your council contribute to making the 
exemption procedure effective, or not? Please explain why / why not. Have this changed 





c) Does the composition of the appeals committee in your council contribute to making the 
exemption procedure effective, or not? Please explain why/why not. Have this changed 





d) Has the approach towards blanket exemptions in your council changed over the past 15 
years (e.g. has there been an increase or decrease in the usage of blanket exemptions, or 
has the approach remain the same)? Why/why not? 
 
e) How regularly do the committees meet?  
 
2.1.4 Non-compliance and enforcement of agreements 
 
a) Is the level of non-compliance with your main agreement problematic? Has this changed 
over the last 15 years? 
 
b) Has the approach towards dealing with non-compliance changed over the past 15 years 
and if so, how? 
 
2.1.5 Two-tier bargaining 
 




Why / why not? 
 
Has this phenomenon changed (increased/decreased/stayed the same) over the last 15 
years, and if so, how and why? 
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b) Are wages negotiated by the bargaining council based on:   
 




2.2   Key area 2: Representivity of bargaining councils. 
 
2.2.1 Determination of registration 
a) Please provide the following membership figures for your trade union / employers‘ 
organisation:  
 






b) Have trade union/employers‘ organisations‘ membership and power on your bargaining 
council  
 
Declined Stayed the same Increased 
  
 ...... over the past 15 years? 
 
 Please elaborate why it has declined, stayed the same, or increased? 
 
2.2.2 Small firm representation 
 
a) Are the needs of small businesses being adequately addressed through your council? 




b) Has the representation of small businesses become more or less effective over the past 
15 years, or did it stay the same? Please explain. 
 
2.2.3 The new world of work  
 
a) Have the changes in the world of work (eg growth in informal sector, casualisation of 
work) affected your trade union / employers‘ organisation over the last 15 years, and if 
so in what way? 
 
Yes No   
Please elaborate 
 




c) What has your organisation done over the last 15 years to maintain or improve 
representivity levels?  
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2.3.1 Bargaining Council Funds  
 
a) Indicate the funds your members have access to in your council; provide detail on how 
these funds have changed over the past 15 years; as well as whether it has been 
extended to non-parties. 
 
Type of Fund Yes/ 
No 
Details on how these funds have 
changed over the past 15 years 
Extended to non-
parties? 
Pension Funds    
Provident Fund    
Medical and Sick Benefit 
Fund 
   
Sick Pay Fund    
Disability cover    
Survivor benefits    
Leave pay    
Holiday Pay    
Unemploy-ment Benefits    
Other Funds    
 
b) Is there a special agreement regarding these funds, or does it form part of the main 
agreement and renegotiated regularly? 
 
c) What forms of flexibility regarding benefit funds (if any) are built into the agreement to 
deal with, for instance, small businesses, the informal sector etc? 
 
2.4  Key Area 4: Dispute resolution 
a) How effective has your council‘s dispute resolution function been over the past 15 
years? Has there been any change in the way this function has been conducted? Please 
elaborate. 
 
b) Does your council experience logistical problems in conducting hearings? 
 
c) Is DR contracted out? In-house? 
 
3  GENERAL 
3.1 In your view, what have contributed to the success or failure of your bargaining council 
over the past 15 years? Do you foresee that these aspects will remain the same in the 
years to come, or that changes may be necessary? 
 
3.2 Have changes to legislation in the past 15 years provided more support to the effective 
functioning of bargaining councils? Could legislation be changed to provide more 
support? Please elaborate. 
 
3.3 To what extent has the BC system helped your trade union/employers‘ association to 
attain its goals over the past 15 years? 
 
3.4 Has the bargaining council system addressed basic policy objectives, such as labour 
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social and economic goals of society? (Eg in reducing unemployment, providing 
adequate labour standards, EE opportunities and so on).  
 
3.5 Should the BC be retained as present, adapted, or wound up? If retained or adapted, 





















APPENDIX  B 








Geographical Area:  
 
Name of interviewee/person supplying information:  
 
Position in organisation:  
 
Time period in the organisation:  
 
Date of interview:  
 
Age of council:  
 
 
1  GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1.1 What aspects particular to the industry in which you operate in have posed either as 
threats or opportunities to your bargaining council over the past 15 years? Are these the 
same currently, or what new threats and opportunities exist? 
 
1.2  Has bargaining become more decentralised (i.e. shifting from national to regional level, 
and from regional to plant-level) / stayed the same  / more centralised over the past 15 
years? Please elaborate?  
 
1.3 What were the most important changes in your bargaining council over the past 15 years 
(1995-2010) and to what can you ascribe these (e.g. major restructuring of your council 
such as amalgamations from regional councils to national councils)? 
 
1.4 Has the size of your bargaining council (e.g. regional versus national councils; and 
number of employers/employees covered) influenced its effectiveness in answering the 
needs of your members, and if so, in what way? 
 
1.5 Has the structure of the industrial sector you operate in (e.g. serving overwhelmingly 
small organisations, or whether the sector is dominated by a few large organisations) 
influenced the effectiveness of your bargaining council in answering to the needs of your 
members, and if so, in what way? 
 
1.6  Has the nature of the employment relationship in the industrial sector you operate in 
(e.g. whether the sector still has fairly standardised employment, or whether the sector 
uses labour brokers, is highly casualised, etc) influenced the effectiveness of your 
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1.7  Has the nature and size of the representative parties on the council (e.g. small versus 
big powerful unions/employers‘ organisations) influenced the effectiveness of your 
council in answering to the needs of your members, and if so, in what way? 
 
1.8  Has the age of the council (e.g. whether it is fairly new, or has been in existence for 
many years) influenced the council‘s effectiveness in answering to the needs of 
members, and if so, in what way? 
 
1.9 Has the financial circumstances of the council influenced the council‘s effectiveness in 
answering to the needs of members, and if so, in what way? 
 
 
2 FOUR KEY AREAS 
 
2.1 Key Area 1: Collective bargaining, focusing on the main collective agreement of the council 
 
2.1.1  Collective agreements 
a) Are there any changes over the last 15 years in the structuring etcetera of agreements 
reached (e.g. do agreements tend to be more modest and enforceable? More of a 
framework from which to work from?). Please elaborate. 
 
b) What flexibility arrangements (if any) have been catered for in the main agreement? Have 
the number of, and kind of arrangements changed over the past 15 years? 
 
Aspects Yes/No Explain 
Based on regional differences   




Size/age of firms   
Other   
 
c) What is the time period for the current main agreement (e.g. one year, two years, etc)? Do 
you think this is optimal or would you prefer a shorter or longer period? Specify. 
 
Did the time period for the main agreement change over the past 15 years, and if so why? 
 
d) What is your council‘s response to the concept of ―regulated flexibility‖ (e.g. is your 
agreement increasingly or decreasingly reflecting minimum standards and policy 
frameworks, thereby allowing more or less operational flexibility and detailed 
implementation at plant level?) Has this changed over the last 15 years? 
 
2.1.2  Extension of agreements to non-parties 
a)  Over the last 15 years has the council‘s main agreement been extended to non-parties? 
 
Yes No 
   
b)  Is the council‘s current main agreement extended to non-parties? 
 
Yes No 
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c)  How has the coverage of collective agreements through extensions changed over the 
past 15 years? Please elaborate on what the reasons for this may be?  
 
d) Has the council ever experienced problems getting the main agreement extended? If so, 
what were the reasons? In particular, has representivity of one or both parties been a 
problem in the past or currently (or are you concerned about this in future)? 
 
e)  Has the DOL become more or less strict on representivity figures being adequate before 
extending agreements since 1995, or has the department‘s approach remained the 
same? 
 
f) Are small businesses exempted from some aspects of the agreement when it is 
extended to them? Did the approach towards small businesses change over the past 15 
years? Explain? 
 
g) Has the extension of agreements over the past 15 years brought stability to the industrial 
relations environment in your sector? Please elaborate? 
 
2.1.3  Exemptions 








Exemption Committee     
Exemption Appeals 
Committee 
    
 
b) Has any of the above details changed over the past 15 years, and if so, why? 
 
c) Does the composition of the exemption committee in your council contribute to making 




d) Does the composition of the appeals committee in your council contribute to making the 




e) What are the criteria for exemptions? 
 
f) Do the criteria set for exemptions in your council contribute to making the exemption 
procedure effective, or not? Please explain why / why not. 
 
Yes No 
   




If so, please provide criteria: 
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h) Has the approach towards blanket exemptions in your council changed over 
the past 15 years (e.g. has there been an increase or decrease in the usage of 
blanket exemptions, or has the approach remain the same)? Why/why not? 
 




If yes, what generally are the time periods?  
 





k) Are exemptions (partial and full exemptions) granted subject to conditions (other than a 




If yes, what types of conditions are usually attached to exemptions?  
 
l) Has the simplicity of the application procedure in your council contributed to making the 




Have this changed over the past 15 years, and if so how? 
 
2.1.4  Non-compliance and enforcement of agreements 
a) Is the level of non-compliance with your main agreement problematic? Has this changed 
over the last 15 years? 
 
b) Is the number of agents in your council responsible for enforcement of agreements in 




c) Has the approach towards dealing with non-compliance changed over the past 15 
years? 
 




Why / why not? 
If yes, since when has this approach been adopted? 
 
2.1.5  Two-tier bargaining 















MME Holtzhausen Page 147 
 
Has this phenomenon changed (increased/decreased/stayed the same) over the last 15 
years, and if so, how and why? 
 
b) If two-tier bargaining takes place within the council‘s jurisdiction, how well co-ordinated is 
it? 
 
c) Should wages negotiated by the bargaining council be based on:   
 




2.1.6 Bargaining chambers  
(Applicable only when there are chambers in the council) 
 
a) Does each chamber have its own bargaining cycle? 
 
b) Is there a central, overarching chamber? If yes, what are its functions? 
 
c)  Do Chambers have formal or informal veto rights over other Chambers? 
 
2.2  Key area 2: Reprensitivity of bargaining councils. 
 
2.2.1 Determination of registration 
 
a) Have trade union/employers‘ organisations‘ membership and power on bargaining 
councils _______________ over the past 15 years:  
 
Declined Stayed the same Increased 
  
 Please elaborate why it has declined, stayed the same, or increased? 
 
2.2.2. Small firm representation 
a) Are the needs of small businesses being adequately addressed through your council? 
Please elaborate on what is happening.   
Yes No 
 
b) Has the representation of small businesses become more or less effective over the past 
15 years, or did it stay the same? Please explain. 
 
c) Does small business representation pose a threat to the effectiveness of the council? 
Explain. 
 
2.2.3 The new world of work  
a) Has there been a steady move within the jurisdiction of your bargaining council towards 
or away from outsourcing, individual contracts, and informal employment or has it stayed 
more or less the same over the past 15 years? Please elaborate. 
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2.3 Key Area 3: Benefit funds as administered (or not) by councils 
 
2.3.1 Bargaining Council Funds  
d) Please provide detail on how funds your council administers have changed over the past 
15 years 
e)  
Type of Fund Details on how these funds have changed over the past 
15 years 
Pension Funds  
Provident Fund  
Medical and Sick Benefit Fund  
Sick Pay Fund  
Disability cover  
Survivor benefits  
Leave pay  
Holiday Pay  
Unemployment Benefits  
Other Funds  
 
a) Is there a special agreement regarding these funds, or does it form part of the main 
agreement and renegotiated regularly? 
 
b) What forms of flexibility regarding benefit funds (if any) are built into the agreement to 
deal with, for instance, small businesses, the informal sector etc? 
 
2.4  Key Area 4: Dispute resolution 
 
a) How effective has the council‘s dispute resolution function been over the past 15 years? 
Has there been any change in the way this function has been conducted? Please 
elaborate. 
 
b) Does the council experience logistical problems in conducting hearings? 
 
3  GENERAL 
 
3.1 In your view, what has contributed to the success or failure of your bargaining council 
over the past 15 years? Do you foresee that these aspects will remain the same in the 
years to come, or that changes may be necessary? 
 
3.2 Have changes to legislation in the past 15 years provided more support to the effective 
functioning of bargaining councils? Could legislation be changed to provide more 
support? Please elaborate. 
 
3.3 To what extent has the BC system served the functions, or helped to attain the goals 
each of the actors expected from it over the past 15 years? 
 
3.4 Has the bargaining council system addressed basic policy objectives and/or social and 
economic goals of society over the past 15 years? (Eg in reducing unemployment, 
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3.5 Should bargaining councils be retained in its present form? Or rather be wound up? If 
retained, what role should they play? 
 
3.6 Any other comments? 
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SACTWU  13 July 2010 (written response) General Secretary 




BWU  22 June 2010 Executive Director 
BIBC (CGH) 
MBA (WC)  
18 August 2010 Vice-chair   
Past-President 
BIBC (CGH)  18 August 2010 General Secretary 
BIBC (CGH)  18 August 2010 Adjunct General Secretary 






NBCCI  16 July 2010 General secretary 
NBCCI  22 July 2010 Employers’ consultant 




MIBCO  9 July 2010 General Secretary 
NUMSA (also on behalf of 
the metal & engineering 
sector) 
16 November 2010 National Motor Sector 
Coordinator 
RMI  24 November 2010 Executive Director 
 
METAL AND ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
 
MEIBC  16 August 2010 General Secretary 
SEIFSA  26 November 2010 Executive Director 
*In no particular order 
 
 
 
